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This Article discusses some of the inadequacies in the current ethical regulation of
the legal system and proposes a new approach to crafting and contextualizing
rules of legal ethics. The proliferation of specialties and subspecialties in law prac-
tice, together with the inadequacies of prevailing ethics regulation and the vagaries
of ethics rules formulations from state to state have not served either the public or
the legal profession well. Manipulation, motivated by politics and self-interest, of
the ideology of the organized bar to adhere to ethical rules predicated on an anti-
quated and unrealistic model of a unified legal profession has likewise been
counterproductive. Emblematic of the problem is the "one size fits all" nature of the
Rules of Professional Conduct and their ill-suitedness to business law, as opposed
to litigation, practice, all of which leads to an atmosphere of indeterminacy in the
ethical standards applicable to business lawyers. Part I of this article briefly traces
the source and nature of the problems facing ethical regulation of the legal profes-
sion, briefly highlighting the practical shortcomings of some antidotes proposed by
other scholars. Part II examines the various ethical scandals that have plagued the
legal profession over the last 35 years. These scandals began with the National
Student Marketing case and include the recent string of corporate scandals which
brought to light the unethical behavior of corporate insiders, including lawyers
and advisors, which ultimately resulted in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002. Part III of this Article endeavors to synthesize some insights from public
choice theory into the structural shortcomings of the existing attorney regulatory
system. From those insights, one would expect state courts and state bar regulatory
agencies to be (and, indeed, they have been) co-opted by the elite bar and not ade-
quately regulating those lawyers in corporate and federal regulatory practice-
including especially those practice areas that affect public investors, public mar-
kets, and the economy as a whole. Part IV offers a critique of the current approach
to attorney regulation, which has featured piecemeal attempts to federalize legal
ethics. Part IV proceeds to illustrate the types of approaches to legal ethics which
should be avoided. Finally, Part V concludes with a proposal for a partial federal
regulation of legal ethics. The model of partial federal regulation offered is by no
means the only, or necessarily the optimal, solution, but hopefully it will spark ad-
ditional discourse that might lead to a workable system for providing business
lawyers with the solid, thoughtful, and objective ethical guidance they need. Con-
sistent with this proposal, Part V identifies and highlights a few areas of ethical
concern specfically in need of regulatory attention.
INTRODUCTION
A doctor, a clergyman, and a lawyer are sitting in a slowly sinking
rowboat in shark-infested waters within sight of a nearby island. The
doctor and the clergyman attempt to swim ashore to get help but, to
the horror of onlookers on the beach, are devoured by the sharks.
The lawyer is not devoured but is actually assisted speedily to shore
by two of the sleek man-eaters. When asked why it was that he was
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not devoured like his two companions, the lawyer replies: "Profes-
sional courtesy." This joke has long maintained its popular place'
on the hit parade of that subspecies of American humor-lawyer
jokes-because it adds a certain piquancy to the popular percep-
tion of lawyers as predators on society, though it addresses none of
the substance behind that perception.
Contrast another more recent-very slightly off color-joke.
The madam of a house of ill repute welcomes an extremely well-
dressed man, who asks for Natalie. The madam assures him that
Natalie is one of her most exclusive and expensive ladies and tries
to interest him in someone else, but he insists on Natalie. No one
else will do. When Natalie makes her appearance, she tells the well-
dressed man that her fee is $1,000 in cash. The man agrees without
hesitation, promptly hands over that amount in cash, and accom-
panies Natalie upstairs. The following evening, the well-dressed
man returns and once again asks for Natalie. Natalie, surprised,
warns the man that she does not offer volume discounts and will
1. Professor Marc Galanter has delivered a wonderfully entertaining lecture laced
with arcane scholarship on the subject of lawyer jokes, and he provides a variant to this one
that dates it back to the 1940's:
A minister, a scientist, and a lawyer were adrift on a life raft in the tropics. At last they
sighted land. But the wind died down while they were still a short way off the beach.
The lawyer, the only one who could swim, volunteered to go ashore with a line and
pull the raft to land. The minister knelt and prayed for his safety. Then the lawyer
dived in. His companions saw the black fin of a shark making straight for him. The
shark disappeared, then came up on the other side, having passed under the swim-
mer. Shortly they saw an even bigger shark darting toward him, but this one also
swerved just in time. After the lawyer had reached shallow water, the minister said to
the scientist, "There, you Doubting Thomas, there is proof of the power of prayer."
"Power of prayer, hell!" retorted the scientist. "That was just professional courtesy."
Marc Galanter, Changing Legal Consciousness in America: The View from the Joke Corpus, 23 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 2223, 2229 n.23 (2002) (citing FUN FARE: A TREASURY OF Reader's Digest WIT
AND HUMOR 200 (Reader's Dig. Ass'n ed., 1949)).
2. Sharks are, of course, the quintessential predators. Galanter notes the derivation of
the linkage between lawyers and "sharks": "By the early Eighteenth Century, the term refers
to a pickpocket or a rapacious swindler; by the early 19th century, it is sea-farer's slang for a
lawyer." Galanter, supra note 1, at 2228 n.20 (citing 15 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 181
(2d ed. 1989)); see also ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF SLANG AND UNCONVENTIONAL
ENGLISH 751 (London, Routledge & Paul eds., 5th ed. 1961); HAROLD WENTWORTH & STU-
ART BERG FLEXNER, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG 463 (Crowell ed., 2d ed. 1975).
Sharks, in turn, were subjected to the ignominy of being termed "sea lawyers." Galanter,
supra note 1, at 2228-29 n.21 (citing HENRY HUPFELD, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF WIT AND WIS-
DOM: A COLLECTION OF OVER NINE THOUSAND ANECDOTES ... COMPILED DURING A PERIOD
OF FIFTEEN YEARS, WITH A SPECIAL REGARD TO MERIT AND PROPRIETY 106 (David McKay
ed., 1871)).
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still demand her usual fee, which the man once again tenders be-
fore accompanying her upstairs. On the third night, the entire
place is abuzz when the same well-dressed man shows up yet again
to ask for Natalie, tenders the $1,000 fee, and upstairs they go.
Later, Natalie privately expresses to him her astonishment: No one
has ever before asked for (or been able to afford) her services two
nights in a row, much less three. "Where are you from?" she asks.
"Cincinnati," he replies. "Really? I'm from Cincinnati too!" says
Natalie. "I know," the man says. "I'm a lawyer. Your father just died,
and your sister engaged me to be the executor of his estate. She
asked me to deliver your inheritance of $3,000."
This joke, unlike the first, provides context for the lawyer's pre-
dation. It is not merely the appearance of impropriety engendered
by the setting but also the shameless self-dealing by this unscrupu-
lous lawyer. Some might object to this characterization and point
out that the lawyer's behavior, despite having given him an interest
in the transaction, does not actually impair his ability to perform
the legal services for which he has been engaged. Nor does it im-
pair his ability (if required) to render impartial advice and counsel
to the client. If the latter approach seems not entirely unreason-
able, it is because such an apologia exemplifies the kinds of
arguments that have from time to time been advanced by the or-
ganized bar to defend allegations of professional misconduct.
Indeed, it is this tendency toward minimization, palliation-at
times, even justification-of profoundly unethical behavior on the
grounds that it does not clearly violate existing rules of profes-
sional conduct that has produced the current climate of ethical
indeterminacy and unaccountability and has given us Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, and a host of other depredations arising from
outright abdication of professional standards.
That indeterminacy and lack of accountability arise in large part
from the dominant, essentially adversarial, paradigm of legal ethics
that informs the bar-drafted rules of professional conduct. Accu-
rately (though somewhat disparagingly) characterized as the "hired
gun" model4 of legal ethics, this approach favors unwavering com-
mitment to clients, even if that commitment produces immoral or
unjust results. Under that model, often referred to in the litera-
3. See infta notes 245-300 and accompanying text.
4. Rob Atkinson, Lawyering in Law's Republic, 85 VA. L. REv. 1505, 1507 n.7 (1999)
(book review). Professors Rhode and Luban use the term "neutral partisanship model." See
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL EThics 87-89 (3d ed. 2001).
5. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundation of the Lawyer-Client Rela-
tion, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyers Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense,
1020 [VOL. 37:4
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ture as the "dominant view," "a lawyer must-or at least may-
pursue any goal of the client through any arguably legal course of
action and assert any non-frivolous legal claim., 6 Axiomatic to this
view is that our legal system works best in conjunction with an ad-
versarial search for the truth, with each side represented by a
lawyer relatively unfettered when it comes to advocating the cli-
ent's interests.
Admittedly, the prevailing ethics rules enjoin lawyers not to aid
their clients in unlawful conduct.7 Seldom, however, are matters so
clear cut, and practicing lawyers, particularly lawyers representing
clients in sophisticated business transactions, learn to become ex-
perts at detecting and exploiting varying shades of gray. Conduct is
not "unlawful" merely because it is on the cutting edge." Lawyers,
however, are also comfortable-perhaps too comfortable-with the
proposition that conduct is not unlawful unless there is precedent
squarely on point that declares it so; to the extent there are distin-
guishing facts, the lawyer will often (and often self-righteously)
assert the client's entitlement to representation coupled with the
fact that the lawyer is not "knowingly" assisting any illegality. It is a
technique not dissimilar to that often employed by a good bridge
a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986); see also MONROE
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (1990); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUS-
TICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY
OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998). A recent example of this model in action was seen in the mis-
conduct hearing brought against Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Maria Lopez by the
Commonwealth's Commission on Judicial Conduct. At issue was the judge's alleged public
berating and mistreatment of prosecutors in a notorious case involving the kidnapping and
molestation of an eleven-year-old boy by a transgendered individual, who pleaded guilty to
the offenses charged. At sentencing, the judge had excoriated prosecutors for advocating
jail time and for, in effect, attempting to "mislead" the court into thinking this was a serious
offense when she believed to the contrary. The prosecutors' views of the case were derived,
in part, from the videotaped interview of the eleven-year-old victim, which had been avail-
able to (but not consulted by) the judge. When this videotape was played during the
misconduct hearing, the judge's lawyer, a criminal defense attorney, demanded the right to
subpoena the child victim to testify in the judge's misconduct hearing-heedless of the
potential trauma to the child from the additional publicity and having to relive the molesta-
tion events yet again, regardless of the lack of relevance of anything the child might say to
the judicial misconduct allegations at issue, and oblivious to the potential backlash on his
client. See generally Margery Eagan, Calling on Boy Speaks Volumes About Judge, BOSTON HER-
ALD, Dec. 3, 2002, at 7 ("The strategy in Lopez attorney Richard Egbert's sleazy move,
however, is hard to fathom. Surely, it torpedoes whatever sympathy Lopez may have accrued
by being pummeled in the papers day after day. Her callousness toward the child, age 11
when he was abducted, is a huge part of why she's in trouble. Why make her seem worse?");
Tom Farmer, Lopez Lawryer Subpoenas Abuse Victim, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 3, 2002, at 1.
6. See SIMON, supra note 5, at 7.
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
8. See infra note 229.
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player when faced, as declarer, with the task of making a difficult
contract: one imagines the lie of the opponents' cards to be such
as will permit a particular line of play to succeed and then pro-
ceeds to play the hand as though the cards do, in fact, lie that way.9
The lawyer simply imagines that what the client seeks to do is legal,
then proceeds to represent the client as though the client's object
is, in fact, lawful, and takes refuge in the soft, bar-crafted ethical
cocoon where lawyers rarely, if ever, "know" that a client is acting
unlawfully. 0
In this mindset, the legal system itself becomes the lawyer's ar-
mory. In representing a client in litigation, the courtroom lawyer
will make use of every authority, policy, and rhetorical technique in
a single-minded campaign of zealous advocacy. The advocate's sole
objective is to win. Partisanship and moral non-accountability are
the principles that animate the representation." The advocate is
thus a warrior for hire, a mercenary-the lawyer version of the
Japanese ronin or the clichtd "hired gun" of the American west-
ern. Traditional models of legal ethics not only support but also
extol this view.
What becomes problematic is the extension of this mindset out-
side the litigation context to the world of business lawyering. 12 The
"hired gun," in the latter context, "acts as a cynical manipulator of
the tools made available by a complex legal system. He takes advan-
tage of the forms and the letter of the law, rather than the spirit or
9. See, e.g., CHARLES H. GOREN & OMAR SHARIF, GOREN'S BRIDGE COMPLETE 546-51
(rev. ed. 1980); VICTOR MOLLO & Nico GARDENER, CARD PLAY TECHNIQUE 171-73 (rev. ed.
1973).
10. Cf Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally
Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669, 672 (1981) (noting that, in an epistemological
sense, a lawyer can never "know" anything).
11. Considerable literature discusses the ethical and philosophical underpinnings of
the advocate's role. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613 (1986); LUBAN, supra note 5;
Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669
(1978) [hereinafter Schwartz, Professionalism]; Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advo-
cate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 543 (1983). Even for the courtroom lawyer, however, the
notion of moral non-accountability is somewhat problematic. (Few people, for example,
viewed the jury nullification and other tactics employed by the so-called "dream team" who
defended O.J. Simpson when he was prosecuted for his ex-wife's murder as morally neutral).
Some of Ted Schneyer's writings posit that this so-called "standard conception" of adversary
representation is oversimplified in failing to consider alternative visions of the trial lawyer's
role. See generally Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984
Wis. L. REv. 1529 (1984); Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC.
11 (1991).
12. See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REV. 277, 294 (1985).
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intent, to maximize his client's narrowly defined and essentially
asocial goals." 3
Although many lawyers despair at this state of affairs and the
bar's seeming inability to rectify it, 4 something must be done to
stem the tide of predation and, if this is not a pipe dream, restore
what seems now to have become a debased, dishonored, and dis-
reputable "trade" of law 5 to its former, loftier status of a "learned
profession." This comprehends the ideals of a "Higher Calling'-
ideals that prompted many to go to law school in the first place
and make careers in the law. Reform is imperative not merely be-
cause of public outrage at the excesses of corporate greed and
professional dereliction. For lawyers to have devolved into little
more than small-minded, common, often grasping tradesmen is to
have besmirched the majestic ideals and illustrious escutcheon that
is responsible for inventing, and later for safeguarding, our fragile
democracy, and for championing the rights of the underprivileged
and the oppressed.' 6
13. Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 399, 419 (1985).
14. Cf DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 213 (2000) ("Despite their considerable influence in American life, many law-
yers perceive themselves as uncharacteristically powerless in the face of the profession's own
problems.").
15. See RoscoE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 9-10 (1953)
(explaining that the essence of professions is that they are practiced with a spirit of public
service, unlike a trade, which aims primarily at personal gain). Commenting on the recent
dissolution of the venerable Boston firm Hill & Barlow (a firm founded in 1895 that had
been involved in a number of high-profile cases going back to the defense of accused anar-
chists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, and numbered among its alumni not only
federal and state judges but also three former Massachusetts governors), one partner la-
mented, "The legal profession ... has become much more of a business, and profit and the
billable hour have become the bane of the profession ... [Tihe profession needs to take
stock and look at what it is we became lawyers for, to see whether those principles are consis-
tent with the profit motive that seems to be driving lawyers more and more." Scott Bernard
Nelson, Hill & Barlow Firm Decides to Dissolve, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 2002, at Al (quoting
former Massachusetts Bar Association President Michael Greco).
16. Robert Gordon eloquently summarizes the ideal:
America in the early republic faced a vacuum of law, governance, and leadership au-
thority. After the Revolution it turned out that the new states, the new nation, and the
new economy required more regular and sustained attention to governance than
part-time legislators and juries could provide. America did not have, and did not
want, a powerful career civil service. Lawyers stepped forward to fill the vacuum. They
had the credentials and the legitimacy because they had articulated the grievances of
the Revolution in legal terms; they had drafted the new Federal and State Constitu-
tions, and gradually got them accepted as legal texts subject to lawyers' arguments
and judges' interpretations. Lawyers made law and legal discourse and legal proce-
dures into primary modes of governance and dispute-settlement in the new nation.
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That "higher calling' is not limited to public service or activism in
support of a -cause. It is a philosophy of how law should be prac-
ticed, and it should permeate all areas of practice, all specialties
and sub-specialties.
Likewise it should inform and animate the manner in which the
practice of law is regulated, but, in that regard, the self-regulatory
scheme characteristic of the organized bar has turned out to be a
dismal failure. Its response to over 35 years of sequential (and se-
quentially more damaging to the public image of lawyers) scandals
has been woefully inadequate to stem the tide of lawyer miscon-
duct.7 Yet no fetor of scandal, no amount of public odium, has led
to any meaningful reform. Lawyers have continued to enjoy the
benefits of self-regulation to a degree unprecedented in the
They dominated high offices, state and federal, elective and appointive; and (after
early experiments with lay judges) achieved a complete monopoly of the upper judi-
ciary-whose professional quality was fairly high, especially considering how little
they were paid. Nearly all successful lawyers moved regularly in and out of politics
and public service. By the 1830s Tocqueville was calling lawyers the American "aris-
tocracy '-more legitimate than a gentry class because they were an aristocracy of
merit.
Over the next two centuries, lawyers, on leave from practice, as a sideline to practice,
and in the regular course of representing clients, continued to take the lead in build-
ing state structures and legal infrastructures for the new republic .... They tried,
with partial success, to rescue judicial selection from partisan patronage and make it
based on merit.
As political statesmen, lawyers tried, though they ultimately failed, to devise legal so-
lutions to the great political conflicts over slavery and reconstruction of the defeated
South. They responded more successfully to the opportunities for leadership opened
up by industrialization, which brought with it all the problems of deaths and injuries
from accidents, labor conflicts, polluted skies, urban poverty, corruption of govern-
ment, absorption of new immigrant groups, concentrated economic power, and
urgent demands for new systems of regulation informed by educated expertise. Law-
yers took the initiative in the Progressive and New Deal reform movements, leading
another wave of state-building, this time to construct and staff the commissions and
agencies of administrative government. Lawyers on leave from New York City practice
dominated the senior policy posts of State, War, and Defense for the entire nine-
teenth century and for most of the last. They also labored to build an infrastructure
of public and private international law to civilize the conduct of commerce, diplo-
macy, and war, and to protect human rights.
Robert W. Gordon, Portrait of a Profession in Paralysis, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1427, 1440-41 (2002)
(book review).
17. As Luban has observed, "[t]he entire enterprise of self-regulation is built on the
premise that, when it comes to the practice of law, lawyers have some special insight into the
public good." LUBAN, supra note 5, at 2.
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American experience. 8 As discussed below,'9 insights from public
choice theory0 show that this state of affairs has conferred upon
the bar enormous privileges.
From those to whom much is given, much is expected. The
question is thus starkly posed: whether the legal profession remains
completely capable of self-regulation, of providing legal services
with honesty, integrity, and decorum, and of accepting fiduciary
responsibilities not merely to clients but to a broader definition of
interests a "learned profession" should serve. After pondering that
question in an era when lawyers' values increasingly are degraded
to pecuniary measurements and to the crass cost-benefit analysis of
"what's in it for me?," when, under the ubiquitous "everybody else
does it" standard of conduct, all things that are not expressly and
specifically prohibited are deemed permissible, and when the evi-
dent collapse of ethical standards under the quotidian pressure of
business generation and the gaping maw of unadulterated greed
has given rise to a dizzying succession of corporate scandals, the
answer, though painful and reluctant, must be "No"-or, at least,
"Not completely."
That answer occasions a fundamental rethinking of how lawyers
ought to be regulated. The deterioration of ethical standards, the
toothlessness of state disciplinary mechanisms (even in the wake of
referrals by a federal regulatory agency),21 and the preoccupation
of the organized bar with relatively unimportant (except from the
viewpoint of economic protectionism) topics, such as the debates
centering on multi-jurisdictional practice vs. the unauthorized
practice of law (something not even worthy of discussion in the
European Union),-all as we move from one ignominious ethical
transgression to another, heedless of the harm being done to inno-
cent third parties and to the reputation of the profession-cry out
for such a fundamental rethinking. After so many missed opportu-
nities at course correction since the early 1970's, the lofty but
18. See, e.g., Susan A. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Layer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69
GEO. L.J. 705, 707 (1981) ("[U]nlike other professionals, who are supervised by state regula-
tory agencies, lawyers remain a virtually self-regulated profession."); Nancy J. Moore, The
Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. Am. L. 7, 14-16 (1989) (stating that the legal
profession has attained "unique heights" of self-regulation); F. L. Ray Patterson, The Function
of a Code of Legal Ethics, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 695, 695 (1981) ("The purpose of a code of
legal ethics is to implement the legal profession's prerogative of self-regulation.").
19. See infra notes 385-402 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 330-47 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 91.
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hollow rhetoric animated by the bar's self-interest can no longer
suffice.
At a minimum, the bar needs a firmer and unbiased hand on
the tiller to right that course. This article purposes to highlight, via
synopses of the key scandals, some of the inadequacies of the cur-
rent system of lawyer regulation and to raise the curtain on what
seems now to be the inevitable and only workable solution: partial
federal regulation of the field of legal ethics.
Part I of this Article will briefly trace the source and nature of
the problem and touching on the practical shortcomings of some
antidotes others have proposed. Part II will review the "highlights"
(if the reader will excuse the expression) of those 35 years of mis-
chief and scandal, beginning with the National Student Marketing
case and culminating in the recent, seemingly never-ending, series
of revelations of malfeasance by corporate insiders and the trans-
gressions (often implicit, but occasionally explicit and outright
derelictions of professional obligations) of their lawyers and other
advisors, all leading to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200222 and the
SEC's controversial rulemaking.3 Part III endeavors to synthesize
some insights from public choice theory into the structural short-
comings of the existing attorney regulatory system. Part IV offers a
critique of the extant "hunt and peck" approach to federalizing
legal ethics and illustrates the kinds of approaches to be avoided,
especially the "overkill" approach consistently taken by the Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS) .4 Finally, Part V concludes with a sim-
ple proposal for partial federal regulation of legal ethics and a few
suggested areas for regulatory attention.
22. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOXA]. Section 307 of SOXA directs the SEC, inter alia,
to promulgate regulations mandating that lawyers go up the corporate ladder and report
evidence of securities fraud. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002). See infra notes 305-10 and accompany-
ing text.
23. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Act Release No. 33-8150, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670 (Dec. 2, 2002) (proposed rulemaking pursuant
to SOXA § 307); Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Secu-
rities Act Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 205) (final rule, implementing modified up-the-ladder reporting of evidence of material
violations, subject to certain procedural sidetracks).
24. See infra notes 431-37 and accompanying text.
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I. OF NOSTALGIA AND NONACCOUNTABILITY,
TECHNOLOGY AND TUSSLE
Historically, the legal profession has justified its autonomy from
external regulation by the commitment of law practitioners to cli-
ents and to public service, subordinating the lawyers' financial self-
interest, as distinguished from businessmen.2 5 This is a powerful
image that was for many years purveyed in the literature, largely
without dissent, to lawyers and law students.
When lawyers of the baby boomer generation were earning their
law degrees, the role models of the day may have varied somewhat
depending upon the locality of one's practice, but all were pillars
of the bar with not merely local but national reputations. In Wash-
ington, D.C., for example, there were appellate legends like E.
Barrett Prettyman, Jr., trial lawyer legends like Edward Bennett Wil-
liams, and lawyer-statesman legends like Leon Jaworski and Clark
Clifford;2 6 in New York, various names like Henry King, Arthur Li-
man, Henry Harfield, and John McCloy ring memory's bell. Other
recollections of the same era might cite additional names in these
jurisdictions, and, of course, there were different pillars of the bar
in other jurisdictions as well. Law graduates of the preceding gen-
eration might have venerated such erstwhile legal movers and
shakers as Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles-people of the ilk
referred to by Dean Anthony Kronman as "lawyer-statesmen." 27
The point of this brief iconography is not to journey down
memory lane but to furnish a foil for the (by now) well-
documented and possibly pandemic disillusionment and discon-
tent of lawyers with the practice of law.28 Flames of disillusionment
25. Cf Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1934)
(disparaging the transformation of many lawyers into, in the words of former Chief Justice
of the United States, "obsequious servant[s] of business ... tainted with the morals and
manners of the market place in its most antisocial manifestations," and decrying the phe-
nomenon of a lawyer's income becoming "the measure of his professional status").
26. The latter's reputation was irrevocably tarnished in later years by the BCCI scandal.
See infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
27. See ANTHONY T. KRONNIAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 3 (1993).
28. See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams, The Legal Profession: A Critical Evaluation, 74 JUDICATURE
77, 77 (1990) (stating a "qualitative revolution has occurred within the legal community to
the extent that the practice which existed 40 years ago is hardly recognizable today"); Robert
W. Gordon, The Independence of Lauyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 50-51 (1988) (arguing that "the
rhetoric of decline has captured something real"); RHODE, supra note 14, at 8-12, 23-48;
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697, 701
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and dissatisfaction with the legal profession are not unique to prac-
ticing lawyers; they are even more apparent among the public at
large 29 and have been fanned ever higher by the recent, and seem-
ingly endless, spate of corporate and securities scandals that have
festooned the newspaper headlines over the past two years. 30 That
public mistrust is only heightened by bar rhetoric that gives the
impression of condoning conduct contrary to commonly-held con-
cepts of morality by asserting that lay people lack the specialized
training and expertise to appreciate the refined professional
judgments made by lawyers."
Perhaps the indelible imprint of lawyers' early career impres-
sions combined with human nature make inevitable the
temptation to wax nostalgic about the caliber of the legal profes-
sion in bygone days. 2 The dynamics of the practice of law did not
then appear to have been simply about money.33 Nonetheless busi-
(1988) (observing that "[p]roponents of the adversary ethic say or imply that traditional
republican legal ethics have either been abandoned or redefined"); cf ABA COMM. ON PRO-
FESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF
LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 3 (1986), reprinted in 112 ER.D. 243, 254 (1987) [hereinafter ABA
BLUEPRINT] (noting that 68% of corporate users of legal services believed legal professional-
ism had decreased over time); see aso james W. Jones, The Challenge of Change: The Practice of
Law in the Year 2000, 41 VAND. L. REV. 683, 695 (1988) (chronicling recent changes in legal
profession and concluding optimistically that "[t]oday's lawyers have the opportunity to
reshape the legal profession at a crucial time in its history").
29. See generally RHODE, supra note 14, at 3-8; Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The
Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 805 (1998);
Ronald D. Rotunda, The Legal Profession and the Public Image of Lawyers, 23 J. LEG. PROF. 51
(1999)..
30. See infra notes 245-300 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Jack R. Bierig, Whatever Happened to Professional Self-Regulation ?, 8 B. LEADER
18 (1983) ("The fact that a professional serves people by bringing highly specialized training
to bear upon their problems lies at the root of professional self-regulation. Lacking this
specialized training, lay persons cannot fully understand what professionals do and cannot
evaluate the judgments that professionals may make."). Moral philosopher Sissela Bok has
pointed out the danger of this sort of rhetoric. See Sissela Bok, Can Lawyers Be Trusted, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 913 (1990); cf Thomas H. Morawetz, Lawyers and Conscience, 21 CONN. L. REV.
383, 395 (1989) ("There is nothing inherent in the lawyer's role that should exempt her
from moral criticism.").
32. Others have done so with considerable eloquence. See, e.g., MARY ANNE GLENDON,
A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); KRONMAN, supra note 27; SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER,
THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
While this may be a "generational" phenomenon, it is interesting that all three of the above
books place the practice of law at its ethical apex in the post-World War II prosperity of
1950's America. See also ABA BLUEPRINT, supra note 28.
33. Here is a view from the 1950's that will strike contemporary readers as thoroughly
anachronistic: "[A] large number of lawyers picture themselves as white knights in shining
armor devoted to their profession with an intensity characteristic of a genius. When a client
comes in with his legal problem, the concern of the lawyer is with the solution of the prob-
lem. The question of his fee is usually in the dim background of his mind and is often
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ness flowed, seemingly effortlessly, to these individuals and their
law firms, and the proof lined office and library book shelves with
expensively printed appellate briefs and those ubiquitous, hefty,
bound volumes comprising the documentation of large corporate
transactions, usually embossed on the spine with gold lettering dis-
playing the highly recognizable names of Fortune 500 companies
and leading Wall Street banking houses. Nor were these titans of
the bar regarded by the lay public as predators or as glorified
tradesmen, but as honorable,3 4 knowledgeable, tough-minded but
fair, and sometimes elegant practitioners of a learned profession.
They moved seamlessly from law office to courthouse to board
room, in and out of public service, and were the brain trust with-
out whose assistance many momentous transactions and events of
the legal and business worlds (often affairs of state as well) could
not have been conceived, much less successfully implemented.
(There was, to be sure, a "dark side" as well to this exemplar, an
ugly, hypocritical, discriminatory underbelly to the elite bar,35 but
the breadth of accomplishment of the most celebrated of these
elite lawyers was inspirational to the younger generation, which was
either ignorant of the organized bar's history of institutionalizing
that "dark side" or else was prepared to rationalize it as sympto-
matic of the societal shortcomings of a less enlightened era).
The foregoing, admittedly nostalgic, unified vision of lawyers
and the legal profession underlies much of the belief system36 that
looked on by him as a necessary evil." Eugene C. Gerhart, The Art of Billing Clients, LAW OFF.
ECON. & MGMT. 29, 29-30 (1960), quoted in Elizabeth Kovachevich & Geri L. Waksler, The
Legal Profession: Edging Closer to Death with Each Passing Hour, 20 STETSON L. REv. 419, 430
(1991); cf ABA BLUEPRINT, supra note 28, at 3 ("Has our profession abandoned principle
for profit, professionalism for commercialism?").
34. Contrast the more contemporary view in Robert R Cochran,Jr., Honor As a Deficient
Aspiration for "The Honorable Profession"- The Lawyer as Nostromo, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 859
(2000).
35. Thus iconography turns to iconoclasm: the names mentioned here were all white
males; those who were descendants of recent immigrants or members of religious minorities
had only recently fought their way to membership in this elite club, while women and racial
minorities were still struggling. GLENDON, supra note 32, at 28, 35; see a/sOJEROLD S. AUER-
BACH, UNEQUALJUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 102-29 (1976)
(stating attorney regulation has favored social and racial elites, offering historical examples
of barriers to entry raised by prominent members of the bar and law professors in order to
"purify" the profession, typically at the expense of minorities, such as the repression of Afri-
can-American andJewish applicants in Pennsylvania during the period 1933-43).
36. I came to feel that the American lawyer should regard himself as a potential officer
of his government and a defender of its laws and constitution. I felt that if the time should
ever come when this tradition had faded out and the members of the bar had become
merely the servants of business, the future of our liberties would be gloomy indeed.
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animates the manner in which regulation of the bar has evolved
over the course of the twentieth century, but the image, if it were
ever an accurate depiction,37 is increasingly anachronistic. Instead,
law has become much like any other service business, such as ad-
vertising, stock brokerage, accounting, and various types of
consulting. Today, lawyers in private practice, ranging from solo
practitioners to partners in large, elite urban law firms, are all en-
deavoring one way or another to peddle usually fungible services
(with rare exceptions) into a saturated, highly competitive market
for a shrinking client base. The business-for "business" it is, and
big business too38-is now dominated by large, multi-jurisdictional
firms, managed by autharcy or anarchy (usually poorly, in either
event), and having a propensity to expand their geographic and
product markets primarily by acquisition of pre-existing practices
or practice groups rather than by internal growth.) The touch-
stone for these acquisitions is not the mobility of law firm partners,
which has become commonplace, 4° but the portability of their bill-
ings; these transfers of allegiance are deals that are little, if at all,
different from standard acquisitions of non-publicly traded busi-
nesses, with the acquiring law firm's focus being on (A) annual
revenues (with seven figures being a threshold of intense interest),
(B) the potential for conflicts with the firm's existing clientele, and
(C) verification (preferably by accounting records from the old
firm) of the new practice's billable hours, realization rates, and ac-
counts receivable. In such a purely economic transaction, new
HENRY L. STIMSON, HENRY L. STIMSON & McGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN
PEACE AND WAR XXii (1947).
37. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 54 (1986).
38. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, SharingAmong the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313,
313 n.1 (1985). In a provocative article, Russell Pearce uses Thomas Kuhn's model of"para-
digm shifts" in the beliefs of scientists as ajumping off point for tracing the transformation
of law practice from a profession to a business. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professional Para-
digm Shift: 1hy Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar,
70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995); see also THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
39. Contrast the attitude of the ABA at the end of the 19th century, decrying the "buy-
ing and selling of law business." SeeJULIus H. COHEN, THE LAW-BuSINESS OR PROFESSION?,
173-200, 238 (rev. ed. 1924).
40. Natural corollaries to the increased mobility of lawyers and law practices are fading
institutional loyalties and often unseemly jockeying for position with in-house counsel of
corporate clients. The latter, in turn, have become far more canny, jettisoning traditional law
firm alliances in favor of choosing individual lawyers (often on the basis of price competi-
tion and a "beauty contest" in which law firms can display their "wares") just as they would
any other service provider, but even then only where outsourcing is imperative, i.e., because
it is more cost-effective than doing the work in-house or because highly specialized legal
work is called for.
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partners' professional credentials, philosophy, or legal writings are
matters of, at most, perfunctory interest.
Competition for clients has become ferocious. The old model of
old-line corporate clients aligned with, and sending their business
to, particular law firms as their exclusive outside general counsel
4
1
has given way to savvy corporate law departments (frequently popu-
lated by elite law firm expatriates) shopping for law firms for
particular projects or particular specialties.42 Often, the company
dispenses with outside counsel altogether and does the work in-
house.43
Within the partnership ranks of law firms facing this "brave new
world," life is radically different. The mobility of partners and
groups has already been noted, and acquisitive firms will even
"raid" the competition to secure the services of rainmakers or
"product lines" they covet. Where once law firm partners were
bound to each other by strong ties of loyalty, now economics is eve-
rything; where once compensation was "lock step," based on
seniority, now it is based on an "eat what you kill" model of busi-
ness generation; where once being elected to the partnership was
the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, now it is a dubious dis-
tinction, no more secure than any other type of employment, and
law firms will cut the equity interests of (or even dismiss) partners
who are not considered to be sufficiently productive. To anyone
who has seen the "blood on the floor" during the periodic (usually
annual or biennial) spectacle of partners engaging in internecine
conflict over how large a piece of the pie they get to take home,
this tableau is all too familiar.
Changing technology has also transmogrified law practice. In
the late 1970's, lawyers generally relied upon their secretaries and
other support staff for the actual physical preparation of legal
documents. Lawyers drafted documents on legal pads or using
41. Cf Kagan & Rosen, supra note 13, at 423 (noting that, even by the mid-1980's, this
independent, outside general counsel role "has been declining as a proportion of the large
firm lawyers' work, to the point that it is now comparatively infrequent").
42. See generally Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J.
1201, 1210 (1997) (retention of firms as outside general counsel giving way to selective reli-
ance on individual attorneys with specialized expertise); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Foreword:
Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawryer, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197, 198 (2000)
(noting that corporate clients now seek specialized, rather than general, services from out-
side law firms); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 489 (1989) (offering and discussing the motto,
"retain lawyers and not law firms").
43. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 12, at 293-94 (noting expansion of corporate law
departments has shifted work away from elite law firms).
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dictating machines and gave them to others to type. Some firms
used so called "mag cards," typewriters attached to a primitive form
of word processor using magnetic cards, allowing the user to save
one page of typewritten text per card, but most people still used
regular typewriters. Most photocopiers were not high-speed, so typ-
ists relied on carbon paper to make duplicates. If mistakes were
made in typing, or edits were necessary, the document had to be
retyped. As a result, the lawyer had every incentive to make the first
draft as good as possible.
Fast forward to today. Most lawyers do not rely on secretaries for
document production but prepare and edit their own documents
with personal computers and sophisticated word processing soft-
ware, enabling them easily to cut and paste from pre-existing forms
or other documents and facilitating editing. The ease of editing
seems, however, to have significantly diminished the overall quality
of legal documents, particularly among younger or less-
experienced lawyers. Without the low-tech disincentives" to pro-
ducing a mediocre first draft, there is a temptation to "throw" any
old thing onto the word processor on the assumption that it can be
cleaned up in the editing process. That assumption is often unjus-
tified: changes in primary and secondary school standards in the
intervening thirty years now produce college graduates (and ulti-
mately law school graduates) whose writing skills leave a lot to be
desired . Spell check and grammar check software cannot cure
that defect. As the old saying goes, you can't make a silk purse out
of a sow's ear.
In conjunction with this "deprofessionalization" of lawyers, cli-
ents have become savvier about the market for legal services and
considerably more demanding. An easy illustration from business
44. For example, the substantial amounts of time required for retyping from scratch,
and the lawyer having to proofread each retyped version afresh.
45. See, e.g., RogerJ. Miner, Confronting the Communication Crisis in the Legal Profession, 34
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1989) (complaining that briefs are deficient and that legal writing is a
disservice to clients from point of view of appellate judge); Tom Goldstein, The Law: Drive for
Plain English Gains Among Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1988, at B7 (recounting Wisconsin
Supreme Court Justice Bablitch's lectures to law students about the poor condition of legal
writing); cf MatthewJ. Arnold, Comment, The Lack of Basic Writing Skills and its Impact on the
Legal Profession, 24 CAP. U. L. REv. 227 (1995); Erik M. Jensen, Reflections in Editing a Law
Journal for Law Teachers, 2 Wvo. L. REv. 119, 123 (2002) (criticizing quality of written submis-
sions by legal writing instructors: "[G]iven the quality of American law students' writing
these days, I'd be inclined to say we have the blind leading the blind, but that would be
unfair to the blind."). Arguably, however, this problem goes back much farther in time. See
William L. Prosser, English as She is Wrote, 7J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 162 (1954) (reprint of essay
originally appearing in 1939) (decrying law students' lack of writing ability but despairing of
law schools' ability to remedy the problem).
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law practice is the amount of time the lawyer has to deliver work
product to the client. As recently as the typewriter/mag card days,
clients received the documents when they were ready and not be-
fore. With the advent of overnight courier services, clients began to
expect document delivery the next day, so lawyers began to dance
to the tune of getting the document drafted and edited in time to
make the final dash to the nearest overnight courier's office before
it closed, usually sometime between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. Next came
the proliferation of fax technology, and clients demanded same-
day delivery of the document. With the advent of e-mail, produc-
tion time has become even more compressed. But Rome wasn't
built in a day. The effect of this time pressure on document quality
is emblematic of the problem that lawyers in a fast-paced society
face generally: they lack time for reflection and for the application
of mature, sober, and detached judgment to client problems.
Nor is it any longer the norm for large, corporate clients to
come to the lawyer's office. The lawyer is expected to come to
them, and travel time compresses the time available for law prac-
tice even further. Older readers may remember the 1950's Saturday
night television western drama in which a professional gunman
(nowadays, he might be called a "troubleshooter") carried a busi-
ness card saying, "Have Gun, Will Travel" (an echt hired gun!). Now
it might read "Have Laptop, Will Travel."
One thing has not changed: the same characteristics of ingenu-
ity and indispensability that have always been hallmarks of the best
lawyers continue to describe the work of elite lawyers today. All too
often, however, those skills have been perverted to facilitate not the
momentous but the nefarious. From the business lawyer's perspec-
tive, part of the problem lies in the indeterminacy of ethical
standards applicable to his specialized practice.
The normative precepts that should guide lawyers in the litiga-
tion sphere and those in the corporate/ regulatory counseling
realm occupy two different orbits around Planet Ethics. While
these orbits may intersect from time to time, they more frequently
diverge. The disparate nature of the tasks performed distinguishes
the overall content of those normative precepts. As one would ex-
pect, the corporate/ regulatory counselor's orbit is much tighter.
The dynamics of business transactions, which-in sharp contrast to
the litigation model-presuppose continuing, often long-term, and
essentially non-hostile relationships, and the imperatives of com-
pliance with complex skeins of federal and state regulation all
require conservative, objective, and dispassionate advice and
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counsel. To be effective, the counselor must be disinterested, unbi-
ased, and in a position to exercise utter independence ofjudgment
and action. He must be free to research and examine the pertinent
facts so that the advice and counsel ultimately given will be both
reasoned and reasonable, both reliable and worthy of reliance.
These precepts have only grown in importance as lawyers are in-
creasingly thrust into tangled, labyrinthine business and regulatory
milieus. Rarely are business lawyers engaged nowadays to give ad-
vice where there are black and white, clear-cut answers. They do
not enjoy the luxury of the litigator's more simple and direct role
as advocate. As the global regulatory environment in which busi-
nesses operate becomes ever more complex, the distinctions
between and among various shades of gray have grown corre-
spondingly more numerous and more subtle. More often than not,
businesses and business lawyers must operate in a zone of uncer-
tainty. Detachment, neutrality, and candor then become all the
more indispensable to the counseling role. While the counselor's
loyalty is primarily to the interests of his client, ascertaining what
those interests are may not always be simple.
Ideally, the business lawyer should undertake an assessment of
the matter at hand that is unbiased and that takes fully into ac-
count whether and to what extent another (whether that other be
another party to a transaction or some entity or constituency-e.g.,
a government agency in the case of a regulated business or the in-
vesting public in the case of a publicly held enterprise-to which
(or whom) the client owes some legal obligation) might come out
differently on the matter if in possession of all the pertinent factual
information.4 In some circumstances, as with representing a regu-
46. The latter qualification is extremely important. It resonates strongly with the
common definition of "materiality" under the federal securities laws in terms of the infor-
mation that an investor might find important in making a decision to buy or sell securities,
and, obviously, investors would dearly have liked to have known the kind of information that
was concealed in a number of recent corporate scandals. See infra notes 245-300 and ac-
companying text. Furthermore, federal regulators during the S&L crisis and during the
BCCI scandal, to name but two examples, would dearly have liked to know information that
was deliberately concealed from them or, worse yet-as was alleged in the infamous Kaye,
Scholer and Jones, Day matters involving Charles Keating and Lincoln Savings & Loan of
Irvine, California-was information that should have been available during the examination
process but for the efforts of lawyers to obstruct access by the examiners and to falsify re-
cords made available to them. See generally In re Am. Cont'l Corp. Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec.
Litig., 794 F.Supp. 1424, 1450 (D. Ariz. 1992) (presenting testimony that "Jones, Day part-
ners knew ACC Lincoln personnel were preparing loan underwriting summaries [after loans
in question] had already been closed. [And] thatJones, Day attorneys participated in creat-
ing corporate resolutions to ratify forged and backdated corporate records"); ABA WORKING
GROUP ON LAWYERS' REPRESENTATION OF REGULATED CLIENTS, LABORERS IN DIFFERENT
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lated client outside the litigation context, the lawyer may have the
further obligation of cooperating with (or, at a minimum, refrain-
ing from actions that would impede, or assist a client's efforts to
impede) regulators' information gathering efforts-an issue aired
most dramatically in the 1992 enforcement proceeding brought by
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) against Kaye, Scholer.f
In contrast, the litigator's orbit is much broader and more ellip-
tical, appropriately so, at least if we hold to the underlying premise
that the purely partisan, adversarial process is institutionally and
procedurally well-equipped to promote the search for "truth" and
the interests of 'Justice." In that context, all parties are presumed
4
VINEYARDS? THE BANK REGULATORS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 26-28 (Discussion Draft
Jan. 1993).
47. For a sampling of the rich and diverse literature on the Kaye, Scholer matter, see,
for example, Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Issues in Banking Regulation, 56 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7 (1993); Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Schole, The Office of
Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 985 (1993); Keith R. Fisher,
Neither Evaders Nor Apologists: A Reply to Professor Simon, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 341 (1998)
[hereinafter Fisher, Neither Evaders Nor Apologists]; Keith R. Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor's
Toesies: A "Roguish" Concurrence with Professor Baxter, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (1993)
[hereinafter Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor's Toesies]; Keith R. Fisher, Statutory Construction
and the Kaye, Scholer Freeze Order, BANKING POLICY REP. (serialized, Aug. 17, 1992 and Sept. 7,
1992), reprinted as ASSET FREEZES: KAYE, SCHOLER, in FIRREA LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. 22A
(Baxter Dunaway ed., 1993); Lawrence J. Fox, OTS v. Kaye Scholer: An Assault on the Citadel
48 Bus. LAw. 1521 (1993); Monroe Freedman, Kaye Scholer-Overzealous or Overblown, 35 S.
TEX. L. REv. 577 (1994); Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve: The Bar's Response to
Kaye Scholer, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 315 (1998); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer Liability in
Third Party Situations: The Meaning of the Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REv. 394 (1993);
Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Fi-
nancial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019 (1993); Peter C. Kostant, When Zeal Boils Over:
Disclosure Obligations and the Duty of Candor of Legal Counsel in Regulatory Proceedings After the
Kaye Scholer Settlement, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 487 (1994); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Kaye, Schole, FIRREA, and the Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case from the
Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 977 (1993);Jonathan R. Macey, Professor
Simon on the Kaye Scholer Affair: Shock at the Gambling at Rick's Place in Casablanca, 23 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 323 (1998); Geoffrey P. Miller, Kaye Scholer as Original Sin, 23 LAw & Soc. IN-
qUIRY 305 (1993) [hereinafter Miller, Original Sin]; Stephen Pepper, Why Confidentiality?, 23
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 331 (1998); Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What
the S&L Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEx. L. REv. 639 (1994); William H.
Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion
and Apology, 23 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 243 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count:
Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1145 (1993) [hereinafter Wilkins,
Context]; Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, Am. LAWYER, May 1992, at
68-79; Steve France, Just Desserts: Don't Cry for Kaye, Scholer, LEGAL TIMES, April 1992, at 8;
Marvin Frankel, Lawyers Can't Be Stool Pigeons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992, at A25.
48. Of course, the usual presumptions about litigation resources and capabilities may
at times be unfounded. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 5, at 64-65; RHODE, supra note 14, at 55-
56. This is especially problematic where a huge disparity between opposing parties' re-
sources unbalances and undermines the adversary system's underlying assumptions because
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to have essentially unfettered access to the relevant facts (i.e., via
the discovery rules, with the usual exceptions, e.g., those for privi-
leged information) and relevant law (i.e., through their lawyer
advocates) on which the ultimate outcome will be predicated, as
well as the benefit of a proctor (i.e., the judge, magistrate, arbitra-
tor) to deter misrepresentations and other abuses of the process.
Here, a lawyer is free to be-and encouraged to be-totally parti-
san because it is up to opposing counsel to expose factual and legal
weaknesses in arguments being advanced on the client's behalf.
49
This largely 50 absolves the litigator of accountability for "truth" or
'justice.'1
Obviously, differences between business lawyering and litigation
could be fleshed out in considerably more detail. Yet even the con-
densed and familiar description offered here of the fundamental
disparities between two distinct roles commonly played by lawyers
in our society vitiates the utility of any "one size fits all" set of
rules-"model" or otherwise-of professional ethics. The defect of
such rules is that they, in David Wilkins's felicitous phrase, "sup-
press[] context."52 For 35 years, the mischief that has flowed from
that defect and from an anachronistic view of the legal profession
and its ethical obligations has given us one after another in a series
of scandals, each more damaging to the public-and to public per-
ception of the legal profession-than the last.
53
only rarely does David defeat Goliath. Those particular concerns are, however, outside the
scope of this Article.
49. See generally Fried, supra note 5.
50. The exceptions are prohibitions against counseling, suborning, or aiding and abet-
ting perjury before a tribunal. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2003).
51. See Schwartz, Professionalism, supra note 11, at 673 (introducing concepts of "parti-
sanship" and "nonaccountability").
52. Wilkins, Context, supra note 47, at 1152. Fred Zacharias has noted that the ABA eth-
ics codes, addressed as they are to the entire bar, are inadequate when it comes to crafting
rules for specialized areas of practice. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsi-
bility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 223
(1993).
53. As Enron's share price fell from a high of nearly ninety dollars to around twenty-
five cents, its 401 (k) plan-in which 15,000 employees participated-lost 1.3 billion dollars.
Louis Uchitelle, The Rich Are Different: They Know When to Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at
1. See also PATRICK J. PURCELL, THE ENRON BANKRUPTCY AND EMPLOYER STOCK IN RETIRE-
MENT PLANS 1, 3 (Jan. 22, 2002) (CRS Report for Congress) available at
http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/rs_21115.pdf (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (stating Enron stock traded at over $80 a share
in January 2001 and less than 70¢ a share in January 2002, and 62% of Enron 401 (k) plans'
assets as of Dec. 31, 2000 were in Enron stock). In addition, while the damage occasioned by
these scandals to the integrity of the markets may well be incalculable, not so the probable
loss to shareholder value. Indeed, one year after the Enron debacle had surfaced, the stock
market, already depressed by the bursting of the "hi-tech bubble," had lost an additional $7
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Ethicists have advanced essentially three types of criticisms of the
"hired gun" model. First, they argue that it subordinates the exer-
cise by the lawyer of moral and professional judgment. Second,
they observe that the underlying philosophy of partisanship is
tainted by the bar's economic self-interest. Third, it is anti-
contextual and seeks to regulate specialists in the same manner as
is applied to that idealized and endangered species, the "general
practitioner."
The first line of criticism asserts that the model subordinates in-
terests that should rather be emphasized. Lawyers should consider
non-client interests (e.g., justice or morality) when making profes-
sional judgments. 54 David Luban and William Simon have both
argued that lawyers should assume greater responsibility for judg-
ing the ends proposed by clients or potential clients. Luban, for
example, suggests that the hired gun model 51 is disrespectful of the
law because adherence to the model rejects the notion that law
possesses any ideal meaning and results instead in "instrumental"
behavior that treats the law as an amoral tool to be used only to
satisfy the client's objectives.56 He suggests replacing that model
with a "morally activist" model in which the lawyer "shares and
aims to share with her client responsibility for the ends she is pro-
moting in her representation ... [and] also cares more about the
means used than the bare fact that they are legal.,5
7
Frequently invoked as a basis for criticizing the dominant legal
ethics paradigm is the conspicuous absence, particularly in the
high-profile legal scandals of the past thirty-odd years, of lawyers
exercising independent judgment about what is in the client's best
trillion in value. Some might argue that the market will eventually recover and this loss is
transient; perhaps that is so, for an artificial construct vaguely referred to as "the market,"
but the losses are certainly not transient to the millions of investors whose "nest eggs" were
wiped out.
54. LUBAN, supra note 5; SIMON, supra note 5.
55. Luban refers to it as the "principle of partisanship." LUBAN, supra note 5, at 7, 11-
18.
56. Id. at 18. Professor Luban identifies two species of "instrumental" behavior, "false
formalism" and "false idealism," each of which he condemns. Id. He characterizes false for-
malism as arguments urging the technical letter of the law in a manner designed to subvert
its spirit and false idealism as arguments intended to defeat the letter of the law by recourse
to some underlying policy that animates the law. Id. Of course, as Luban acknowledges,
these typical modes of lawyer behavior can only be wrong if one can identify a "true" spirit
or meaning of the law. Id.
57. Id. at xxii. "As a result," Luban continues, "the morally activist lawyer will challenge
her client if her representation seems to her morally unworthy; she may cajole or negotiate
with the client to change the ends or means; she may find herself compelled to initiate ac-
tion that the client will view as betrayal; and she will not fear to quit." Id.
SUMMER 2004] 1037
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
interests, rather than reflexively (and uncritically) empowering
client autonomy!8 Zealously representing a client "within the
bounds of the law "59 is a very open-textured concept that depends,
quite obviously, on one's conception of what "the law" is. William
Simon's position is that the conception endorsed by the so-called
"dominant view" is a hybrid recipe consisting chiefly of formalism
and legal positivism-namely that "law" consists of nothing more
than a set of rules-spiced with a pinch of libertarianism that per-
mits the bar to envelop itself with the noble self-image of heroes
construing such rules broadly against oppression of clients by the
state. 0 Professor Simon argues for a more flexible conception of
what "law" is, a conception broad enough to encompass not merely
a strict construction of the language of legal regimes but also their
broad underlying purposes, adding to the recipe a soupcon of the
common law's adaptability-putting old wine in new bottles, to ex-
tend the Epicurean metaphor-and adopting new legal standards
from a larger context of societal norms.61 His antidote to the dele-
terious social effects of the "hired gun" model, then, is that
"[1] awyers should take those actions that, considering the relevant
circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote jus-
tice., 62 For Simon, unlike Luban, justice is not congruent with
morality but denotes instead "legal judgments grounded in the
58. See, e.g., LINOWITZ, supra note 32, passim; THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. RO-
TUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 719 (7th ed. 2000).
59. Representing a client "within the bounds of the law" was explicit under the prior
regime of the Model Code, but the concept has been adulterated under the Model Rules by
a surfeit of concern with the client's wishes. Canon 7 of the Model Code provided, "A Law-
yer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law." The same principle
was set forth in the Ethical Considerations. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC
7-1 to 7-3 (1969). The pedigree of this notion goes back at least as far as the original ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics, which pronounced that "the great trust of the lawyer is to be
performed within and not without the bounds of the law." ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS
Canon 15 (1908). Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003) (providing that a
lawyer shall abide by her client's decisions concerning objectives of the representation). The
sop to lingering notions about the exercise of professional judgment is the assertion-hardly
appropriate to be denoted as a "rule" per se-that representation of the client "does not
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activi-
ties." Id. at R. 1.2(b).
60. See also Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389,
1448 (1992) ("The central and recurring theme in the profession's narratives portrays the
lawyer as champion, defending the client's life and liberty against the government, which is
portrayed as oppressor, willing, ready and able to use its power to destroy the individual and
the values society holds dear.").
61. David Wilkins also calls for a more contextual approach to ethical norms. See Wil-
kins, Context, supra note 47.
62. SIMON, supra note 5, at 54-62.
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methods and sources of authority of the professional culture. 6 3
Their two approaches are closer than might at first appear, how-
ever, given that what Simon means by "professional culture" is one
in which lawyers will make 'judgments that often, though not in-
variably, incorporate moral norms, including norms that
sometimes justify ad hoc nullification or even conscientious resis-
tance to laws whose operation is conspicuously unjust. 6 4
Both Simon and Luban hypothesize situations where a lawyer
must choose between the client's objectives and the interests of
justice. Such approaches are often criticized by the private bar as
being overly academic. As Enron and the other contemporaneous
corporate scandals have amply demonstrated, however, the resolu-
tion of such ethical dilemmas is no longer a matter of purely
academic interest. Moreover, there are clearly some situations
where the uncritical furtherance of the client's desires is anathema
to what are, or should be, commonly shared moral imperatives.6 5
Admirable and valuable as they are to the burgeoning discourse
on legal ethics, both Luban's and Simon's work suffer-and this is
no criticism of their work but a sad reflection of reality-from in-
evitable practical difficulties. In the frenetic, rough-and-tumble
world of contemporary law practice, (A) few busy lawyers have the
time to read such books; (B) fewer have the inclination to read
them; (C) fewer still have actually read them; (D) of that minority,
fewer yet, even in the so-called "elite" law firms, will have the requi-
site background in, or intellectual proclivities toward, moral
philosophy and legal theory to internalize those readings and
transform them into a workable modus operandi for the quotidian
pressures of law practice; and (E) the standards advocated by
Luban and Simon, thoughtful as they are, nonetheless display
some of the very same characteristics of vagueness that plague
63. Id.
64. Robert W. Gordon, The Radical Conservatism of the Practice ofJustice, 51 STAN. L. REV.
919, 922-24 (1999) (reviewing SIMON, supra note 5, and also pointing out other respects in
which Simon's approach differs from Luban's).
65. One example of such clear-cut instances include the hiding of design defects of
the Ford Pinto. See LUBAN, note 5 supra, at 206-17. Another is the Cigarette Papers episode,
in which tobacco industry lawyers sheltered behind the cloak of confidentiality and the
protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine industry-
sponsored research into the relationship between cigarette smoking and health problems,
even when that research unambiguously contradicted public representations to regulators
and to the public at large. See STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996); see
also Bruce A. Green, Thoughts about Corporate Lawyers after Reading The Cigarette Papers: Has the
"Wise Counselor" Given Way to the "Hired Gun"?, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 407 (2001).
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bar-crafted rules of professional conduct.6  What lawyers in the
trenches need is a set of clear rules and standards of ethical con-
duct that will inform their decisionmaking in the cut and thrust of
the competitive, pressure-cooker environment in which they find
themselves. As the bar-crafted rules do not adequately perform this
function, alternatives must be considered.
A second criticism of the partisan or "hired gun" philosophy that
is seen as dominating bar-crafted rules of legal ethics is that the
derivation of that approach proceeds less from a principled and
comprehensive assessment of ethical issues facing legal practitio-
ners than from the collective, economic self-interest of the
organized bar. To be sure, the self-interested nature of many pro-
fessional ethics rules has been well-recognized by economists,
6
sociologists, 6s and the legal academy, both in general69 and with re-
gard to specific rules. 7° Indeed, the American Bar Association's
principal purpose in promulgating the original 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics was protectionist. "Rules of ethical deviance
were neither universal nor timeless. They were applied by particu-
lar lawyers to enhance their own status and prestige. Deviance was
less an attribute of an act than a judgment by one group of lawyers
about the inferiority of another.,7' Evidence of protectionism is
66. Rarely, of course, are situations quite as clear-cut as the Ford Pinto or Cigarette Pa-
pers episodes. When ethical dilemmas move into realms of uncertainty and indeterminacy,
as they more commonly do, one finds few business lawyers steeped in moral philosophy.
Furthermore, Luban's notion of "moral activism" presupposes the existence of a commonly
shared morality, a proposition that is increasingly problematic in a large, predominantly
secular, and pluralistic society such as ours.
67. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
68. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON,
THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977).
69. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 14, at 143-83 (proposing lawyer self-interest permeates
virtually all aspects of attorney regulation).
70. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 3-9
(1998) (stating confidentiality rules are structured primarily for the benefit of lawyers);
Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model
Rules, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 243, 270-72 (1985) (stating conflict of interest rules are structured
primarily for the benefit of lawyers); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional
Credential, 94 YALE LJ. 491, 507-46 (1985) (proposing that character and fitness require-
ments for admission to the bar are designed principally to assist lawyers); see also Benjamin
Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers ?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry
and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIz. ST. LJ. 429 (2001); cf. Daniel R. Fischel, Multidisciplinary
Practice, 55 Bus. LAw. 951, 974 (2000) (taking the example of prohibitions on fee sharing
and noting that proponents of that prohibition "have attempted to cloak their arguments in
the rhetoric of 'professionalism,' 'lawyer's independence,' and the 'public interest,'
[though] their goals are no different from any other trade union or interest group pursuing
economic protectionism").
71. AUERBACH, supra note 35, at 50. See also Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 488-89 (N.Y.
1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) (castigating "unscrupulous minority" of the bar for "[a]mbulance
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abundant. It animates greater difficulty in bar examinations (and
the concomitant decline in bar passage rates),7" unauthorized prac-
tice of law rules against multijurisdictional practice, and the
opposition to multidisciplinary practice as well. The pervasiveness
of protectionist responses' is nowhere more evident than in the
chasing" and other "evil practices"); 1 A.B.A. REP. 212 (1878) (decrying low entry standards
as contributing to "extraordinary numbers" of "ignorant" and "unprincipled" lawyers); 29
A.B.A. REP. 601-02 (1906) (calling for promulgation of ethical standards as an antidote for
the "new breed" of lawyers for whom "the good or bad esteem of their co-labourers is noth-
ing ... provided their itching fingers are not thereby stayed in their eager quest for lucre");
Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical
Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 537-38 (1983) (recounting rejection by the Illinois Supreme
Court of a state statute granting graduates of Illinois law schools automatic bar admission
because schools were "diploma mills" and students were frequently immigrants); Marvelle C.
Webber, Origin and Uses of Bar Associations, 7 A.B.A.J. 297, 298 (1921) (holding the New York
bar up as a model to be emulated in battling those who are a "bad influence"). This divide
was emblematic of the inherent elitism that animated the founding of various state and
municipal bar associations, as well as the founding of the ABA itself. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 562-63 (1973);John A. Matzko, "The Best Men of
the Bar" The Founding of the American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN
POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 75-90 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984); POUND, supra note 15, at
255-270.
72. See DeborahJ. Merritt et al., Raising the Bar: A Social Science Critique of Recent Increases
to Passing Scores on the BarExam, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 929 (2001) (noting sharp decline in
bar passage rates since 1994). Whether characterized by the somewhat punning phrase "rais-
ing the bar" (as in the article title just cited) or as "pulling up the ladder," such practices
confer economic benefits upon existing practitioners, who can justify higher fee structures
premised on the profession's higher qualification and entry standards without themselves
having to meet those standards because they are "grandfathered" in. See Barton, supra note
70, at 441-44.
73. See, e.g., Birbrower v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998) (invalidating a retainer
agreement, and fees billed thereunder, by a New York law firm to an originally New York-
based client who later expanded its business and business presence into California in con-
nection with settlement of a dispute (otherwise subject to arbitration) with a Delaware firm
having its principal place of business in California, but curiously ruling that work performed
for the California operations of the client by the New York firm in New York was severable
from the "illegal" California-based work); In re Ferrey, 774 A.2d 62 (R.I. 2001) (denying fees
to a Massachusetts lawyer representing a client before a Rhode Island administrative body,
even though that body had admitted the lawyer po hac vice). The Rhode Island Supreme
Court arrogated unto itself alone the prerogative of pro hac vice admission and held that the
administrative body's action was invalid. Id.
74. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 725-26 (7th ed. 2000). For discussion of the A.B.A. House of
Delegates' rejection of the proposal by the A.B.A. Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
that recommended permitting partnership and fee-sharing with nonlawyer professionals, see
Jenny B. Davis, The Enron Factor, A.B.A.J., April 2002, at 45.
75. An interesting take on the subject is offered in a recent article by Andy Perlman,
who identifies protectionism as one of the reasons that representational rules and structural
rules of ethics suffer from the lack of any unifying theory. SeeAndrew M. Perlman, Toward a
Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977 (2003).
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organized bar's opposition to the proposed rules of the SEC pur-
suant to the statutory mandate of SOXA.6
A third, and equally cogent, criticism of the hired gun model is
that it seeks to impose a "one size fits all" method of regulating le-
gal ethics upon an increasingly fragmented profession composed
of fewer and fewer "general practitioners, 77 and more and more
specialists and sub-specialists in the proliferation of complex,
highly regulated areas of practice.7" To talk in the 21st century
about "the legal profession" is to speak of a nonexistent, monolithic
construct that is, at best, a holdover of 19th century images of
small-town or local law practice 79 and, at worst, a figment of the
imagination.s Though the A.B.A.'s original 1983 Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct,sl which made certain rudimentary distinctions
between a lawyer acting as an "advocate" or as a "counselor,""' rep-
resented an acknowledgment of bar pluralism conspicuously
absent from earlier avatars that relied exclusively on the adversarial
litigation role model, 3 the primacy of trial lawyers' (and, in par-
76. See infra notes 304-28 and accompanying text.
77. Cf James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of Core Values: A "Radical"
Proposal to Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1159,
1178-79 (2000) (proposing that popular conception of the independent general practitio-
ner no longer represents what most American corporate lawyers actually do).
78. See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 3 (1982) ("It has been apparent for some time that the simple view
of the bar as a single, unified profession no longer fits the facts."); David B. Wilkins, Legal
Realismfor Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468, 515-18 (1990).
79. James W. Jones, Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: An Iconoclast's View, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 537, 541 (2002) [hereinafterJones, Future Structure]. AsJones explains:
Our current paradigm sees the prototypical lawyer, much like the English barrister, as an
independent, self-employed litigator who, as a generalist, serves as the personal representa-
tive of his clients and who, because of his unique skills and devotion to public service, is
entitled to an exclusive franchise to a range of activities known as the 'practice of law.' Cli-
ents, under this model, are seen as autonomous individuals who lack the specialized
knowledge of the lawyer concerning the processes, requirements, and language of the law
and, thus, are vulnerable to the system.
Id. See also David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal
Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICE AND TROUBLE CASES 68-108 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
80. As Professor Wolfram has pointed out, the assumption that "all lawyers are suffi-
ciently homogeneous to conform to common standards... was probably unfounded [even]
in 1908," when the A.B.A. first promulgated canons of professional ethics. WOLFRAM, supra
note 37, at 54.
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983).
82. Compare id. art. 2 (Counselor) with id. art. 3 (Advocate).
83. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 54; Schwartz, Professionalism, supra note 11, at
670 (discussing failure of Model Code to make distinctions between litigation and counsel-
ing); E. Wayne Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEx. L. REv. 575, 578-79
(1961) (discussing failure of 1908 Canons to address practice other than litigation); cf
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (Preliminary Statement 1969) (setting standards
for "all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional activity").
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ticular, criminal defense lawyers') 4 concepts of zealous advocacy
of, and unswerving loyalty to, the client continues to force square
pegs into round holes.
85
Some tragic consequences of that disjunction are chronicled in
Part II.
II. FROM NATIONAL STUDENT MARKETING TO ENRON
AND OTHER RECENT SCANDALS
He saw a Lawyer killing a Viper
On a dunghill hard by his own stable;
And the Devil smiled, for it put him in mind
Of Cain and his brother Abel."6
The decline of lawyers' professional ethics can begin innocently
enough, but that downward slope can be slippery indeed. Facilis est
descensus Averno. Let us briefly make a vicarious descent:
* Can it be ethical to alarm or intimidate corporate execu-
tives with the suggestion that particular conduct might
lead (however remote that prospect might be) to indi-
vidual criminal liability (i.e., introducing the prospect
not merely of a fine for the corporate entity but of im-
prisonment) in order to induce them to authorize
massive expenditures for an internal corporate investiga-
tion by the law firm?
" Can it be ethical for a law firm to staff a matter for a cor-
porate client with the highest level employees who could
conceivably perform particular tasks (e.g., using junior
associates rather than nonlegal staff to photocopy
84. See RHODE, supra note 14, at 55 (criticizing "bar's overreliance on criminal defense
as an all-purpose paradigm for the lawyer's role").
85. Cf Jones, Future Structure, supra note 79, at 541 (explaining that rules for governing
the legal profession assume that litigation is the normative setting for legal work); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1159, 1188 (1995) ("[T]he Model Rules still represent an ethics for lawyers
who are presumed to be engaged in a generic practice, with a focus on litigation-even
transactional problems are analyzed with an assumption of the adversary model.").
86. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Devil's Thoughts, in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SAM-
UEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE 320 (Ernest Hartley Coleridge ed., 1912).
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boxloads of corporate documents), thereby inflating
firm billings? 7
Can it be ethical to mark-up long distance telephone
charges, facsimile charges, and overnight courier
charges, to impose charges per key-stroke of word proc-
essing done by secretarial staff, and to charge 250 or 500
per page for photocopying (when the going rate com-
mercially is 5¢), and passing on these inflated charges to
clients in their bills for legal services?"8
* Can it be ethical to represent a corporate client against a
hostile takeover but to refuse to consider a legal defense
simply because it would have a deleterious impact on an
investment banking client that refers millions of dollars
of business to the law firm? 9
" Can it be ethical, to paraphrase Roger Cramton, to "as-
sist ... the managers of insolvent or nearly insolvent
[clients when one knows, or ought to know, they are]
87. Of course, worse practices abound, including fictitious hours and double billing.
For review of some of these practices, see, for example, Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138
U. PA. L. REv. 659, 703-04 (1990). See also Lisa G. Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking: Regulation of
Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 205 (1999) (discussing sixteen
case histories).
88. These practices were rife in large law firms in the 1980s and early 1990s, until ad-
verse publicity in the trade press led to an ABA ethics opinion condemning this practice,
among others. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379
(1993).
89. Another much more shocking example of the lengths to which some lawyers will
go (or, more properly, the depths to which they will descend) from the hostile takeover
milieu has been chronicled. See Philip B. Heymann & Lance Liebman, M&A: The Conoco
Takeover, in THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAwYERS: CASE STUDIES, 106, 117-18 (1988).
As summarized by David Luban:
At one point in the complex machinations, Seagram's entered a hostile tender offer
for Conoco. Joseph Flom, Conoco's chief legal advisor in the tender fight (and the
dean of mergers and acquisitions lawyers), suggested a number of strategies for fend-
ing off the takeover. Among them was a plan to alert Conoco's Arab suppliers that
Seagram's was owned by Edgar Bronfman, a Jew who was highly active in Jewish af-
fairs. Flom reasoned that if the suppliers made a fuss, then Conoco's board could not
permit a potentially devastating change in ownership. The plan was carried out suc-
cessfully. Here, assuming the account is correct, the lawyer has created a potential
international incident, fomented and utilized antisemitism, and-perhaps-
obstructed a legitimate and worthwhile market transaction. Yet here too the standard
conception of the lawyer's role seems to preclude any moral criticism of the tactic.
David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to
Stephen Ellman, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1004, 1018 (1990).
1044 [VOL. 37:4
The Higher Calling
cooking the books, lying to regulators, and defrauding
investors . . ."
From a conventional ethical viewpoint, merely to ask such ques-
tions is, of course, to answer them. Yet, state bar associations and
their disciplinary arms have been appallingly unable or unwilling
(or both) to take effective steps to dissuade such behavior.9'
Indeed, for approximately 35 years, a succession of frauds (e.g.,
National Student Marketing in the late 1960's to early 1970's,
O.P.M. in the 1970's, abusive tax shelters of the 1970's and early
1980's, several of the more spectacular S&L failures during the
S&L crisis of the 1980's and early 1990's,9' the global BCCI bank
fraud of that same period, and now Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, etc.
at the dawn of the 21st Century) have raised questions about law-
yers' professional obligations when they know, or with the exercise
of ordinary professional diligence should know, that corporate in-
siders or agents are engaged in unlawful activity, breaches of
fiduciary duty to the lawyers' actual client (the corporation) that
are likely to cause harm to third persons and/or the corporation.
The unvarnished truth is, of course, that none of these frauds
could have been successfully perpetrated without the assistance of
lawyers, usually skilled and knowledgeable lawyers from the nation's
most elite law firms. That simple truth underlies the drafting and
enactment of SOXA § 307, as evidenced by the contemporaneous
90. Roger C. Cramton, Partners in Crime: Law Schools and the Legal Profession, 19 COR-
NELL L. FORUM, 2, 5 (1993). Such assistance often includes, as chronicled below, the
rendering of legal opinions predicated on facts the lawyer knows, or with the exercise of
reasonable diligence should know, are untrue.
91. Criticism of the efficacy of lawyer disciplinary proceedings comes from many quar-
ters: the former Chief Justice of the United States, the ABA (somewhat unexpectedly), and
(quite expectedly) public interest groups. See, e.g., SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DIs-
CIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (1970) [hereinafter CLARK REPORT]; SHARON TISHER ET AL.,
BRIDGING THE BAR TO JUSTICE 86-117 (1977); Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professional-
isn 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 949, 950 (1995); HALT, Lawryer Accountability, available at
http://wwwhalt'org/reform-projects/lawyer-accountability (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). In a speech delivered September 20, 2002, former SEC
Chairman Harvey Pitt asserted that, despite scrupulous record-keeping of referrals by the
Commission to state bar associations for disciplinary action, there seems to have been no
response from the state bars. Rachel McTague, Pitt Says SEC Will Take on Assignment of Disci-
plining Lawyers if State Bars Do Not, 79 BNA BANKING REP. 530 (Sept. 30, 2002).
92. To name but a few of the most notorious: Lincoln Savings & Loan of Irvine, Cali-
fornia; American Diversified Savings Bank of Costa Mesa, California; Vernon Savings & Loan
of Dallas, Texas; and Centrust Savings of Miami, Florida. See generally MARTIN MAYER, THE
GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY 293-94 (1990, rev. 1992).
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remarks of certain Senators. For example, Senator Michael Enzi
(R-Wyo.), referring to the corporate scandals that precipitated
SOXA, observed "that probably in every transaction there was a
lawyer who drew up the documents involved in that procedure.
9 3
Even more telling was the statement by a co-sponsor of § 307, a
former partner and CEO of Goldman Sachs, SenatorJon Corzine:
In fact, in our corporate world today-and I can verify this by
my own experiences-executives and accountants work day to
day with lawyers. They give them advice on almost each and
every transaction. That means when executives and account-
ants have been engaged in wrongdoing, there have been
some other folks at the scene of the crime-and generally
they are lawyers .
A. National Student Marketing
1. The Ethical Problems--A planned merger between National
Student Marketing Corp. (NSM) and Interstate Corp., companies
represented, respectively, by two distinguished law firms, New
York's White & Case (W&C)7 and Chicago's Lord, Bissell & Brook
(LB&B), was on the verge of foundering. Shareholder approval
had been solicited based on disclosures that the acquirer, NSM,
anticipated a $700,000 profit for the first nine months of that year,
but, on the day of closing, NSM's accountants had developed cold
feet and had not delivered the "comfort letter" (confirming that
the $700,000 profit projection was consistent with GAAP) called for
in the definitive merger agreement. The accountants had cold feet
for good reason: the $700,000 profit represented to the sharehold-
93. 148 CONG. REc. S6554 (daily ed.July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
94. 148 CONG. RIc. at S6556 (statement of Sen. Corzine). As is well known, similar
sentiments were expressed in the aftermath of the S&L crisis.
95. Rather than litigate, W&C, without admitting or denying the Commission's find-
ings, stipulated to a consent order requiring it to comply with the federal securities laws and
ordering it "to adopt, effectuate and maintain procedures in connection with its representa-
tion of clients in matters involving the federal securities laws." SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg.
Corp., Litigation Release No. 7012 (May 2, 1977) (on file with author). Among the proce-
dures were "provisions relating to the taking on of certain new clients, review of certain
registration statements by a second partner of the firm experienced in securities matters
who is not otherwise involved in the transaction, and identification of certain circumstances
involving the issuance of securities to the public where consultation with other partners
within the firm is required." Id.
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ers was non-existent and an accurate projection for the period in
question was in fact a loss.
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. National Student Marketing
Corp.,96 the SEC sued both law firms for allowing the deal to close
without disclosing this material change in NSM's financial condi-
tion and prospects to the shareholders; indeed, not only did the
lawyers allow the deal to close despite a huge discrepancy in the
financial statements, but they also delivered at closing opinion let-
ters to the effect that the merger complied with applicable laws.07
The SEC asserted that the rules of ethics required any lawyer
who knows his client is committing fraud to endeavor to persuade
the client to desist, and, failing that, to disclose the fraud. Interest-
ingly, in 1972, at the time the case was brought,98 this ethical norm
was endorsed by the American Bar Association and was part of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility,qg then the prevailing body of
rules governing lawyers because it had been almost universally
adopted by the states.'00
The complaint sought injunctive relief designed to prescribe a
flow chart of attorney conduct in such situations:
(1) endeavor to get the clients to postpone the merger, and
thereupon revise the documents to make them not mis-
leading and resubmit them to the shareholders;
(2) if that fails, endeavor to impede the closing of the trans-
action by refusing to provide requisite opinions of
counsel; and
96. 457 F.Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
97. Id. at 714-15.
98. The conduct obviously antedated the proceeding, having begun in 1968. Com-
plaint, SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972).
99. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969). The extant (1969) version of DR
7-102 (B) (1) provides: "A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that ... [h]is
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribu-
nal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is
unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal." This language
restated what had been the prevailing (and longstanding) ethical rule under the predeces-
sor regime, the CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, which provided in pertinent part: "When
a lawyer discovers some fraud or deception has been practiced, ... he should endeavor to
rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if his client refuses to forgo the advantage thus
unjustly gained, he should promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so that they
may take appropriate steps." CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 41 (1908).
100. WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 56.
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(3) if that fails, resign the engagement and disclose the cli-
ent fraud to the SEC and the shareholders. 11
The bar vigorously and stridently opposed this approach, argu-
ing that any such ethical precept was, in effect, "trumped" by
another ethical principle-the lawyer's duty of confidentiality.0 2 To
continue this whist/contract bridge metaphor, the SEC's complaint
posited what was at the very least a no trump regime, or possibly
even a different trump system, embodying a contrary hierarchical
array of ethical duties-one where the obligations of rectification
and disclosure in the case of client fraud would trump the duty of
confidentiality, either in general or, at the very least, where neces-
sary to stop the fraud.
In an article published ten years ago, Susan Koniak offered a
trenchant critique of the court's somewhat bizarre decision in Na-
tional Student Marketing.0 3 On the one hand, it held that the lawyers
had violated the federal securities laws by knowingly and substan-
tially assisting the client fraud, even where the extent of the
lawyer's conduct was, in effect, to stick his head, ostrich-like, in the
sand and pretend not to see the fraud. 10 4 "[S]ilence or inaction in
such situations is wrong," the court opined, "[because] the attor-
neys' responsibilities to their corporate client required them to
take steps to ensure that the information would be disclosed to the
shareholders.",105
Koniak pointedly criticized the court for begging the question.
Not only did the court fail to specify what those steps should be,0 6
or even what the lawyers did in the case that violated the securities
laws, but it went on to say: "[I]t is unnecessary to determine the
precise extent of their obligations here, since ... [the lawyers]
took no steps whatsoever to delay the closing .... But, at the very
least, they were required to speak out [to their clients] at the clos-
101. Complaint, SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972).
102. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1945), in-
terpreting the predecessor to the Model Code, the CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908): "We
do not consider that either the duty of candor and fairness to the court, as stated in Canon
22, or the provisions of Canon 29 [requiring disclosure of perjury] or Canon 41 [requiring
disclosure of fraud to the injured party or tribunal] ... are sufficient to override the pur-
pose, policy and express obligation [to keep client confidences] under Canon 37."
103. Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame It to Their Wi,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (1993).
104. See SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.Supp. 682, 713--15 (D.D.C. 1978).
105. Id. at 713.
106. Koniak, supra note 103, at 1081 ("What steps? There's the rub.").
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ing ... 1"07 As Koniak observed, the words "at the very least" sug-
gest that further obligations, such as disclosure, resignation, or
both, might be appropriate, but the court declined to take a posi-
tion, to grant the SEC's requested injunction, or even to explain
why specification of a securities lawyer's obligations in this setting
was "unnecessary."' ' s Instead, the court merely invited the organ-
ized bar to reconsider its position: "The very initiation of this
action ... has provided a necessary and worthwhile impetus for the
profession's recognition and assessment of its responsibilities in
this area."'09 Amazing is it not, what six years of litigation can yield?
Even more pernicious than the court's abdication of its respon-
sibility to come to grips with the issues raised by the case was the
equivocal message conveyed by the decision. On the one hand, the
bar was presumed to enjoy plenary self-regulatory authority over
the conduct in question, even to the extent of defining for itself
(potentially at odds with the regulatory pronouncements of the
SEC) what constitutes securities fraud, notwithstanding the bar's
known proclivities toward elevating client confidentiality above all
other ethical values. Furthermore, the court declined to enjoin
LBL to revamp its internal policies and procedures in a manner
that would minimize the risk of repeating the misconduct identi-
fied in the case, because the court assumed that the firm would
voluntarily take "appropriate steps" to see to it that its lawyers "con-
form their conduct to the dictates of the law."" 0 This sent a strong
message to the bar that its hegemony over professional regulation
was undiminished by the regulatory context of the case.
To justify its refusal to sanction the lawyers, the court ex-
pressed its confidence that the defendants' "professional
responsibilities as attorneys and officers of the court" would
lead them to honor the court's interpretation without force.
The court's confidence in the lawyers before it, and by exten-
sion in all lawyers, rings hollow. According to the court, the
lawyers before it aided securities fraud, and the bar needed
the SEC's threat of force to mend its ways.... [Yet], according
107. Nat'1 Student Mktg., 457 ESupp. at 713.
108. Koniak, supra note 103, at 1081.
109. Nat'l Student Mktg., 457 F.Supp. at 714.
110. Id. at 716-17. Sadly, the firm failed to take those steps, an omission that only came
to light seventeen years later when it was sued for similar securities law violations and ended
up settling for $24 million. See Tim O'Brien, Some Firms Never Learn, AM. LAW., Oct. 1989, at
63-64.
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to the court, [it] need not back its interpretation with force
because lawyers, members of the bar, are involved. The court
seems to have been determined to perpetrate the myth that
lawyers, unlike the rest of the populace, are so committed to
the law (at least as articulated by courts) that no power is
needed to ensure the legal community's obedience. At the
same time, the court seems to have been all too aware that
this is a myth-a myth that might be shattered if courts articu-
lated with any precision what a lawyer must do instead of just
sitting there. Rather than test the myth and risk shattering it,
the court abdicated its responsibility, leaving the state and the
bar to battle over the shape of the law.1"'
On the other hand, as Koniak notes, the court did not brand the
SEC's enforcement posture as inappropriate or illegitimate. 2 Far
from it: The court did accept the notion that the lawyers in the case
were culpable to some unspecified degree. 3 This confused and
timid approach, which Koniak seems rightly to have characterized
as an "abdication" of the judicial role, allowed the organized bar to
mount an effective" 4 public relations campaign against what was
characterized as an unwonted intrusion by a federal government
111. Koniak, supra note 103, at 1083 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 1081-82.
113. As for closing opinions asserting that the merger complied with applicable laws,
the court concluded that this was not sufficient to constitute "substantial" assistance to secu-
rities fraud so as to give rise to aiding and abetting liability. See Nat'l Student Mktg., 457
F.Supp. at 715. Koniak has more recently criticized this aspect of the court's decision as well:
"[T]hat reasoning conflicts with the court's holding that silence during the meeting consti-
tuted substantial assistance." Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle
With the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1236, 1252 (2003). Arguably, Koniak's criticism does not
go far enough. Opinions of counsel such as those exchanged at the National Student Mar-
keting closing are, in fact, indispensable to the parties' ability to consummate the
transaction and are frequently a condition precedent (as they were, in fact, in National Stu-
dent Marketing) to the parties' obligations to close. See, e.g., SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR.,
BUSINESS PLANNING FOR MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS 784 (2d ed. 2001). Put another way,
the transaction cannot close without delivery of those opinions and, by delivering them
under these circumstances, the lawyers were allowing their work product to be used by the
client to effect a fraudulent result. Hence, to require of the lawyers some affirmative per-
suading or cajoling activity to motivate the client to "do the right thing" was actually
superfluous, when all they needed to do was refuse to deliver the requisite closing opinions.
114. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text for more on the efficacy of this cam-
paign. At the same time that it gave comfort to the ABA, however, National Student Marketing
sent an implicit message to the federal government that it may under appropriate circum-
stances be able to use its enormous power to coerce the bar into reconsidering its position
on ethical issues, thereby creating the institutional incentives for the OTS's use of adminis-
trative enforcement actions against law firms, including its notorious 1992 action against
Kaye, Scholer.
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agency into the prerogative of the states to regulate and discipline
attorneys."15
2. The Regulatory Response-The ABA had a double-barreled re-
action to the SEC's stance in the NSM case. Both barrels were
aimed at strengthening the citadel of client confidentiality, which
the bar has since conveniently (if mistakenly) characterized as one
of its "core values."
'
1
6
First, the ABA amended the Model Code's DR 7-102(B)" 7 in
1974 to vitiate the lawyer's disclosure obligation thereunder "when
the information is protected as a privileged communication.""
8
Given the breadth with which the bar interprets the scope of privi-
leged communications, this effectively renders any affirmative
obligation on the part of attorneys to rectify client fraud nuga-
tory."9 As a leading legal ethics treatise tartly observes, "To
115. Faced with a storm of professional outrage, the SEC took a considerably more
modest position in In re Carter andJohnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (1981) (explaining that when a
lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a company's compliance with
the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is
engaged in a substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his
continued participation violates professional standards unless he takes prompt steps to end
his client's noncompliance); see infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
116. That characterization came in connection with the ABA House of Delegates' rejec-
tion in 2000 of the recommendations of its Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice. See
John Gibeaut, "It's a Done Deal": House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chances for MDP, A.B.A.J., Sept.
2000, at 92. That rejection was accompanied by a resolution on "core values of the profes-
sion" that provided, in pertinent part, "1. It is in the public interest to preserve the core
values of the legal profession, among which are ... [c.] the lawyer's duty to hold client con-
fidences inviolate." ABA House of Delegates Resolution adopted July 2000, § 1 (c), available
at http:// www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecoml0F.html (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). Nathan Crystal has elegantly demonstrated that this notion lacks a
sound footing from either the historical or the policy points of view. See Nathan M. Crystal,
Core Values: False and True, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 747, 756-62 (2001).
117. See supra note 99 (discussing 1969 version).
118. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(B)(1) (1974). Interestingly,
only a minority of jurisdictions adopted the ABA's amended version of DR 7-102(B). Geof-
frey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a Professional Norm, 33
EMORY L.J. 271, 294 n.38 (1984) (listing 14jurisdictions).
119. A somewhat bizarre application of these principles arose in Massachusetts where a
law firm was sued for knowingly failing to disclose in a private placement memorandum that
its client was insolvent. Paradoxically, the court concluded that the firm might be liable in
negligence to third parties that it knew would rely on its legal work, but not for intentionally
misleading behavior, as was alleged here. Austin v. Bradley, Barry & Tarlow, P.C., 836 F.Supp.
36, 40 (D. Mass. 1993). Though the case was decided ten years after introduction of the
Model Rules, Massachusetts remained governed by its version of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In balancing the duty of confidentiality against the duty owed to third parties,
the court curiously failed to come to grips with the Code's requirement that the lawyers
endeavor to rectify client fraud when their services were being used to further it. Instead,
the court found the law firm's economic interests in keeping the client happy and
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effectively repeal the duty to rectify fraud, while nominally preserv-
ing it, is surely disingenuous.'
2
1
Second, the ABA adopted a policy statement that threw down
the gauntlet:
Any principle of law which, except as permitted or required
by the [Model Code], permits or obliges a lawyer to disclose
to the S.E.C. otherwise confidential information should be es-
tablished only by statute after full and careful consideration of
the public interests involved and should be resisted unless
clearly mandated by law.'
2
'
Professor Koniak's criticism of this language, and of subsequent
language in the policy statement expressing apprehension about
lawyers being deterred from maintaining client confidences by an
"erroneous position of the S.E.C. or a questionable lower court de-cso ," 122 isscic.n 123
cision, is succinct and devastating. Her main point is that
implicit in the bar's language and lobbying efforts is the notion
that lawyers as a group (ill-defined, of course, though presumably
the ABA hierarchy, which is dominated by the Section on Litiga-
tion, is really referring to itself) "know better"124 than the legislative
and executive branches of government what the law is and will
construe contrary pronouncements that infringe upon lawyers'
turf as narrowly as possible, and a "call to arms" for members of the
bar to resist.1
25
continuing to collect large legal fees too minimal to establish a prima facie showing that its
(concededly material) omission was intended to further the client's fraud and concluded
that the plaintiff had therefore failed to rebut the proposition that the lawyers' silence was
dictated by the obligation of confidentiality. Id. at 39-40.
120. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 284 (3d ed.
1999). For more on the history of this episode, not the bar's finest hour, see id. at 282-88.
121. Statement of Policy Adopted by American Bar Association Regarding Responsibilities and Li-
abilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. LAw. 543, 544-45 (1975) [hereinafter ABA
Policy Statement]. Koniak has a field day with the extreme ungainliness of this document's
title: "Notice the implicit separation of the SEC from the law the agency 'administers' in this
awkward and thus obviously consciously drafted title. The message is that the SEC's state-
ments (certainly including its National Student Marketing complaint) are a far cry from the
law. The agency and the lawyers (advising on 'compliance') are rendered equals by this
artful phrasing." Koniak, supra note 113, at 1254 n.60.
122. ABA Policy Statement, supra note 121, at 545.
123. SeeKoniak, supra note 113, at 1254-55.
124. A point Koniak does not make is that this theme of lawyers "knowing better" than
nonlawyers is pervasive. See, e.g., Bierig, supra note 31.
125. See Koniak, supra note 113, at 1255. What Koniak does not say is that this call to
arms is couched in phrases emphasizing the bar's view of itself as the public's champion:
"[E]fforts by the government to impose responsibility upon lawyers to assure the quality of
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Koniak's enthusiasm for deconstructing the National Student
Marketing decision is manifest.2 1 Yet the case is "becoming an
anachronism,"2 7 not merely because the harm pales beside that
caused by the other scandals summarized here in Part II, but be-
cause of more recent judicial decisions condoning far worse lawyer
conduct in connection with securities matters. The oft-excoriated
128
Fourth Circuit decision in Schatz v. Rosenberg29 held that lawyers
could substantially assist clients in committing fraud in a securities
transaction and escape liability even where they knew of the fraud
and had "papered" the deal. The Fourth Circuit again, in Fortsen v.
Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick,130 though acknowledging the
law firm's violation of pertinent securities laws as well as a formal
opinion of the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Ethics,'
refused to hold the firm liable for failing to question clients about
their clients' compliance with the law or to compel lawyers to give advice resolving all doubts
in favor of regulatory restrictions would evoke serious and far-reaching disruption in the
role of the lawyer as counselor, which would be detrimental to the public, clients and the
legal profession." ABA Policy Statenent, supra note 121, at 545. This formulation owes much
to the "criminal defense" mindset of the bar's ethics dogma, but "[b]ar rhetoric that casts
the lawyer as a 'champion against a hostile world' seems out of touch with most daily prac-
tice. The vast majority of legal work assists corporate and wealthy individual clients in a
system that is scarcely hostile to their interests. When a Wall Street firm representing a For-
tune 500 corporation squares off against understaffed regulators or a victim of unsafe
products, the balance of power is not what bar metaphors imply." RHODE, supra note 14, at
55.
126. She has critiqued the decision in print now on at least three occasions. See Susan P.
Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 217-19 (2003); Koniak,
supra note 103, at 1079-84, 1093-95; Koniak, supra note 113, at 1248-56.
127. Donald C. Langevoort, Were Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers' Re-
sponsibilityfor Clients'Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 89 n.54 (1993).
128. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Schatz Ruling Errs on Legal, Moral Basis, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 20, 1992, at 17; Peter C. Kostant, Sacred Cows or Cash Cows: The Abuse of Rhetoric inJustify-
ing Some Current Norms of Transactional Lawyering, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 49, 56 (2001);
Langevoort, supra note 127, at 87-88; Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Dis-
closure for Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REv. 225, 244 (1996) . See
also David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEo. L.J. 957, 979 n.52 (1999) (explaining that the
"court simply rolled outright lies into the category of nonfraudulent nondisclosures" and in
responding to argument that Maryland's stringent legal ethics rules required disclosure or
withdrawal, "stated that ethics rules are not rules of civil liability-completely ignoring the
Schatzes' point that ethics, violations should establish liability under federal securities law,
not under the ethics rules"); Richard M. Philips, Client Fraud and the Securities Lawyers'Duty of
Confidentiality, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 823, 826-28 (1992) (characterizing Schatz as an ex-
treme case and noting that, even within the securities bar, there is concern that the
"obligation of silence" under Model Rule 1.6 "undermines public confidence in the integrity
of the profession").
129. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
130. 961 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1992).
131. To wit: ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (revised
1982), discussed infra at notes 166-170 and accompanying text.
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illegal schemes. In another case, knowingly misrepresenting to
buyers of securities and their counsel that the issuer was not in de-
fault on loan obligations and that the proposed transactions would
not constitute a further default, as well as warning them against
communicating directly with the lender in question, was astonish-
ingly deemed by a district court to be a suitable occasion for
awarding summary judgment to the law firm, a decision that was
initially affirmed on appeal,13 only to be finally reversed en banc,1
3
3
albeit with several judges in dissent.
Other courts have demonstrated institutional reluctance-
indeed, distaste-for anything smacking of imposing liability for
failure to "tattle""134 on clients, even where the lawyers affirmatively
threatened third parties (securities analysts, journalists, and even
members of the public!) if they should investigate or publish arti-
cles about the client's financial condition,3 5 or where the lawyer
was also a director 3 6 whose board colleagues were buying a minor-
ity shareholder/ director's stock without disclosing to their seller
colleague the existence of secret negotiations to buy the com-
137pany.
132. Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 110 F.3d 1247 (6th Cir. 1997).
133. Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
134. The disparaging "tattling" motif-an all but outcome determinative characteriza-
tion because of the word's primal, stigmatizing connotations from typical elementary school
experience-appears to have originated with, of all people, Judge Frank Easterbrook, in
Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Neither
lawyers nor accountants are required to tattle on their clients in the absence of some duty to
disclose."), and to have been quoted with approval in a number of other cases. See, e.g.,
Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 E3d 1194, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001); Schlaifer Nance & Co. v.
Estate of Andy Warhol, 927 ESupp. 650, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 119 F.3d 91 (2d Cir.
1997); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1133 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds,
492 U.S. 914 (1989); In re Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F.Supp. 2d 1331, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2002);
Morin v. Trupin, 711 F.Supp. 97, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). That the quoted language from Judge
Easterbrook's opinion begs the question posed in all these cases (i.e., whether there is a duty
to disclose) is, perhaps, too obvious a point forjudges fond of the anathematizing "tattling"
label to trouble themselves about. Cf In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., Nos. 1:90-CV-805, 1:90-CV-
806, 1992 WL 226912, at *7 (W.D. Mich. July 8, 1992) (characterizing Schatz and Barker as
"pure tattling cases"); Ferguson v. Lurie, No. 89 C 2283, 1990 WL 180582 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31,
1990) (holding the allegations of the second amended complaint sufficient to survive mo-
tion to dismiss and not implicating Barker's concern with tattling on clients).
135. In 7e Cascade Int'l Securities Litig., 840 F.Supp. 1558, 1563-64 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
136. Cf Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F.Supp. 255, 266 (D. Or. 1972) (stating role of law-
yer/director goes "beyond a lawyer's normal one"). Accord, Rospatch, 1992 WL 226912 at *7.
137. Camp v. Dema, 948 E2d 455, 463 (8th Cir. 1991). The court's conclusion that the
information was not significant because it was confidential stands legal analysis on its head.
Apart from the oddity of condoning negotiations for sale of the company that can be kept
"confidential" from a member of the board, it was only because of the nondisclosure of
those secret negotiations that the fraud and deception in question could have taken place.
In these cases, 38 whether the court chooses to hide behind the
analytically bankrupt "tattling" metaphor or not, the point is not
simply imposing liability for merely keeping silent but for affirma-
tively-and knowingly-involving oneself in furthering the client's
fraud. Thus, these decisions are actually much worse than National
Student Marketing. There, while the SEC sought to hold the lawyers
responsible for failure to take steps to stop the merger once they
learned that shareholder approval had been procured on the basis
of false financial information, there was no evidence of scienter at
the time the false and misleading disclosure statements were pre-
pared or filed and no evidence that the lawyers desired to facilitate
the fraud.139 Thus the bar's public relations campaign in the wake
of National Student Marketing has been unusually successful in pre-
disposing the judiciary to distend client confidentiality-even to
cover circumstances where lawyers threaten lawsuits in order to
dissuade investors or others from self-help to learn the truth-and
thereby largely immunize business lawyers from the consequences
of their own misconduct.
The question that one wants to ask with respect to this tactic of
threatening investors to prevent them from learning material facts,
however, and one that keeps recurring in case after case like a
fugue subject, is: "What could these lawyers have been thinking?" Is
there any way, other than by recourse to the most extreme inter-
pretation of what it means to be a zealous advocate, to justify that
138. Note that the lawyer conduct in these cases antedated the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), and that
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), does not authorize
liability for aiders and abettors but only for primary violators. Even so, much of the conduct
at issue in the cases described involved actual misrepresentations by lawyers, not merely assis-
tance in drafting documents in which the client misrepresented, and, under such
circumstances, liability should lie even under the tougher Central Bank standard. See, e.g.,
Rubin, 143 F.3d at 267 (lawyers in "direct contact" with plaintiffs). Also, while liability to
private plaintiffs might at times be problematic under the Central Bank standard, Congress
affirmed the SEC's ability to proceed against aiders and abettors in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PSLRA]. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f). For insightful
discussions of this legislation and Central Bank, see Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities
Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1293
(1999); Melissa Harrison, The Assault on the Liability of Outside Professionals: Are Lawyers and
Accountants Off the Hook?, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 473, 498-513,523-24 (1996).
139. Cf In re Carter & Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (1981) (explaining that the SEC, in the
context of a Rule 2(e) disciplinary proceeding, found no willful aiding and abetting in law-
yer silence or inaction in the face of client misconduct, but rather lawyers who were "simply
at a loss for how to deal with a difficult client") For discussion of SEC administrative actions
and Rule 2(e), see infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
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sort of behavior, especially when, outside the litigation context, the
"zealous advocate" characterization is inapt and inappropriate?
So much for private securities litigation, but what of the possibil-
ity of an SEC proceeding? Sadly, the bar's campaign has been quite
effective in diluting this alternative as well, and, since 1981, rela-
tively few such proceedings have been brought against lawyers.
Indeed, the frequency with which one encounters the "revolving
door" phenomenon with securities lawyers from elite firms becom-
ing senior SEC officials (including Commissioners), developing
close working relationships with both career SEC staff and other
"revolving door" personnel, and then returning to private practice
makes that agency unusually susceptible to regulatory capture by
the private securities bar.
In the aftermath of the court's unsatisfying decision in National
Student Marketing and the unremitting hostility of the private bar,
the Commission developed an understandable preference for pro-
ceeding administratively. 140 The first significant action against a law
firm was In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp,14 in which the Commis-
sion alleged that the law firm had prepared for its client a variety of
documents and legal opinions and had provided legal advice and a
range of legal services in connection with transactions in which the
filings made with the SEC contained untrue statements of material
facts and material omissions of fact. The proceeding, which was
brought under the SEC's Rule 2(e),1" was contemporaneous with a
civil injunctive action filed against the client, its controlling share-
holder, chairman and president, Ohio magnate Carl H. Lindner,
140. Nevertheless, since its National Student Marketing complaint, the SEC has occa-
sionally brought injunctive actions against lawyers who commit securities violations. These
have, for the most part, been carefully chosen and have been resolved by consent orders. See,
e.g., SEC v. Goodman, Litigation Release No. 14,471, 1995 WL 229093 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 18,
1995); SEC v. Matthews & Wright Group, Inc., Litigation Release No. 12, 50, 49 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 975 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1991); SEC v. Vance, Litigation Release No. 12,652, 47
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 367 (D. Utah Oct. 1, 1990); SEC v. Grushko, Litigation Release No.
12,252, 44 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1078 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 1989).
141. Exchange Act Release No. 34-15982 (July 2, 1979), 1979 WL 186370.
142. 17 C.ER. § 201.2(e) (1979). Under Rule 2(e), the SEC reserves the right to disci-
pline professionals appearing or practicing before it whom it finds to lack the requisite
qualifications, to lack character or integrity (or to have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct), or to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the viola-
tion of any provision of the Federal securities laws. Id. During the SEC's 1995 revisions of its
rules of practice, Rule 2(e) was recodified as Rule 102(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e), but with-
out any substantive change to its language or scope.
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and two of the name partners, Charles H. Keating, Jr. 4"' and Donald
P. Klekamp. Both proceedings were settled by consent.
In the Rule 2(e) proceeding, the Commission declined to im-
pose any sanction against the law firm but preferred to announce
standards of attorney conduct prospectively. Commissioner
Roberta Karmel, in dissent, questioned the SEC's authority to dis-
cipline lawyers under Rule 2(e) and expressed the belief that "it is
repugnant to our adversary system of legal representation to per-
mit a prosecutorial agency to discipline attorneys who act as
counsel to regulated persons. The frequently made distinction be-
tween the lawyer as an adversary versus the lawyer as an advisor
cannot and should not be made by an agency with significant
prosecutorial responsibilities."' This drew a retort from Chairman
Harold Williams, who wrote separately to point out that "[f] ederal
courts have recognized the authority of agencies generally to disci-
pline professionals who practice before them,"145 and to assert that
he could not "accept that the Commission should now, as a matter
of law, reverse itself, conclude that it lacks an authority which it has
repeatedly exercised, and deny its ability to shield its administrative
mechanisms from those professionals who have demonstrated a
capacity and willingness to abuse those processes.'
46
More widely known is the Commission's landmark Carter &John-
son proceeding. 147 The case concerned falsely rosy reports of
financial condition intended to deceive lenders. The lawyers, out-
side securities counsel, advised the client to make appropriate
disclosures, but the client refused. In dismissing the case, the
Commission concluded that the lawyers in question had neither
aided and abetted the issuer's disclosure violations nor violated
established standards of professional conduct. The Commission
also rejected the staffs position that taking no action while the cli-
ent committed securities fraud constituted ethical and professional
misconduct.149 However, the Commission did take the opportunity
143. This was the very same Keating who, within a few years, would preside over one of
the largest and most damaging financial frauds in U.S. history, Lincoln Savings & Loan of
Irvine, California.
144. In reKeating, Muething & Klekamp, Release No. 15982, 1979 WL 186370 at *12.
145. Id. at *17. Rule 2(e) dated back to the 1930's, and since that time, the Commission
had brought over 100 proceedings thereunder against lawyers and eighty against account-
ants. Id.
146. Id. at *18.
147. In re Carter &Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (1981).
148. Id. at 500-12.
149. Id. at 511-12.
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to announce a prospective standard for lawyers with significant re-
sponsibilities regarding a company's compliance with the
disclosure requirements. If such a lawyer should become aware
that his client is engaged in a substantial and continuing failure to
satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued participation
would violate professional standards unless he took prompt steps
to end the client's noncompliance.'50 While initially counseling that
accurate disclosure would adequately discharge the lawyer's obliga-
tion, the Commission stated that there may come a point at which
a reasonable lawyer must conclude his or her advice is not being
followed or sought in good faith.15' At that point, the lawyer would
be required to take some other action, such as approaching other
members of the company's management or its board of directors,
or even resigning from the representation, to avoid the inference
of having been co-opted into the scheme of non-disclosure. 52
Since Carter &Johnson, the SEC has followed a practice, first an-
nounced in 1982 by then-General Counsel Edward Greene, of not
commencing a Rule 2(e) proceeding against an attorney in the
absence of a prior determination by an Article III court that the
attorney was guilty of wrongdoing in connection with securities
laws. 153 The agency's punctilious observance of this practice, and
the inordinate attention that it gives to proceedings against mem-
bers of the private securities bar,154 is a strong indication of the
150. Id.at5ll.
151. Id.at511-12.
152. "What is required, in short, is some prompt action that leads to the conclusion that
the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying problem, rather than having ca-
pitulated to the desires of a strong-willed, but misguided client." Id at 512. Applying this
standard in a subsequent proceeding in the Salomon Brothers government securities trad-
ing scandal, the Commission held that Salomon's chief legal officer, knowing that a trader
had submitted false bids on Treasury securities, should have taken affirmative measures to
cause the misconduct to be addressed. These measures ranged from taking the matter
straight to the board of directors, resigning from the representation (difficult when one is a
full-time employee), or disclosing to regulatory authorities. See In re Gutfreund, SEC Release
No. 34-31554, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,067 (Dec. 3, 1992).
153. Edward F. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Remarks to the New York County Lauyers'Ass'n Uan. 3, 1982] 14 SEc. REC. & L. REP.
(BNA) 168 (Jan. 20, 1982).
154. Indeed, this subject has preoccupied many SEC General Counsels both before and
after Greene. See, e.g., James R. Doty, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Lawyers: The Next Phase,
35 S. TEx. L. REv. 585 (1994); Daniel L. Goelzer & Susan F. Wyderko, Rule 2(e): Securities and
Exchange Commission Discipline of Professionals, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 652 (1991); James R. Doty,
Regulatory Expectations Regarding the Conduct of Attorneys in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities
Laws: Recent Developments and Lessons for the Future, 48 Bus. LAw. 1543 (1993); Ralph C.
Ferrara, Administrative Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e), 36 Bus. LAw. 1807 (1981);
Simon M. Lorne & W. Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions Against Lawyers Before the SEC, 50
Bus. LAW. 1293 (1995).
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degree to which the SEC has been subject to regulatory capture by
elite securities attorneys.'5
B. Tax Shelter Opinions
1. The Ethical Problems-In general, tax shelters are nothing
more than tax-advantaged investments making use of benefits and
tax preferences Congress has provided in the Internal Revenue
Code. In addition to enjoying a return on the investment, the pur-
chaser may benefit from a deduction or tax credit that serves to
reduce or "shelter" taxable income from other sources. There is
nothing intrinsically wrong or unethical about either purchasing
or marketing a tax shelter or furnishing counseling or other legal
services in connection with such shelters, because there is no legal
or ethical obligation to pay more in taxes than the law requires.
Nevertheless, as with other investment vehicles, there is potential
for abuse.
Beginning in the early 1970's, tax shelters began to be marketed
to smaller, middle-class investors who previously could not have
afforded them. As that decade wore on, with the advent of double-
digit inflation, soaring interest rates, and high marginal tax rates,
demand for such investments skyrocketed, and unscrupulous pro-
moters saw an opportunity to sell investments that were not
genuinely intended to exploit areas of business (e.g., energy) upon
which Congress had, for policy reasons, decided to confer tax pref-
erences, and that, in fact, had no business purpose or investment
rationale other than tax avoidance. s6 These "abusive" tax shelters
took advantage of a number of factors, including the limited audit
resources of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the high cost of
audits relative to the anticipated return, and the fact that ordinary
investors could be inoculated against severe tax penalties because
they reasonably relied on legal opinions rendered in connection
with the investment offering and could not, therefore, be proved
155. Nor is it an accident that most of these articles in the preceding footnote were
published in the Business Lawoyer, the official journal of the ABA's Business Law Section,
which is dominated by the securities bar. See infra note 428 and accompanying text.
156. For example, land flips and other transfers of property at artificially inflated prices,
passing off nonrecourse debt as risk debt, sham trading to create losses, and allocating in-
come and tax deductions in limited partnerships in a manner totally at odds with economic
reality.
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by the IRS to have acted recklessly or fraudulently (or, indeed,
even negligently).
Thus, after years of banging its head against the wall in failed at-
tempts to crack down on these abusive tax shelters directly, the
IRS'5 realized that the most promising avenue of attack was against
the legal opinions themselves. Three genres of legal opinions
aided significantly in promoting such shelters, and they shall be
categorized here as (i) phantasms, (ii) "pure" hypotheticals, and
(iii) selective ignorance. Phantasms were legal opinions proceed-
ing from a set of meticulously identified factual assumptions that
allowed the opinion giver to opine favorably from the tax perspec-
tive (based, of course, solely on those factual assumptions), even
though those assumptions did not necessarily bear any resem-
blance to reality. 8'5 "Pure" hypotheticals were opinions proceeding
from naked sets of facts, the tax consequences of which were
clearly spelled out, but without any hint of even a remote connec-
tion to the actual facts of an actual transaction or investment
opportunity. 59 Selective ignorance opinions gave consideration to
only some (and usually, the least difficult or controversial) of the
tax issues raised by a particular transaction or investment opportu-
157. As argued in Part IV, infra, one pervasive problem in federal agency actions against
lawyers is the agency's inherent conflict of interest. Federal agencies, like governmental
units anywhere, are chronically understaffed and underfunded. Nothing would please them
better than to be able to deputize the private bar to assist them in performing their ap-
pointed regulatory functions. This temptation, and the linkage of claims brought with the
agency's substantive policies, causes many attorney disciplinary proceedings (e.g., SEC Rule
2(e) proceedings, see supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text) or enforcement actions
(e.g., OTS proceedings against law firms, see infra notes 430-39 and accompanying text) to
lose the appearance of fairness. Arthur Best noted a similar problem with respect to the
Treasury's effort to crack down on tax shelter opinions:
When [Treasury] proposed standards for lawyers who write opinions for planned tax
shelter transactions tensions such as those described in connection with the SEC's
work developed, leading the ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility to issue an opinion that countered some of Treasury's standards. Compare Tax
Shelters; Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, Proposed Treas. Regs., 45 Fed.
Reg. 58,594 (1980) (allowing opinions given with due diligence in representing facts)
with ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (revised 1982)
(forbidding knowing or grossly incompetent "false opinions which ignore or mini-
mize serious legal risks or misstate the facts or law.").
Arthur Best, Shortcomings of Administrative Agency Lawyer Discipline, 31 EMORY L.J. 535, 582
n.159 (1982).
158. If, as was frequently the case, the facts differed from those assumed, the opinion
was not worth the paper on which it was written.
159. Effectively, then, the "pure" hypotheticals were a subspecies of the "phantasm"
opinions described in the preceding footnote, and of comparable value.
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nity while ignoring-indeed, not even identifying the existence
of-the others.'6 °
Previously, the Treasury Department had promulgated regula-
tions, commonly referred to as Circular 230,'6' that governed tax
practice before the IRS. In 1980, the Treasury decided to amend
Circular 230 to set forth stricter standards of conduct for attorneys
providing tax shelter opinions that were intended for distribution
to investors (most, if not all, of whom were not, of course, the at-
torneys' clients) as part of the offering materials. 162
2. The Regulatory Response-First, the regulatory response
should be bifurcated into two components: the regulatory response
from the Department of the Treasury and the regulatory response
from the bar.
When the bar failed to take up the gauntlet promptly, the Treas-
ury stepped into the vacuum and promulgated revisions to Circular
230 that sparked some controversy. First, the proposed revisions
required tax lawyers to exercise due diligence in order to ensure
(1) that the facts relevant to the offering were fully and fairly de-
scribed in the offering materials, (2) that pertinent legal issues
were fully and fairly described therein, and (3) that the tax opinion
was properly described therein.' 63 Second, the proposed revisions
prohibited tax practitioners from issuing any opinion other than
one taking the position that it was more likely than not that the
bulk of the tax benefits described in the offering would be avail-
able to investors. 164 While some bar groups were sympathetic to the
160. From the investor's point of view, this category of opinions was the most perni-
cious, inasmuch as the investor was likely to be lulled by the opinion into believing that all
the important tax issues relating to a particular tax shelter had been considered and ana-
lyzed by competent counsel. Even where the text of the legal opinion specified that it was
addressing solely certain issues, lay persons would not realize the significance of such an
implicit disclaimer or even entertain a moment's suspicion that a professional would give an
opinion treating less than all of the relevant tax issues.
161. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.0 et seq (2002). The scope of Circular 230 encompasses a range of
matters, including eligibility for admission to practice, standards of practice, and disciplinary
measures.
162. Actually, the Treasury originally endeavored to persuade the bar to adopt appro-
priate guidance. See Robert Mundheim, Remarks on Standards for Tax Attorneys, 15 DAILY TAX
REP.J-1 (Jan. 22, 1980), reprinted in BERNARD WOLFMAN &JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROB-
LEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 175 (2d ed. 1985). When those efforts at moral suasion
came to naught, the Treasury resorted to rattling its sabers by threatening regulation and,
when the bar was slow to act, actually promulgated amendments to Circular 230. See Dept. of
the Treasury, Tax Shelters; Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, Proposed Rule, 45
Fed. Reg. 58,594 (Dep't of the Treasury Sept. 4, 1980) (to be codified at 31 C.ER. pt. 10).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 58,597.
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need for regulation, the reaction of the bar as a whole was decid-
edly negative. Predictably, the principal defect complained of was
that regulation of lawyers was the purview of the bar, not the fed-
eral government. 11
Within a year, in response to the Treasury's proposed revisions,
the ABA Standing Committee issued a formal opinion 66 declaring
that an attorney providing a false opinion16 was violating the disci-
plinary rules of the Model Code168  and establishing eight
aspirational (i.e., derived from the Model Code's Ethical Consid-
erations) principles as guidance'6 9 for lawyers issuing tax shelter
opinions. 76 The guidance was indeed well conceived and fairly
165. See, e.g., ABA Section of Taxation, Statement on Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230
with Respect to Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAx LAW. 745 (1981).
166. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1981). After col-
lecting comments, the Commission issued a revised version of Formal Opinion 346 in
January 1982. Id. (rev. 1982), reprinted in 68 A.B.A.J. 471 (1982).
167. A "false opinion" is defined in Formal Op. 346 as an opinion in which the lawyer
accepts as true facts provided by the promoter when the lawyer should know that further
inquiry would disclose that the facts are untrue. Id.
168. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (2003) (duty to represent
client within bounds of the law); DR 1-102(A) (4) (conduct that a lawyer knows to be dis-
honest, deceitful, or fraudulent); DR 7-102(A) (5) (knowing misstatements of fact and law);
DR 7-102 (A) (7) (counseling or assisting the offeror in conduct the lawyer knows to be ille-
gal or fraudulent); and possibly DR 7-102(A) (3) (concealment of matters that the lawyer is
required by law to reveal).
169. These principles provide that the lawyer should (1) establish at the outset a rela-
tionship with the client under which the lawyer will have full access to all relevant facts; (2)
be satisfied that the material facts are accurately and completely stated in the offering mate-
rials and that representations as to future activities are reasonable and complete (i.e., no
assumed facts opinions); (3) relate the law to the actual facts of the offering, (i.e., no "pure
hypothetical" opinions); (4) inquire to ensure that the promoter has received competent
advice on any relevant non-tax legal issues; (5) take reasonable steps to assure that all mate-
rial tax issues have been considered, and should address issues as to which there is a
reasonable possibility of challenge by the IRS, whether or not those issues are also consid-
ered by nonlawyer tax professionals (i.e., no partial opinions); (6) where possible, provide
an opinion as to the likely outcome on the merits of each material tax issue addressed in the
offering materials in the event of an IRS challenge (with an explanation of the likely IRS
position as deduced from prior revenue rulings or court decisions), or else explain why it is
not possible to express such an opinion; (7) include in the opinion an overall evaluation of
the extent to which the aggregate tax benefits are likely to be realized as contemplated by
the offering materials, or if that is not possible, explain why not; and (8) review the offering
materials to ensure that the nature and extent of the provided tax opinion are properly
represented. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility Formal Op. 346, 68 A.B.A. J.
471, 473-74. The Ethical Considerations incorporated into these guidelines included EC 1-
5, EC 6-1, EC 6-4, EC 6-5, EC 7-1, EC 7-3, EC 7-5, EC 7-6, EC 7-8, EC 7-10, EC 7-22, and
EC 7-25. Id.
170. For purposes of Formal Op. 346, a tax shelter opinion constitutes tax advice (in-
cluding advice on the tax aspects or risks of the offering materials, whether or not a separate
opinion is issued) that is referred to in offering materials or in sales promotion activities and
that is directed to persons who are not clients of the lawyer providing the advice.
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comprehensive, and was drafted with due regard to what ought to
be the lawyer's obligations when called upon to issue a tax shelter
opinion. For the most part, however, it had no teeth and served
only as guideposts for state disciplinary authorities, who would only
adventitiously take uniform positions (assuming they took any posi-
tions at all) on the subjects covered by Formal Opinion 346.
For these reasons, and others,17 the Treasury, though it had
been tempted to withdraw its own tax shelter rules in favor of For-
mal Opinion 346, ultimately determined to issue a further
revamped Circular 230.172 Effective in mid-1984, the revised Circu-
lar 230 incorporated many of the standards in Formal Opinion
346, but also went its own way on certain (usually technical) points.
The major difference was that Circular 230 represented positive
law, enforceable by sanctions as severe as suspension or disbarment
from practice before the I.R.S., as opposed to the soft-pedaled
standards of an ABA ethics opinion the majority of which were
couched in aspirational terms (and thus did not necessarily subject
lawyers to disciplinary action for violation thereof).
Overall, the reaction of the bar to the Treasury's concerns about
abusive tax shelter opinions was extremely professional and coop-
erative. Formal Opinion 346 took an objective view of the
problems and, strikingly, included reasonable duties of investiga-
tion and inquiry as affirmative obligations for lawyers practicing in
this area.71 This was all the more surprising, given the ABA's nor-
mally adversarial stance with the IRS.1 14 Had the organized bar
reacted to the other scandals described herein with equivalent
consentience and polish, much of the harm-to the profession, to
171. Not only considerations of nationwide uniformity in federal tax practice, but also
the simple fact that tax is a multi-profession practice whose practitioners encompass not only
lawyers but a variety of nonlawyers-including accountants (CPAs are automatically admit-
ted to practice before the IRS. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(b) (1966)) and enrolled agents (e.g.,
enrolled actuaries), who of course are not bound by Formal Opinion 346, tilt the scale in
favor of federal standards.
172. See Dep't of the Treasury, Amendments to Circular 230, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (1984)
(codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
173. Contrast this with the allergic reaction by the Business Law Section to any intima-
tion of such duties.
174. The ABA's general position has been that the IRS is neither a "true tribunal" nor a
"quasi-judicial institution" because of its lack of impartiality, but is instead an adversary to
whom the lawyer owes no greater duty than is owed to any other adversary. See generally ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965). See also ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) (stating lawyers have no obliga-
tion to disclose an aggressive position on a tax return to the IRS because the filing of such a
return could realistically be regarded as the "first step in a process that may result in an
adversary relationship between the client and the IRS").
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its public image, and to the public at large-could have been
averted.
C. O.PM.
1. The Ethical Problems--O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc. (O.P.M.)
was a company engaged in widespread fraud in amounts ($210 mil-
lion) which, at the time (late 1970's), seemed considerable, but
which pale by comparison with later events (the S&L crisis, Enron
et al.). The ideas for the scheme itself were nothing terribly elabo-
rate. O.P.M. was ostensibly in the business of leasing office
equipment (e.g., computers), and the income stream from the
leases, as well as the underlying equipment itself, were used to se-
cure substantial loans from banks and other lenders. So far, this
describes a plain vanilla financing arrangement. Where the fraud
crept in was in the details of the security arrangements. A single
piece of equipment would be pledged as collateral for multiple
loans from different lenders (each kept ignorant of the others) ,
and inflated values would be ascribed to certain pieces of equip-
ment in order to justify larger loan amounts. 116 Yet, the fraud took
in a number of extremely sophisticated players, including Ameri-
can Express, Chase Manhattan Bank, and what was then Lehman
Brothers Kuhn Loeb.
The law firm of Singer, Hutner, Levine & Seeman had prepared
the documentation for O.P.M.'s leasing transactions and had fur-
nished legal opinions to O.P.M.'s lenders intended to provide them
with adequate assurances as to the value and legitimacy of the col-
lateral against which they were advancing funds. When the scheme
began to unravel, the firm took the position that, for 10 years, it
too had been bamboozled by O.P.M.'s fraudulent conduct and only
learned of it in 1980 when an executive vice president confessed it
to the lawyers. Yet the nature of the ongoing client relationship was
175. At times, O.P.M. would use the proceeds from a fraudulently obtained loan from
Bank Y to make payments on an earlier fraudulently obtained loan from Bank X-a varia-
tion on the classic pyramid scheme.
176. A concise description of these and other relevant facts may be found in Stuart Tay-
lor, Jr., Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1983, (Magazine) at 31-33. A
more elaborate rendering is found in the Report of the Trustee Concerning Fraud and
Other Misconduct in the Management of the Affairs of the Debtor, In re O.P.M. Leasing
Servs., Inc., No. 81 B 10553 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1983), parts of which are excerpted in
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 120, at 304-08. O.P.M. factual matters set forth herein are culled
from those sources and depend upon them for accuracy.
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such that, by that time, the lawyers already knew a number of facts
that should have put them on notice that something was amiss.
First, they knew that O.P.M. was constantly experiencing liquidity
problems; second, they knew that O.P.M. had pleaded guilty to
check kiting; on top of that, O.P.M. had instructed Singer, Hutner
not to forward any of the lease transaction documentation to the
lessees, a request sufficiently at odds with both common sense and
mainstream legal practice as to have raised red flags that illegal or
fraudulent conduct might be afoot. Furthermore, the firm was
aware that, even though the leases called for the lessees to make
insurance payments on the leased equipment, O.P.M. itself was
making those payments, and was even making some of the lease
payments that were being forwarded to the lenders.
If all that were not enough, Singer, Hutner received a letter
from O.P.M.'s CFO upon his resignation from the company in June
1980. The resignation letter explicated the CFO's discovery of sub-
stantial amounts of O.P.M. borrowings that had been procured by
fraud. Meetings with the CFO's lawyer led to revelations of further
details. O.P.M.'s business was a tissue of multimillion-dollar fraud
and deceit-including false documents upon which the law firm
had relied in preparing its opinions-and, like all pyramid
schemes, could only survive by the perpetration of additional
fraud.
Singer, Hutner, confronted now with credible evidence, to which
it could not turn a blind eye, that its services had been (and con-
tinued to be) employed to assist in the perpetration of a massive
fraud, took advice on its professional obligations from two ethics
consultants,' 7 whose opinion was music to the firm's ears. First,
New York's stricter than usual version of Model Code's DR 7-
102(B) (1)178 absolutely barred the firm from making any disclo-
sures whatsoever about client fraud. Second, the firm could
ethically continue to represent O.P.M. by taking O.P.M.'s assur-
ances (if made in writing) that no ongoing fraud was being
177. The two legal ethics consultants were Joseph McLaughlin (later a federal judge)
and Henry Putzel.
178. The original ABA version, by contrast, provided:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that his client... in the course
of the representation, perpetrated a fraud on a person or tribunal shall promptly call
upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, ...
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal....
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(b) (1970).
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committed and giving them the benefit of the doubt, although
lacking a reasonable basis for believing such assurances. Third,
while the firm should make efforts to root out evidence of any past
wrongdoing, New York's overarching obligation of confidentiality
bound Singer, Hutner to keep everything it learned secret, all the
while continuing to close new loans for O.P.M. Fourth, the firm
need not check the authenticity of documents purporting to show
that O.P.M. had sufficient collateral to repay the loans, even when
those documents were being provided to lenders in order to obtain
new financing. Fifth, there was no obligation to withdraw or dis-
avow the possibly false opinion letters and documents that Singer,
Hutner had "unwittingly" provided to lenders in the past in sup-
port of loan applications by O.P.M., even though lenders were
continuing to rely on those documents, apparently on the theory
that "leaving the victims of a past fraud in the dark was not an on-
going fraud."
1 79
. By following that advice, in due course, Singer, Hutner enabled
O.P.M. to commit even more fraud as, to their chagrin, they "dis-
covered" when the house of cards came tumbling down. Then and
only then, when the horses had long bolted, Singer, Hutner de-
cided to close the barnyard door and resign, having succeeded in
the interim in assisting O.P.M. in procuring another $80-90 mil-
lion in fraudulent loans. is° Despite the magnitude of the fraud and
the flagrant abuse of its services in effecting it, the firm adhered to
its posture of non-disclosure to those who had been defrauded.
Nor did Singer, Hutner tell the successor law firm of O.P.M.'s use
of its former lawyers to commit fraud, and, all too predictably, the
new law firm assisted O.P.M. in obtaining yet another $15 million
in fraudulent loans before the whole scheme was uncovered and
reported to federal authorities.81
When O.P.M.'s victims later sued Singer, Hutner for having been
an accomplice to its client's fraud, the firm-in a pattern seen
again and again during the S&L crisis-settled the claims, but ad-
mitted no wrongdoing, insisting, rather, that it had acted in
accordance with the law and the highest ethical standards of prac-
tice that placed the duty of confidentiality to the client above all
other obligations.
1 8 2
179. Taylor, supra note 176, at 46.
180. Id. at 49.
181. Id. See also PHILIP B. HEYMANN & LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 195 (1988).
182. Peter Fishbein and Kaye, Scholer would make a similar argument a decade later to
justify their conduct toward federal savings and loan regulators in the course of the Charles
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2. The Regulatory Response--Commentators have noted that the
notoriety of the O.P.M. case
is attributable largely to the coincidence that the revelation of
the lawyers' role in the fraud coincided with professional and
public debate in the early 1980s on the tension between loy-
alty to one's client, including the obligation to keep client
secrets, and protecting others from harm at the client's
hands-a debate fueled by the ABA's then ongoing effort to
revise the Model Code, the effort which ultimately gave rise to
the Model Rules.'83
Indeed, while O.P.M., with its lawyers' assistance, was bilking
every lender unlucky enough to do business with it, the Kutak
Commission had been busy preparing recommended revisions to
the ABA's rules of ethics. Among the recommendations was a lim-
ited authorization-not a mandate upon the lawyer but a
discretionary ability-to disclose client fraud, but only under cir-
cumstances in which the client had used the lawyer's services to
accomplish the fraud. The ABA House of Delegates resoundingly
rejected that proposal, basically within a month of publication of
the New York Times expos6 on O.P.M. and Singer, Hutner. What was
adopted, instead, was the original version of Model Rule 1.6,
which, while perfectly willing to sacrifice client confidences on the
altar of the bar's self-interest when the lawyer's own liability is at
issue, forbade disclosure for acts of civil or criminal fraud, and in-
deed only permitted disclosure in the event of future (not even
past) crimes likely to result in death or substantial bodily injury.
8 4
Keating Lincoln Savings and Loan debacle. See infra notes 216-31 and accompanying text.
By a bizarre twist of fate, Fishbein and Kaye, Scholer were the successor counsel to O.P.M.
after Singer, Humer's belated resignation.
183. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 120, at 304. See also Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar
Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 723-
24 (1989).
184. As originally adopted, Model Rule 1.6 provided:
Confidentiality of Information. (a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for dis-
closures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and
except as stated in paragraph (b). (b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from com-
mitting a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm; or (2) to establish a claim of defense on behalf of the lawyer
in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
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Simultaneously, Rule 4.1, requiring lawyers to be truthful in
statements to others, made disclosure to third parties of material
facts when necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act
by a client subservient to the disclosure prohibition of Rule 1.6.185
Under these circumstances, adoption of these rules was widely re-
garded as a vindication by the organized bar of Singer, Hutner's
conduct in the O.P.M. scandal.
18 6
Even as late as 2001, the ABA House of Delegates rejected an
amendment proposed as part of the "Ethics 2000" revision of the
Model Rules that would have restored some of the Kutak Commis-
sion's original formulation1 7 and expanded the categories of
permissible disclosure under Rule 1.6 to include prevention and
rectification of substantial financial injury resulting from a client's
abuse of the lawyer's services.188 Nevertheless, amended commen-
tary to Rule 4.1, added not as a sop to propriety but to enable
attorney vindication of self-interest when faced with allegations of
wrongdoing, permits, "in extreme cases," disclosure when required by
substantive law "to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's
crime or fraud."' S9 After sustaining considerable criticism for its
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's rep-
resentation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983). Interestingly, a majority of U.S. jurisdic-
tions did not adopt Model Rule 1.6 as recommended by the ABA. Thirty-seven states permit
a lawyer to disclose confidential information to prevent a client's criminal fraud; four states
require a lawyer to make such a disclosure; only nine states and the District of Columbia
arguably forbid it. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 73-77 (2004) (compiling statutory variants in U.S. jurisdictions
on disclosure of confidential information to prevent harm to third persons).
185. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1983). The Commentary to Rule 1.6
subsequently ratified by the ABA did permit discretionary noisy withdrawal-i.e., disaffir-
mance or withdrawal of documents or legal opinions issued by the lawyer on behalf of the
client-except in cases where the lawyer withdrew from the representation (and such with-
drawal was clearly not mandatory). Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. (1984).
186. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 118, at 306 (relating calls to lawyers at Singer, Hutner
to this effect after the Kutak Commission's recommendation of discretionary disclosure of
client fraud was defeated in the House of Delegates).
187. Nor was the rejection of the Ethics 2000 Commission's recommendation the first
time that such proposals had met with a similar fate. In the wake of the S&L crisis, in 1991,
the House of Delegates rejected such a proposed amendment to Model Rule 1.6. HAZARD
ET AL., supra note 120, at 287.
188. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Privileges Lost? Privileges Retained? 69 TENN. L. Rv. 65, 89
(2001); Lisa H. Nicholson, A Hobson's Choice for Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron Environment:
Striking a Balance Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 91, 144 (2002). For the text of the proposal, see Ethics 2000 Commission Report
(Nov. 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2krule16.html (on file with the Uni-
versity of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
189. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. (2002) (emphasis added).
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stance on Rule 1.6 in the wake of Enron and other corporate scan-
dals, and on the recommendation of the ABA Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility, "0 in August 2003, the ABA House of
Delegates relented and amended the rule along the lines originally
proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission. "'
D. The S&L Crisis
1. The Ethical Problems-The S&L crisis of the 1970's-1980's,
which gave rise to so many abuses, had many origins. Long a gov-
ernment-created and government-encouraged cartel subsidized by
customers receiving less interest on their deposits (because of fed-
eral deposit insurance and federally imposed interest rate ceilings)
than free market competition would have provided,192 the S&L in-
dustry was essentially a captive tool of Congress' national housing
policy. With the increased inflation and soaring interest rates of the
late 1970's, thrift institutions, which traditionally had been statuto-
rily circumscribed to residential mortgages and related lending
funded by insured deposits subject to interest rate regulation, suf-
fered from severe asset-liability mismatches and massive
disintermediation as retail depositors defected in droves to the
money market funds, which were not subject to interest rate regu-
lation. Congress responded with significant, though ill-considered,
deregulation of the thrift industry in 1980 and 1982,93 which al-
lowed those institutions to offer interest-bearing transaction
accounts at market rates (including NOW accounts and money
market deposit accounts) and to diversify into commercial lending
and significant real estate development activities.
190. This Task Force was chaired by former ABA Business Law Section Chair James
Cheek and was formed to consider primarily corporate governance issues in the wake of the
many corporate scandals. Its final report was published last spring. See A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, FINAL REPORT (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://
www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/home.html (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
191. The amendment is available on the ABA website: http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/2003/journal/ 119a.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
192. Similar cartelization through governmental controls characterized commercial
banking during the same period.
193. Carn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (1982).
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The demise of traditional barriers and the consequent cutthroat
competition-not merely among depository institutions inter se, but
also between depositories and nondepository competitors (e.g.,
mutual funds, brokerage houses, insurance companies), created a
brave new world for which the sleepy thrift industry was ill-
prepared. The overall effect was similar to taking a domesticated
animal that had been raised all its life never wanting for food, se-
cure in the gilded cage of government regulation, and suddenly
turning it loose to fend for itself in a world of predators raised in
the wild. 94 If the analogy were perfect, such a regulatory sea
change would have been harsh, but at least everyone would have
played by the same rules-survival of the fittest. Unfortunately, the
domesticated S&L animal remained tethered, albeit on a very long
string, to the government via the deposit insurance subsidy and an
antiquated regulatory and supervisory system.
The end result was that Congress effectively opened the Treas-
ury's coffers to any reckless or unscrupulous S&L operator willing
to pay a premium (now that interest rate ceilings had been elimi-
nated) to attract insured deposits, thereby allowing any
institution-no matter how undercapitalized and poorly (or crimi-
nally) managed-to compete for insured deposits, aided and
abetted by equally greedy deposit brokers who collected large fees
steering depositors from all over the country toward whichever in-
stitution was offering the highest rate, without regard to whether
the institution was sound. These marginal institutions would then
aggressively hunt for places to lend or invest that money, and the
need for high returns to compensate for the higher cost of funds,
along with the phenomenon of too many desperate, would-be
lenders pursuing too few creditworthy borrowers, led to ever-riskier
deals. Thus was born the savings and loan debacle.
1 95
194. Some of those predators were wild indeed, including a variety of con artists, swin-
dlers, money launderers, and individuals found to have been connected with organized
crime. See generally STEPHEN PIZZO ET AL., INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMERICA'S SAVINGS
AND LOANS (1989).
195. Even with legitimate operators, the resulting feeding frenzy was a recipe for disas-
ter:
A real estate developer explained ... how it worked. The year was 1982, and an en-
ergy-led building boom was in full swing in Texas. He and his partner approached
one of the aggressive savings and loans with plans to build a $15-million building.
"Why not build a $25-million building?" they were asked. "All we need from you is an
upfront commitment fee of 4 percent of the loan commitment so that we can book
the fee immediately as a profit. That way we will have the capital we need for regula-
tory purposes so we can raise the deposits to make you the loan. Of course, we will
loan you the money for the commitment fee and we will want to build into the loan
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Instances of S&L fraud and mismanagement were, naturally,
many and varied, but certain patterns or templates seem to be
characteristic of some of the most egregious cases. Bad loans were
carried as sound ones. Real estate was carried on the books at
grossly inflated values. Inordinately risky loans were made almost
heedless of the prospects for repayment, so long as the loans were
large enough 96 that the S&L received a large origination fee (e.g.,
5%) up front (bookable immediately as profit) and could set aside
funds for an interest reserve that would cover payments for a pe-
riod of time (e.g., one to five years) so that the loans would not
the interest payments needed to keep the loan current for five years, just in case you
have difficulty leasing the building up. We can also give you the name of a good ap-
praiser for your property. And we will not require you to personally guarantee the
loan. Your building will be our sole collateral.
LOWELL BRYAN, BANKRUPT: RESTORING THE HEALTH AND PROFITABILITY OF OUR BANKING
SYSTEM 68-69 (1991). What about the less legitimate operators?
Dr. Duayne Christensen, a Southern California dentist-turned-real-estate speculator,
got tired of begging for loans from straitlaced thrift officers and in January 1983 he
opened North American Savings and Loan in Santa Ana, California. A married man
with teenage children, Christensen had undergone a midlife crisis of some sort and
had taken up with a flashy real estate lady from Oak Grove, California, Janet F.
McKenzie .... In short order, according to an FSLIC lawsuit, the two began to wheel
and deal with North American's deposits, investing them in grossly overappraised real
estate projects in which they held a secret interest. One project alone (a twenty-unit
condominium project in Lake Tahoe, Nevada), which they acquired for less than $4
million, they sold back and forth to artificially increase its value to $40 million ....
Reno mortgage broker John Masegian helped put together loans for the condomin-
ium deal. The next month, February 1983, while he was attending a savings and loan
convention in Miami, he was garroted in the stairwell of the Fountainebleau Hilton.
The murderers tried to stuff his body down the trash disposal chute but it wouldn't
fit. No one was charged with his murder. A security guard claimed that a few months
later Christensen tried to hire him to kill a business partner who lived in Arkansas,
but later Christensen changed his mind.
North American collapsed in June 1988 and cost the FSLIC $209 million. The day be-
fore North American was seized by federal regulators, Christensen was killed in a
mysterious single-car accident when his Jaguar slammed head-on into a freeway
abutment at six o'clock in the morning, leaving a $10 million life insurance policy
that named McKenzie as his sole heir ....
STEPHEN PIZZO ET AL., supra note 194, at 22. McKenzie was later convicted on twenty-two
counts of racketeering and bank fraud. David Greenwald, S&L Insider Convicted of Theft,
Fraud, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Mar. 30, 1990, at 1.
196. If the principal amount exceeded the institution's regulatory limit on loans to one
borrower, the loan could be participated to other willing S&Ls, but in practice straw borrow-
ers would often be used.
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appear delinquent to examiners. 1 7 There were high-risk, often os-
tentatiously so, investments (e.g., casinos or gaudy resort hotels)
and expensive office space, ornately furnished and decorated (of-
ten with millions of depositors' dollars worth of objets d'art). Loans
and investments were funded through high volume, high-cost bro-
kered deposits. The CEOs and their families had high-roller
lifestyles. Bad loans were swapped with other, like-minded institu-
tions when the examiners were coming, subject to an obligation to
repurchase them once the examination was completed. Finally,
there were a variety of shenanigans, such as post hoc alterations of
the minutes of board meetings, falsified or made-to-order real es-
tate appraisals, falsified financial statements for certain borrowers,
and a variety of documents concocted to mimic compliance with
regulations, supervisory agreements, and the like.
This is by no means an imaginary scenario. It is a reasonable,
though by no means complete, summary of what went on at noto-
rious S&Ls such as Don Dixon's Vernon Savings & Loan
(nominally headquartered in tiny Vernon, Texas, but with high-
rent corporate headquarters in Dallas to facilitate all the wheeling
and dealing) and Charles Keating's Lincoln Savings & Loan of Ir-
vine, California." 's
None of this could have been accomplished without the coop-
eration of unusually inept (and occasionally corrupt) regulators. 99
197. See supra note 195. When the funds in the interest reserve were depleted, the S&L
would roll over the loan, establishing a new interest rate reserve to keep payments current
for another period of time, and pocket another upfront fee for the loan renewal that would
show as immediate profit eligible for new loans or investments (thereby giving the appear-
ance of both profitability and growth) or for dividending to insiders or a parent holding
company (often indistinguishable from the insiders). The renewals, of course, necessitated
advancing additional funds to the borrowers (usually from brokered deposits), thereby wid-
ening and deepening the hole the S&L was digging for itself.
198. For popular accounts of the abuse and looting of these institutions, see STEPHEN
PIZZO ET AL., supra note 194, at 249-73, 277-79, 290-302 (Don Dixon and Vernon), 350-53,
388-92, 396-403, 409-33 (Charles Keating and Lincoln); MAYER, supra note 92, at 9-13,
237-39 (Don Dixon and Vernon), 165-225 (Charles Keating and Lincoln).
199. For example, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), then the federal
regulator of the S&L industry (it was succeeded by the OTS in 1989), apparently never met a
violator of the Bank Secrecy Act that it did not like. In connection with congressional hear-
ings about a 1980s federal money laundering investigation, Operation Greenback, it came
out that senior FHLBB officials actually altered examination reports that would have re-
vealed potential currency reporting violations at a thrift in Puerto Rico, whose president was
also vice-chair of the Federal Home Loan Bank of New York. Delaware Senator William
Roth, chair of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, contrasted large percentages of banks examined by the FDIC (includ-
ing ten out of eleven banks in Puerto Rico) found to have committed such violations, while
the FHLBB found only two violations out of 2,185 thrifts examined. See STEPHEN PIZZO ET
AL., supra note 194, at 171.
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Likewise, none of this-the loan documentation, the participa-
tions, the repurchase agreements, the real estate investments, and
so forth-could have been accomplished without the assistance of
many lawyers.
Indeed, amidst this bizarre world of incompetents and knaves
operating thrift institutions, one finds a variety of lawyers, some of
whom were just as marginal or as crooked as the S&Ls they repre-
sented. The concern is not so much with them, however, as with
the number of prominent law firms-Jenkins & Gilchrist in Dallas;
O'Melveny & Myers in Los Angeles; Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue in
Cleveland and Washington, D.C.; Blank, Rome, Comiskey &
McCauley in Philadelphia; Sherman & Howard in Denver; Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler in New York; Sidley & Austin in
Chicago and Washington, D.C.; Kirkpatrick & Lockhart in Pitts-
burgh and Washington, D.C.; Paul, Weiss, Rifkin, Wharton &
Garrison in New York, to name but a few, that were publicly hu-
miliated for their participation in a variety of schemes and scams,
and, occasionally, were required to pay large sums in damages, civil
penalties, and settlements of third-party claims. 00 Nothing could
serve better to illustrate the depredations that gave rise to these
claims than some excerpts from the Charles Keating/Lincoln Sav-
ings and Loan saga.
Keating, himself a lawyer whose scarcely unblemished past
201should have disqualified him from owning an S&L, was nothing if
not creative, both in the schemes he used to loot the federally in-
sured gravy train and in his use of lawyers. He used all the
techniques in the above-described template and then added some
innovations of his own. One of these involved selling bonds in Lin-
coln Savings' holding company, American Continental
Corporation (ACC), to the public. These securities could not be
marketed except in conjunction with requisite disclosure docu-
ments, which were replete with false and misleading disclosures
(financial statements of ACC's subsidiary thrift were wildly inflated
with bad loans and poor investments carried on the books at face
200. Perhaps a more accurate statement would be that, in general, it was not the part-
ners of the firms themselves but their malpractice insurers who were required to pay
because most settlements stayed (deliberately) within the limits of malpractice coverage.
That means, of course, that the entire legal profession (not just those responsible) ended up
paying for the misdeeds of the malefactors through higher insurance premiums, and that
cost undoubtedly was passed down the food chain to the client population, and thence to
the economy at large.
201. See supra notes 141-46.
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value). Furthermore, the manner in which these bonds were mar-
keted (out of the thrift's retail branch offices) to depositors misled
them into believing the investments were federally insured obliga-
tions.0  Lawyers familiar with offerings of these securities
understand the disclosure obligations of the issuer's counsel and
the due diligence obligations of the underwriter's counsel. They
also know how carefully sales practices with any connection to a
federally insured depository are scripted. The fugue subject re-
turns, recognizable even though in a different key: What could
these lawyers have been thinking when they furnished the legal
services to facilitate these transactions?
Another bizarre twist in the Keating saga involved a pledge by
Lincoln of $15 million of its assets to guarantee the debt of ACC's
ESOP. The ESOP borrowed money from unaffiliated lenders in
order to finance its purchase of ACC stock, the proceeds of which
(apart from close to $1 million in legal fees) went to bail Keating's
pal Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert out of its ACC
stock holdings °s with the remainder (approximately $8 million) to
the Keating family.0 4 Keating hired James Fleischer, a partner in a
tiny, Washington, D.C. thrift boutique that Keating knew would be
hungry for the business of so large a client, to provide a legal opin-
ion that this pledge would not violate an FHLBB regulation
prohibiting a thrift from guaranteeing the debt of an affiliate.
Clearly, ACC, the parent holding company, was an affiliate, but,
according to OTS, Fleischer assumed-contrary to the clear lan-
202. Mayer explains:
The sales were made by employees of Lincoln Savings (though both state and federal
regulators had been assured that couldn't and didn't happen). ACC and Lincoln
used the same A-shaped logo and print styles in their advertising.
The ACC notes, sold in $1,000 denominations, paid higher interest than insured de-
posits. Their purchasers were mostly elderly, because special efforts were directed at
the retirement colonies and because the old folks really loved the idea of the higher
interest. The selling technique was often bait-and-switch. Customers would answer ads
offering high-rate insured CDs in the S&L, and their interlocutor would switch them
to the note from the holding company; which paid even higher interest. And it had to
be better, didn't it, because it was the owner of the S&L who stood behind it-a For-
tune 500 company. Employees at the branches got bonuses for selling the notes.
MAYER, supra note 92, at 167-68 (citing George Williamson, Ex-Lincoln Workers Say Tellers Got
Bonuses for Pushing Bonds, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 17, 1989, at 1. See also Michael Lev, California
Accuses Lincoln of Misleading Bond Buyers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1990, (magazine) at 35.
203. See JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991), for an absorbing account of junk
bond financing and the S&L industry, including Keating's dealings with Michael Milken.
204. MAYER, supra note 92, at 203-04.
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guage of the absolute bar in the regulation-that the prohibition
would not apply if the ESOP's trustee were independent of ACC
(apparently on the theory that, under those circumstances, the
ESOP would not be an affiliate and the pledge could be made).°
Fleischer rendered an unqualified opinion,2 °0 according to the al-
legations of an enforcement action later brought by OTS.
Fleischer-who had uncritically accepted a certificate from a Lin-
coln officer that the ESOP trustee was "independent"207 "assumed
the relevant legal conclusion that the ESOP was not controlled by
ACC or Lincoln" even though he "knew or should have known that
because of the language of the regulations the ESOP would be
deemed to be under the control of Lincoln's holding company
and, therefore, not independent of Lincoln., 20 8 Due either to a lack
of competence or to vulnerability to the competitive pressures of
business development, Fleischer gave Keating precisely what he
needed to milk the federally-insured Lincoln cow further.
One of the most astonishing aspects of the S&L scandal was the
willingness of members of Congress to use their offices to influ-
ence and intimidate the FHLBB when it belatedly sought to rein in
(and, ultimately, shut down) the worst S&L offenders. Don Dixon
had gotten two Democratic Congressmen to intervene with the
FHLBB on Vernon's behalf,2 9 but Keating succeeded in getting no
less than five United States Senators, to whom he gave substantial
contributions,210 to intervene in federal regulators'c a m p a i g n c o t i u t o s t o i n e v ne i e e r l r g u a o s
205. In point of fact, the ESOP would be under ACC's control if ACC had the power to
appoint or remove the ESOP trustee, and, according to OTS, it was almost universally true
that ESOP sponsors had such powers.
206. The ESOP's lender, Bankers Trust Company, required the opinion as a condition
of closing the loan.
207. In short, Fleischer accepted a layperson's conclusion of law as ipse dixit, without
making any inquiry whatsoever into the existence of facts supporting the officer's certifica-
tion.
208. Order to Cease and Desist and for Affirmative Relief from James S. Fleischer, In re
James S. Fleischer, OTS AP No. 92-52, at 4-5 (May 21, 1992) (on file with University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
209. The two were Tony Coelho (D-Cal.) and Jim Wright (D-Tex.), the latter both be-
fore and after he became Speaker of the House. Both men's political careers were ended by
the subsequent scandal. Coelho did not bother to seek reelection, and Wright was ultimately
brought down by a House ethics inquiry.
210. Keating frankly acknowledged that he sought to buy influence with the political
contributions. BrooksJackson, New Disclosures of Riegle's Lincoln Role Suggest He Was More Than
a Bystander, WALL ST.J., Nov. 15, 1989, at A28 (stating that Keating "arranged $1.4 million in
political donations for the five senators"). Indeed, when asked by reporters whether his
financial contributions influenced support for his cause, Keating replied, "I want to say this
in the most forceful way I can. I certainly hope so." STEPHEN PIZZO ET AL., supra note 194, at
295 (emphasis added).
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investigation of Lincoln Savings and Keating.21' Pressure from the
Keating Five ultimately got the FHLBB to drop an investigation
into Keating's and Lincoln's affairs being conducted by the Federal
Home Loan Bank of San Francisco.2  Following a changing of the
guard at the FHLBB and the replacement of Chairman Edwin Gray
with M. Danny Wall (who had been an administrative aide to for-
mer chair of the Senate Banking Committee Jake Garn), further
political pressure was brought to bear, resulting in the unprece-
dented step of stripping the Federal Home Loan Bank of its
supervisory jurisdiction over Lincoln and ACC,21 3 transferring all
Lincoln-related matters to Washington, and starting from scratch.
Lawyers had a hand in this maneuver as well. A Sidley & Austen
partner had endeavored to cut certain key regulators from the San
Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank who were familiar with the
Lincoln investigation out of a key meeting in Washington with
Chairman Wall. Her subsequent letter to Keating crowing about
her success caused severe embarrassment to the firm when it was
made public by the House Banking Committee's investigation of
Keating and Lincoln and picked up by the national media:
You have the [FHLBB] right where you want them.... As you
know, I have put pressure on Wall to work toward meeting
your demands and he has so instructed his staff. They all
know the Wednesday meeting is crucial to their future....
211. The five senators were Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), Sen. Alan Cranston (D-
Cal.), Sen. Donald W. Riegle (D-Mich.), Sen. John H. Glenn (D-Ohio), and Sen. John
McCain (R-Ariz.). They became known as the "Keating Five." See The Keating Five, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 16, 1989, at A14 (editorial). Two of Senator DeConcini's top aides received more
than $50 million in real estate loans from Lincoln. Andy Hall & Jerry Kammer, DeConcini
Aides Got Keating S&L Loans, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 14, 1989, at Al. Senator McCain received
$112,000 in campaign contributions and $13,433 in unreported airplane trips, and his wife
and father-in4aw invested $359,100 in a shopping center partnership with Keating. Andy
Hall &Jerry Kammer, Kin's Deal, Trips Reveal Close McCain-Keating Tie, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct.
8, 1989, at Al. Senator Cranston received $47,000 in political contributions from Keating
and $850,000 that went to voter-registration drives supporting the senator. Sam Stanton,
Ethics Review Urged of Keating Senators, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 14, 1989, at Al. Senator Glenn
received $200,000 from Keating for a political action committee controlled by the senator
and $39,000 in direct contributions, which probably violated federal election laws. Id.
212. See, e.g., Andy Hall & Jerry Kammer, Lincoln's 'Kamikaze Banking: Wallflower Thrift
Become High Roller, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 16, 1989, at A2. The Senate Five, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
1989, atA18 (editorial).
213. When William Robertson, chief of regulation and supervision at the San Francisco
Federal Home Loan Bank's Office of Enforcement, recommended to Wall that Lincoln
Savings be placed into receivership in 1987, Wall told Robertson that he would be replaced.
Brooks Jackson, Sleeping Watchdog: How Regulatory Error Led to Disaster at Lincoln Savings, WALL
ST.J., Nov. 20, 1989, at A12. Wall then stripped the San Francisco regulators of power to act
over the case. Id.
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San Francisco is finished. There is no going back to San Fran-
cisco and nothing can be done to follow up their exam ....
Nothing will be done in the exam that you are not aware of in
advance.... The staff will not be able to enforce any violation
of the agreement without going to the Board first and seeking
approval.... ."
Again, our fugue subject returns: What could the lawyer who
wrote such a letter have been thinking? It is all well and good to
protect the downtrodden from oppression, but how can a lawyer
justify acting on behalf of an S&L kingpin (himself a wealthy and
experienced lawyer, much as the bar would like to disown him,
with enough political and financial clout to "buy" the assistance of
five Senators), to derail a legitimate regulatory function (to wit: a
financial institution examination and subsequent investigation into
questionable transactions uncovered by the examiners) critical to
the safety and soundness of our financial system, eviscerate the
fruits of that investigation, and hamstring subsequent investigatory
efforts, when all of those results are incontrovertibly inimical to the
legal system and the interests ofjustice?21 5
Perhaps the best known '6 of the Lincoln Savings lawyer scandals
involved the forged and backdated corporate minutes and ongoing
efforts to conceal these and other deficiencies (e.g., absence of
policies and procedures for safe and sound operations, inadequate
loan underwriting, improper transactions with affiliates). These
were concealed from regulators through the one-two punch of
Kaye, Scholer's alleged stonewalling of examiners' access to Lin-
coln's staff and records and Jones, Day's preparation of backdated
documents. In addition, both firms failed to notify Lincoln's board
of directors of the raft of illegal and irregular activities2"7 by
214. Letter from Margery Waxman, Sidley & Austin, to Charles Keating (May 10, 1987),
reprinted in STEPHEN PIZZO ET AL., supra note 194, at 423-24. See also MAYER, supra note 92, at
421-22.
215. The resultant two-year delay before the government ultimately seized Lincoln and
shut Keating down cost the taxpayers at least another $1 billion. See, e.g.,Jackson, supra note
210; Stanton, supra note 211. Sidley & Austin ultimately settled with the government for $7.5
million. Amy Stevens & Jonathan Moses, Sidley & Austin, RTC Said to Reach Pact, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 31, 1991, at B2.
216. Best known, that is, because of the detailed public allegations in high-profile mat-
ters such as the ACC Securities Litigation and the OTS proceeding against Kaye, Scholer.
217. Admittedly, this was not mandatory under then-prevailing rules, but would have
seemed only prudent if either firm had taken the entity theory seriously, as opposed to ac-
quiescing in whatever Keating wanted.
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management and both were complicit in drafting and filing false
and misleading documents with the FHLBB. s
2. The Regulatory Response-A great deal of ink (black ink, in
contrast to the S&L industry's balance sheets) has been spilled on
Lincoln Savings2 '9 and the Kaye, Scholer matter.20 The level of at-
tention devoted to the OTS proceeding against that firm was
occasioned not so much because the facts (or, more properly, the
OTS's allegations) were unique-which they were 21-but because
of the draconian nature of the government action in freezing the
assets of the entire firm and its partners.
Several years ago, William Simon wrote an article condemning
the response of the organized bar to the Kaye, Scholer matter as
irresponsibly "evasive" and "apologetic" because of the failure to
come to grips with what Kaye, Scholer was alleged to have done.222
Unfortunately, Simon was off the mark about the specifics of the
Kaye, Scholer case. First, the unproved allegations were so unusual
(interference with an examination, the OTS's alter ego theory,
etc.) and so unlikely to be repeated (even more unlikely after what
happened to Kaye, Scholer!) that detailed study was not likely to
218. Jones, Day ultimately settled with the government for $51 million and with private
plaintiffs for another $24 million. See Order to Cease and Desist for Affirmative Relief from
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19 (1992); Alison Leigh
Cowan, Big Law and Auditing Firms to Pay Millions in S.&L. Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1992, at
Al (reporting that Kaye, Scholer ultimately settled with class-action plaintiffs for $20 million
and with the government for $ 41 million); John H. Cushman, Jr., Law Firm Settles S.&L.
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at DI; Sharon Walsh, Law Firm Settles S&L Complaint; Pact
With Regulators Calls for $41 Million Payment Over5 Years, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1992, at Al.
219. Besides the above-cited sources, a wealth of additional background information on
the Lincoln failure and a host of collateral issues is readily available. See, e.g., In reAm. Cont'l
Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F.Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992); Lincoln Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F.Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990); Senate Select Committee on Ethics, Preliminary
Inquiry into Allegations Regarding Senators Cranston, DeConcini, Glenn, McCain, and Riegle, and
Lincoln Savings and Loan: Open Hearings, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
220. See supra note 47.
221. First, Kaye, Scholer had no expertise in banking or S&L regulation when it ac-
cepted the engagement to represent Keating and Lincoln, which was already ethically
questionable given the competence requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Indeed, it was probably for this reason that Keating (himself an experienced securities and
business lawyer prior to becoming an S&L kingpin) hired the firm. That way, he could avail
himself of lawyers too unsophisticated in regulatory matters to ask embarrassing questions of
their client, but all too skilled in what could be called "junkyard dog" or "take no prisoners"
midtown Manhattan litigation tactics. Second, and consistent with this lack of knowledge
and expertise, Kaye, Scholer took the unprecedented step of interposing itself between the
thrift and the government during the examination process insisting that all requests by the
examiners for information be funneled through the law firm, even though, by law, examin-
ers are to have unfettered access to the institution's books, records, premises, and
employees.
222. Simon, supra note 47.
SUMMER 2004] The Higher Calling
have been a particularly fruitful expenditure of time and resources.
Second, the OTS's Notice of Charges alleged violations of widely
accepted and well-understood professional obligations and, if
proved, would have been unexceptionable. Third, the focus of the
bar's concern, while also unique, was decidedly capable of repeti-
tion and potentially quite toxic to lawyer's abilities to stand up (in
an apprpriate way, of course, not the way Kaye, Scholer did) to gov-
ernmental overreaching-namely, the assertion by an agency of
the United States government of novel and dubious professional
223duties and the unprecedented freeze of an entire law firm's assets
(including assets of partners completely innocent of any wrongdo-
ing) 24 that arguably compelled the firm to capitulate without an
opportunity to defend itself against the allegations. 225 Excoriating
the bar's jumping to Kaye, Scholer's defense was thus not totally
fair22 6 and was even, as Jonathan Macey put it, "charmingly naive,"
in view of the bar's self-interested, protectionist penchant in these
227
matters.
223. See, e.g., Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor's Toesies, supra note 47, at 50-68.
224. The freeze order was couched as a "temporary cease and desist" order under the
authority of Section 8(c)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1)
(2002), was issued ex parte, and was effective immediately upon service, rather like a tempo-
rary restraining order, except for the absence of a neutral and detached judge. The order
prohibited Kaye, Scholer from making capital expenditures in excess of $50,000, prohibited
the three partners individually named (along with the firm) as respondents from transfer-
ring assets in excess of $5,000 without written notice to the OTS (and required them to
escrow significant percentages of their earnings), and prohibited all partners, the three
named respondents, and the rest of the partnership (other than those who joined the firm
after the events set forth in the Notice of Charges) from leaving the firm without posting
security or (along with their families) from disposing of assets except under circumscribed
conditions. Temporary Order to Cease and Desist, In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-20 (Mar. 1,
1992). See generally Stephen Labaton, U.S. Moves to Freeze Assets of Law Firm for S&L Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at Al.
225. As Miller explains:
[I]t is quite understandable that the matter of most pressing interest to the bar was
the asset freeze. The fact that Kaye Scholer may (or may not) have behaved unethi-
cally was hardly surprising. Firms, like people, do behave unethically from time to
time. What was surprising-what was "news"-was the unprecedented relief that OTS
sought-relief that in the view of many observers effectively precluded Kaye Scholer
from any realistic chance of obtaining a hearing on the charges leveled against it.
Miller, Original Sin, supra note 47, at 311.
226. The author thus adheres to the views expressed in his rejoinder to Professor
Simon's article, even though he has reconsidered the efficacy of lawyer self-regulation in
general. See Fisher, Neither Evaders nor Apologists, supra note 47.
227. Macey, supra note 47, at 324.
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Had Simon only changed his thesis a little, however, he would
have been dead on. The bar, or at least the highly politicized seg-
ment of the bar that constitutes the leadership of ABA sections and
the ABA as a whole, was being evasive, but in a different way. By
focusing attention on the travails of Kaye, Scholer and the com-
paratively easy target of government overreaching that is OTS's
specialty,2 8 the bar hierarchy was able partially to deflect public at-
tention from-or at a minimum avoid having to focus its own
attention on-the ethical defalcations of the many other elite law
firms that were found by the government to have been complicit in
the S&L debacle. In fact, relatively little attention was devoted by
the ABA to Keating's other law firms, the lawyers for Vernon, the
lawyers for Silverado, or the lawyers for Centrust (to name only the
most notorious of the corrupt S&Ls).
To be sure, a great many lawyers counseled their S&L clients to
stretch the law to the limit, and there is certainly a respectable ar-
gument to be made (and one that was made, repeatedly, by law
firms, by bar groups, and by the author) 29 that counseling a client
to do things on the cutting edge of legality are part of what a law-
yer is "supposed" to do for clients. There is a vast difference,
however, between the fundamentally interpretive exercise inherent
in representing clients on the "cutting edge" and doing whatever
228. The freeze order and the OTS Chief Counsel's novel theories of attorney liability
provided ample ammunition, but OTS has gone much further and has subsequently earned
the ire of courts on judicial review. See infra note 430 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor's Toesies, supra note 47, at 63 (summarizing
instances of creative lawyering that exploited "loopholes" in federal banking law); Brief
Amici Curiae of Banking and Business Lawyers In Support of Petitioner at 23-24, O'Melveny
& Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (No. 93-489) (The author wrote this brief and was
Counsel of Record.). Typical of such efforts have been the use of both federal and state law
to permit banking organizations to engage in various aspects of the insurance business via
creative construction of statutory language and functional equivalence analysis. See, e.g.,
Nations Bank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995);
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 890 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 810 (1990); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 656 F.Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1987), affd in relevant
part, 854 E2d 1405, 1409-11 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Typical also is the creation of bank securities
affiliates engaging in underwriting and dealing in all manners of securities by exploiting a
loophole in the Glass-Steagall Act. See, e.g., Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 839 F.2d 47
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 900 F.2d
360 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See generally Keith R. Fisher, Orphan of Invention: Why the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act Was Unnecessary, 80 OR. L. REV. 1301, 1350-60, 1386-87 (2001). These sorts of
examples are, on the whole, instructive because what they exemplify is not lawyers assisting
clients in the furtherance of schemes that will defraud or injure third parties, but rather
assisting them in navigating through the gray areas of open-textured regulatory regimes to
achieve legitimate business goals. These goals were often procompetitive and helped break
down outmoded, inefficient, and artificial barriers segmenting the financial services indus-
tries.
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the client wants. In representing clients on the "cutting edge," the
lawyer uses independent judgment and consummate skill, fully con-
sistent with intellectual and moral integrity and in the highest
traditions of the bar, to determine whether (and if so, how, and to
what extent) the bounds of the law can be broadened in the cli-
ent's interest, while remaining within the bounds of prudence and
caution."O At the opposite end is the intellectually and morally
bankrupt mindset that, come what may, the lawyer must do every-
thing the client wants done, without the interpolation of that
independence of mind that separates the professional from other
service providers.
The oft-heard justification, a counter-subject to the recurrent
fugue subject of "what were these lawyers thinking?", is that the
client is entitled to undivided loyalty and zealous representation.
That argument, of course, fallaciously conflates the duties of a trial
lawyer,"' operating in a system of procedural checks and balances
that offset zealous advocacy, with those of a business lawyer provid-
ing services to clients that desperately need sound, dispassionate,
and, above all, independent advice and counsel. From that confla-
tion, the path leads down the slippery slope to O.P.M. and
beyond-to Lincoln Savings and other S&L excesses, all the way
230. Justice Brandeis once testified, in response to businessmen's complaints about the
uncertain outer boundaries of antitrust laws:
[Y]our lawyers ... can tell you where a fairly safe course lies. If you are walking along
a precipice no human being can tell you how near you can go to that precipice with-
out falling over, because you may stumble on a loose stone ... but anybody can tell
you where you can walk perfectly safe within convenient distance of the precipice."
The difficulty which men have felt... has been rather that they wanted to go to the
limit rather than they wanted to go safely.
Hearings Before Sen. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62nd Cong. 1161 (1911) (statement of Louis
D. Brandeis), quoted in HAZARD ET AL., supra note 120, at 62.
231. As a matter of fact, it is not strictly accurate, even when limited to trial lawyers.
Manifold provisions of the Model Rules themselves unambiguously dilute, if not abate en-
tirely, that so-called "undivided" duty of loyalty. An obvious example is multiple
representation, which is permissible with the clients' consent, not merely if their interests
are potentially conflicting (Rule 1.7(b)), but even where they are actually conflicting so long
as there is a reasonable possibility that the lawyer can assist them in resolving those differ-
ences (Rule 2.2). Other examples abound as a result of trial lawyers' duties to the court (as
"officers of the court") and to the legal system, e.g., duties not to make frivolous claims
(Rule 3.1), not to put on perjured testimony (Rule 3.3(a)(4)), not to engage in improper
communications with court personnel or jurors (Rule 3.5), and not to make misrepresenta-
tions to third parties (Rule 4.1), etc. For more on this topic, see generally Nathan M. Crystal,
Limitations on Zealous Representation in an Adversarial System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. Rev. 671
(1997).
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down to Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and whatever scandal is the fla-
vor of the month.2 2
E. B.C.C.I.
1. The Ethical Problems-In October 1988, Bank of Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI) and eight of its employees were
indicted in Tampa, Florida, on charges of laundering millions of
dollars for the Medellin drug cartel.233 The charges had been the
adventitious result of an unrelated, undercover investigation by
U.S. Customs agents, who had literally stumbled upon the bank's
involvement. The ensuing indictments and convictions, and even
the bank's guilty plea and payment of a then record $15 million
fine, turned out to be the first step in the unmasking of a global
bank that thrived on secrecy and operated in a financial under-
world where billions of dollars in "hot money '235 flowed effortlessly
across borders in streams of electrons.
232. The flavor of the month now is the mutual fund industry and continuing revela-
tions, amidst investigations spearheaded chiefly by N.Y. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, of
breaches of fiduciary duty and sharp business practices that found the SEC's Division of
Investment Management asleep at the switch. See, e.g., Tom Lauricella, Pilgrim and BaxterFace
Charges; Mutual-Fund Firm's Founders Are Accused of Breach of Duty, Civil Fraud, by SEC and
Spitzer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2003, at Cl; Christopher Oster, Invesco Charged in Scandal as
Strong Quits; Strong's Financial Chief Resigns, Plans to Shed Controlling Stake Amid Mutual-Fund
Investigation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at Cl; Christopher Oster, Mutual Funds Under Fire:
Details Emerge on Security Trust Role; SEC Files Civil Charges as Bank's Executives Face Criminal Case
in New York, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2003, at CIO; David Reilly, Regulators Begin to Investigate
Funds in Europe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2003, at C7. Thus far, there has been little focus on
attorney involvement, though that could change. See, e.g., John Hechinger &James Bandler,
Putnam Settles With SEC, Questions Remain; Probe Reaches Top Legal Officer; Firm Agrees to Pay Back
Investors As Pairt of Civil Settlement Order, WALL ST.J., Nov. 14, 2003, at C1 (noting investigation
by Massachusetts Securities Division into possible short-term trading in personal accounts by
Putnam General Counsel).
233. The following facts are distilled from the congressional investigation into BCCI's
illegal activities in the United States, including in particular Senator John Kerry & Senator
Hank Brown. The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, No.
102-140 (Comm. Print), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 1992).
234. BCCI simply paid the fine and went about its business as though nothing untoward
had happened. Publicly, the bank explained away the incident as the isolated work of
crooked, lower-level employees and dispatched an army of retainers to smooth the ruffled
feathers of customers, law enforcement agents, and regulators.
235. These included money from narcotics trafficking, illegal arms dealing, illegal flight
capital from the wealthy elite of unstable countries who evade currency restrictions and
drain their homelands of funds desperately needed to finance their development, and
ill-gotten loot from Third World countries where dictators with names such as Ferdinand
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Flotsam from all of these streams of dirty money flowed to
BCCI's coffers because the "value added" service it provided-
indeed, the bank's raison ditre-was to make the flow of funds in-
visible to, or at a minimum beyond the reach of, law enforcement.
Founded by Pakistanis and financed by wealthy Arab potentates,
BCCI had billed itself as a Third World bank, as the financial tool
that would help developing countries pull themselves out of pov-
erty and starvation. The bank came into existence in perfect time
to take advantage of the untold wealth then beginning to flow into
oil-producing countries in the early 1970s in the form of petrodol-
lars. This level of wealth only multiplied with the creation of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the oil embargo,
and the transmogrification of the Persian Gulf region into a mid-
dle-eastern boom town. Trading on its Islamic origins in Pakistan,
BCCI opened offices in four Persian Gulf states and in London, the
latter office intended to cater to the large Pakistani and Asian
populations in that metropolis.
Yet BCCI was neither organized nor regulated in any of those ju-
risdictions. Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA was
registered in the Cayman Islands in 1975 as the principal banking
subsidiary of BCCI Holdings SA, which had been established in
Luxembourg in 1972.6 Beneath these two umbrella groups, the
bank's founder, a reclusive Pakistani named Agha Hassan Abedi,
had organized a bewildering labyrinth of additional companies
and banking entities. The method behind this seeming madness
was to create a hydra-like institution that operated across borders
with impunity because no single regulatory authority could (even if
so inclined, unlike Luxembourg and the Caymans) see the entire
picture. In short, the goal was to make BCCI "offshore" everywhere
in the world!
It had disguised itself through numerous charitable operations
and had hired influence peddlers and respected politicians world-
wide to embellish that image. Among them were former U.S.
Marcos, Franois and Jean-Claude ("Papa Doc" and "Baby Doc") Duvalier, Manuel Noriega,
and Saadam Hussein plundered the meager wealth of their people.
236. Both Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands were long-time bank secrecy havens,
part of a small fraternity of nations known as "OFCs"-"Offshore Centers"-that lure finan-
cial institutions of all stripes with the promise that their books would be closed to nosy
outside regulators and law-enforcement officials. Of late, however, as part of a trend toward
tougher international law enforcement efforts against narcotics trafficking and money laun-
dering, these two jurisdictions have begun to strengthen their domestic laws. See generally
Keith R. Fisher, In Rem Alternatives to Extradition for Money Laundering, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 409 (2003).
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President Jimmy Carter, who had over several years accompanied
Abedi on trips to China and other developing countries and pro-
vided the banker with invaluable access and respectability, and
attorney Clark Clifford, a former presidential adviser and elder
statesman of the Democratic party, whose reputation and influence
helped Abedi to realize his crowning ambition: to acquire secret
control of a significant banking organization in the United States.
For approximately twelve years, beginning with BCCI's earliest
attempts to gain entry into the U.S. banking market, continuing
through the successful and surreptitious acquisition of control of
Financial General Bancshares (FGB) and the formation of the suc-
cessor holding company system under the name First American,
and ending with their forced resignation as Chairman and Presi-
dent, respectively, of the First American organization, Clark
Clifford-former counsel to President Truman, former Secretary
of Defense under President Johnson, and hminence grise to Democ-
ratic Presidents and power brokers for forty years-and his prot~g6
and law partner, Robert Altman, were integrally involved in BCCI's
U.S. machinations. Among these, first, were representing former
OMB Director Bert Lance in selling control of the National Bank
of Georgia to a BCCI nominee, Ghaith Pharaon. Second, they rep-
resented Lance, BCCI, and a variety of Arab shareholders in an
initial, abortive takeover of a U.S. bank and subsequently, with the
additional representation of Commerce and Credit American
Holdings (CCAH) and various subsidiary holding companies, in
the successful takeover of FGB. 37 (Third, they served as the senior
executives and as directors of the First American organization.
Fourth, they handled, through their law firm (Clifford & Warnke),
a variety of legal matters for First American-including its acquisi-
tion from straw purchaser Pharaon of the National Bank of
Georgia-and parceling out other legal work to counsel of their
own choosing. Fifth, they became multi-millionaires by acquiring
substantial share ownership in First American with undisclosed
(indeed, actively concealed from U.S. regulators in flagrant viola-
tion of federal banking laws) funding from BCCI. Sixth, they
represented BCCI in connection with a congressional investiga-
tion. Seventh, they coordinated the defense of BCCI and its
officers in connection with the money laundering prosecution that
237. The Federal Reserve's approval of this takeover relied heavily upon Clifford's ster-
ling reputation and his personal assurances that he was acquainted with the individual Arab
purchasers (all straw men for BCCI) who were acquiring control positions in the holding
company, as well as his representation that BCCI was not in any way involved in the acquisi-
tion, other than having acted as financial adviser to some of the Arab purchasers.
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arose from a Customs Department sting operation that stumbled
upon irregularities in BCCI's Tampa, Florida office (and that ulti-
mately led to the unraveling of the concealed skein of relationships
by means of which BCCI had unlawfully acquired control of FGB/
First American). Eighth, they withheld from regulators critical in-
formation in their possession about BCCI's ownership of First
American and deceived both regulators and Congress about their
own knowledge of, and personal involvement in, BCCI's illegal ac-
tivities in the United States. The congressional investigation found
that, throughout their tenure at the helm of First American, Clif-
ford and Altman made business decisions regarding acquisitions
that were unrelated to any legitimate business needs of First
American, but were instead motivated by BCCI's sinister agenda.
Furthermore, they represented to federal regulators that these de-
cisions were their own, when in fact they had been made by Agha
Hassan Abedi and other senior officials at BCCI and sent as direc-
tives to Clifford and Altman, who then caused those decisions to be
implemented and ratified, as necessary, by the appropriate boards
of the various First American banks (some of which were not
wholly-owned and had substantial minority shareholder interests3 ')
and holding companies.
Throughout this 12-year period, and the comprehensive con-
gressional investigation, Clifford and Altman maintained not only
that they were innocent of any wrongdoing but that they had no
knowledge of what BCCI was up to.239 Given the level and duration
of their activities, this is extremely difficult to credit, but, if true,
bespeaks at best a level of ostrich-like behavior that demands inclu-
sion in the Guinness Book of World Records-this on the part of
two clever, experienced, and sophisticated lawyers, who amassed
enormous personal fortunes, far in excess of anything they could
238. These shareholders were also bilked by First American's machinations in connec-
tion with a freezeout merger as to which ajury subsequently found knowing violations of the
securities laws by the directors and where evidence was adduced of undisclosed ownership
interests in the holding company by Clifford. See Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979
F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1992).
239. See, e.g., Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Af-
fairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1991) (testimony of Clark M. Clifford) ("In all these years, we
didn't encounter a single suspicious circumstance.... Were we deceived? Apparently, we were
deceived.") (emphasis added); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Narcotics and
Int'l Operations of the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 3) 63
(1991) (testimony of Clark M. Clifford) [hereinafter BCCI Senate Hearings] ("We have not
violated any law. We have not been guilty of any impropriety .... [I]f all that we read about,
this poisonous constant stream of misconduct, if that is a true statement of what this bank
did, then we have been grossly deceived.").
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have earned in legitimate legal fees, on the basis of their admitted
dealings (i.e., the financings on unbelievably favorable terms of
their equity holdings in First American) with BCCI.4°
It is time once again for the return of the fugue subject: What,
one wonders, could these lawyers have been thinking? Could any
lawyer-much less one with the experience and sophistication of a
Clark Clifford-be that naive?
24
'
In point of fact, the congressional investigation found that their
statements and sworn testimony lacked credibility, standing as they
did in sharp contrast with facts contained in contemporaneous
documents and with the testimony of other witnesses, including a
variety of BCCI officials who testified before Congress, such as the
former head of BCCI's operations in Miami, Abdur Sakhia.
[I]n any management discussions ... on our future in the
United States, we would think of three entities-BCCI, Na-
tional Bank of Georgia, and First American-in the same
breath. Who would be going where, who would work in which
entity, what area of entity will be handled by which entity, al-
location of businesses, markets, geographic territories, all
took place as if this was one entity .... [I t is very hard to be-
lieve that Clifford and Altman did not know [about BCCI's
ownership of First American]. 242
2. The Regulatory Response-The behavior of the lawyers in the
BCCI scandal-without which BCCI would never have been able to
effect its surreptitious and grossly illegal acquisition of control of
one of only a very few (at the time) multi-state banking organiza-
tions, and the only one with banking operations in both the
nation's political capital (Washington, D.C.) and its financial capi-
240. More information on Clark Clifford's role in the BCCI scandal can be found in the
following sources. See generally Notice of Charges and of Hearing, In re Clifford, Bd. of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Reserve System, Docket Nos. 92-080-E-11 et seq. (July 29, 1992); JAMES
RING ADAMS & DOUGLAS FRANTZ, A FULL SERVICE BANK: How BCCI STOLE BILLIONS
AROUND THE WORLD (1993);JONATHAN BEAY & S.C. GWYNNE, THE OUTLAW BANK: A WILD
RIDE INTO THE SECRET HEART OF BCCI (1993); DOUGLAS FRANTZ & DAVID MCKEAN,
FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES (1995); MARK POTTS, NICHOLAS KOCHAN, & ROBERT WHITTING-
TON, BCCI: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE WORLD'S SLEAZIEST BANK (1992). See also RAJ K.
BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFTER BCCI 6-8, 15-17, 20 n.69, 82-83, 131-34, 175
(1994).
241. Clifford himself reportedly conceded that his involvement virtually compels an
outside observer to conclude that he was either stupid or venal. See David E. Rosenbaum, A
Charm for Plebeian and Patrician, N.Y. TIMES,July 30, 1992, at C5. It would indeed be a rare
case of stupidity that could attain what Clark Clifford accomplished professionally.
242. BCCI Senate Hearings, supra note 239 (pt. 2), at 505, 518.
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tal (New York City)-received little more attention than a footnote
in history. No disciplinary action seems to have been taken against
243
either Clifford or Altman. No lawyer regulation response whatso-
ever was forthcoming from either the bar or the federal
government, though the latter devoted considerable attention to
increasing regulation and supervision over entry requirements for
foreign banks wishing to do business in the United States and the
permissible activities and activity structures of such foreign banks,
as well as additional anti-money laundering legislation.244
F Enron and Other Contemporary Corporate Scandals
1. The Ethical Problems-Famed film director George Lucas must
cringe whenever he hears about details of the scandal involving
Enron Corp. (Enron) because many of the special purpose entities
(SPEs) were named after aspects of the Star Wars® movies. These
included such SPEs as 'JEDI" (named, cynically, after the order of
mystic knights dedicated to preserving freedom and combating
tyranny and evil) and Chewco Investments L.P. ("Chewco," named
after Chewbacca, that rather tall, hirsute companion of Han Solo
in the first three films of the series).
The Enron debacle is clearly the most highly publicized of the
recent spate of corporate scandals. The facts are voluminous and
complex, and, as a detailed recitation thereof is unnecessary to this
discussion, a synopsis of key points necessary to an appreciation of
243. Altman was prosecuted by the District Attorney for New York County, Robert
Morgenthau. See People v. Abedi, 595 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). He was ultimately
acquitted. Thereafter, he opened his own law office in downtown Washington. Clifford was
also indicted, but did not stand trial because he was too infirm. See Today's News Update,
N.Y.LJ., Dec. 1, 1993, at 1. He died in October 1998. Another elite firm lawyer implicated in
the BCCI scandal was Baldwin Tuttle of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, who provided
legal advice and made regulatory filings in connection with the Financial General First
American matter. See generally BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A. v. Clifford, 964 F.Supp.
468 (D.D.C. 1997).
244. Those banking reforms were effected by the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhance-
ment Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, §§ 201-215, 105 Stat. 2236, 2286-305 (1991), agency
regulations promulgated thereunder, and the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992), but are clearly beyond the scope of this
Article.
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the malfeasance of lawyers (as opposed to corporate executives,
banks, accountants, etc.) should suffice. 4 '
As is well known, on October 26, 2001, Enron, a Texas-based in-
ternational energy and communications conglomerate, announced
that it was taking a $544 million after-tax charge against earnings
related to transactions with LJM2 Co-Investment, L.P. ("LJM2"), a
partnership created and managed by Enron's Executive Vice Presi-
dent and Chief Financial Officer Andrew S. Fastow. Also
announced at the same time was a reduction of shareholders' eq-
uity of $1.2 billion related to transactions with LJM2.
Shortly thereafter, Enron announced that it was restating its fi-
nancial statements for the period from 1997 through 2001 because
of accounting errors relating to transactions with a different Fas-
tow-managed partnership, LJM Cayman, L.P. ("LJMI"), and an
additional related-party entity, Chewco Investments, L.P.
("Chewco"). These restatements were enormous. They reduced
Enron's reported net income by $28 million in 1997, $133 million
in 1998, $248 million in 1999, and $99 million in 2000. They re-
duced reported shareholders' equity by $258 million in 1997, $391
million in 1998, $710 million in 1999, and $754 million in 2000.
They increased reported debt by $711 million in 1997, $561 mil-
lion in 1998, $685 million in 1999, and $628 million in 2000.246
Enron's management used the two LJM partnerships and
Chewco to effect transactions that would not have been done on
an arm's length basis with unaffiliated entities. It all started when
JEDI lost its outside investors. Originally, JEDI had an independ-
ent, outside investor with a 50% equity interest, which permitted
Enron, under prevailing accounting rules, to report JEDI's profits
on its books but notJEDI's indebtedness. 47 When, late in 1997, the
outside investor wished to unload its stake in JEDI, Enron was
faced with the prospect of having to consolidate all of JEDI (in-
cluding the indebtedness) on Enron's balance sheet, which would
245. The following facts are distilled principally from two sources. The first is the de-
rivative litigation filed against Enron. See In re Enron Corp., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235
F.Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002) [hereinafter In re Enron]. The second is the Report of the
Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The Special Investigative Committee comprised three
individuals: Dean William C. Powers, Jr. of the University of Texas School of Law, Herbert S.
Winokur, Jr., a longstanding member of Enron's Board and Chairman of its Finance Com-
mittee, and Raymond S. Troubh.
246. Enron Report, supra note 245, at 3.
247. Plaintiffs in the Enron derivative litigation alleged thatJEDI accounted for perhaps
as much as 40% of Enron's overall profits in 1997. In re Enron, 235 F.Supp. 2d at 614.
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not merely have deprived Enron in the future of the significant, if
artificial, profits it had been booking on its financial statements as
a result of JEDI's operations, but would also, in fact, have wiped
out that profit for 1997. Unsuccessful in finding a replacement
outside investor to avert this financial calamity, Enron created
Chewco, arranged for Barclays Bank to lend Chewco the funds to
purchase the requisite (only 3%) equity stake inJEDI to avoid con-
solidation, and further arranged for Barclays to lend straw parties
enough to fund an equity stake in Chewco sufficient to dissociate
(for accounting purposes) Chewco from being consolidated with
Enron."8 Apart from the consolidation issue, Enron, as a public
company, also had to avoid having to make disclosure that any of
its senior management controlled Chewco, and this was done
through the subterfuge of putting one of Fastow's henchmen in
charge of Chewco.249
Thus began a long and convoluted sequence of schemes con-
cocted to preserve Enron's fictitious profitability. The subterfuges
succeeded in that aim for another three years.
Many of the most significant transactions apparently were de-
signed to accomplish favorable financial statement results, not
to achieve bona fide economic objectives or to transfer risk.
Some transactions were designed so that, had they followed
applicable accounting rules, Enron could have kept assets and
liabilities (especially debt) off of its balance sheet; but the
transactions did not follow those rules....
Other transactions were implemented-improperly, we are in-
formed by our accounting advisors-to offset losses. They
allowed Enron to conceal from the market very large losses
resulting from Enron's merchant investments by creating an
appearance that those investments were hedged-that is, that
a third party was obligated to pay Enron the amount of those
losses-when in fact that third party was simply an entity in
which only Enron had a substantial economic stake. We be-
lieve these transactions resulted in Enron reporting earnings
from the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of
248. Id. at 615.
249. An Enron Global Finance employee, Michael J. Kopper, who reported to Fastow,
apparently managed Chewco. Enron Report, supra note 245, at 50.
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2001 that were almost $1 billion higher than should have
been reported.5 °
Not surprisingly, a number of Enron employees involved in
these shams and subterfuges improperly received significant finan-
cial benefits from the transactions that gave rise to these mammoth
losses. 51
Ultimately, of course, the house of cards came tumbling down,
and, within a month of the second announced restatements of fi-
nancials., Enron filed for bankruptcy. The financial consequences
to investors and pension holders were catastrophic.
From the disclosure point of view, there was an abject derelic-
tion of duty by the professionals involved-"an absence of forceful
and effective oversight by Senior Enron Management and in-house
counsel, and objective and critical professional advice by outside
counsel at Vinson & Elkins2 52 or auditors at Andersen."253 But the
derelictions went far beyond mere disclosure defalcations. The se-
ries of complex transactions that concealed, for a time, Enron's
true financial condition could not have been effected without pro-
fessional assistance. Much of that was done through improper
accounting, for which responsibility has been laid at the doorstep
of Arthur Andersen & Co., which billed Enron $5.7 million in
connection with work performed specifically on the LJM and
Chewco transactions during the period 1997-2001, over and above
Andersen's normal audit fees.254 The Houston-based law firm Vin-
250. Id. at 4.
251. At the time of these announcements, it was revealed that Fastow had personally
pocketed more than $30 million from LJM1 and LJM2, Kopper at least $10 million, two
other employees $1 million each, and still two more by amounts believed to have been at
least in six figures. Id. at 4. Furthermore, Kristina Mordaunt, an in-house lawyer at Enron, is
said to have accepted interests in one of the related-party investments that enriched Fastow,
Southampton Place, without obtaining the consent of Enron's Chairman and Chief Execu-
tive Officer, which represented, at minimum, a violation of Enron's internal corporate code
of conduct. Id. at 27.
252. For example, the lawyers obligingly approved non-disclosure of the tens of millions
of dollars in SPE-related compensation paid to Fastow (who obviously preferred it that way),
notwithstanding SEC Regulation S-K requiring such disclosure, apparently on the theory
that, because it was still uncertain how much Fastow would eventually earn from all the
transactions, Enron did not have to disclose even what he had earned thus far. See id. at 187;
17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2002). See generally, Enron Report, supra note 245, at 178-208. The SEC
disclosures did aver that these "related-party" transactions had been negotiated at "arm's-
length" and on terms "comparable" to those in deals with non-related parties, notwithstand-
ing the lack of any factual foundation whatsoever for such assertions and apparently
heedless of the facially suspect nature of these transactions. Id. at 198.
253. Enron Report, supra note 245, at 17.
254. Id. at 5.
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son & Elkins (V&E) was Enron's longstanding outside counsel, and
the Chicago-based law firm Kirkland & Ellis (K&E) represented
Chewco andJEDI (itself a concurrent representation that was ques-
tionable under the Model Rules, given the importance of reifying,
via the spurious third party equity investments, the "independ-
ence" of Chewco from JEDI and JEDI from Enron)5 'G and other
Enron-related partnerships and SPEs as well. Both firms provided
key legal advice and transactional assistance (including documen-
tation and indispensable legal opinions) in connection with many
of the transactions discussed in the Enron Report and also assisted
Enron with the preparation of what turned out to be wholly inade-
quate, if not false and misleading, disclosures of related-party
transactions in proxy statements and the footnotes to the financial
statements in Enron's periodic securities filings.5 7
Perhaps it would not be condign to assign any blame to V&E
with respect to its failure to detect or comment upon the impro-
priety of various accounting treatments, though the extent of the
firm's involvement in Enron's affairs and the proliferation of SPE
transactions that were, at best, of marginal legality, should have
raised plenty of red flags. 58 Clearly, V&E "should have brought a
stronger, more objective and more critical voice to the disclosure
process."259 Furthermore, it was obvious that Enron's management
255. One wonders how the lawyers could possibly have been duped if they were privy to,
or worse yet participated in documenting, the loans from Barclays to these "investors."
256. In fact, the allegations in the Enron derivative litigation suggest that K&E treated
Enron and its senior management as the law firm's defacto clients (another, all too common
multiple representation of dubious propriety, discouraged by the entity-representation stan-
dard of Model Rule 1.13), at the expense of the interests of the sham clients they were
theoretically engaged to represent. Adding insult to injury, K&E is also alleged to have rep-
resented Fastow. See generally In reEnron, 235 F.Supp. 2d 549, 669-73 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
257. Both firms are also alleged to have advised Kopper that all of his actions were
proper when he expressed concern about the propriety of his simultaneously managing
Chewco, serving as the "owner of [its] general partner," having an equity interest in its lim-
ited partner, and serving as an Enron employee. Id. at 671. Kopper ultimately pleaded guilty
to money laundering and wire fraud charges, arising from allegations of a conspiracy, span-
ning the period 1997-2001, with Fastow and others to concoct a series of transactions with
Enron-related partnerships for the purpose of concealing debt, falsifying Enron's financial
statements, and enriching the conspirators. SeeJonathan Weil et al., Guilty Plea by Enron's
Kopper Increases Scrutiny of Ex-CFO; Admission of Two Felonies by Former Finance Aide Seen as Water-
shed in Case, WALL ST.J., Aug. 22, 2002, at Al.
258. Enron was V&E's largest client, reportedly contributing some $27 million in an-
nual fees, representing 7.8% of the firm's business. See, e.g., Otis Bilodeau, V&E Shoots Back,
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at 1; Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Vinson & Elkins and Enron Un-
plugged, TEx. LAW., Mar. 12, 2002; John C. Schwartz, Troubling Questions Ahead for Enron"s Law
Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at Cl, C8.
259. Enron Report, supra note 245, at 26.
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and its Board "relied heavily on the perceived approval by Vinson
& Elkins of the structure and disclosure of the transactions."
2 60
For its part, K&E is alleged to have known that Enron's stock was
propping up the SPEs (including subsequent generation enter-
prises known as the Raptor SPEs) and that, if the stock price
should decline, the SPEs would fail, eliminating the illusory profits
they were contributing to Enron's financial statements. 261 When
that vicious cycle seemed imminent in late 2000 and in subsequent
years, the derivative action plaintiffs allege, K&E "helped restruc-
ture and capitalize the Raptor SPEs ... by transferring even more
shares of Enron stock to them."26 2 These are the same Raptor SPE
financings that feature so prominently in the alarm-ringing memo-
randum of whistleblower Sherron Watkins.6
Sadly, the saga does not end here. Once Enron's true financial
condition became known, V&E was engaged to conduct a "pre-
liminary" internal investigation2 1 of Sherron Watkins's allegations
of various accounting improprieties. 26 If "preliminary" is synony-
mous with "cursory," then V&E's efforts were right on target,2 6  and,
predictably, the result was a recommendation to management that
nothing further be done to follow up on Watkins's allegations.67
No great surprise there: V&E was conducting an investigation that,
if scrupulously and professionally performed, would call into ques-
260. Id.
261. In re Enron, 235 F.Supp.2d at 659-60, 672.
262. Id. at 672.
263. Id. at 657 n.92.
264. The ostensible reason for Enron's management choosing V&E was its familiarity
with Enron and its businesses, thereby facilitating a quick investigation. See Roger C. Cram-
ton, Enron and the Corporate Lauyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143,
162-63 (2002).
265. The entire text of Sherron Watkins's memorandum to Enron Chairman Kenneth
Lay was reprinted in the New York Times. See Text of Letter to Enron's Chairman After Departure
of Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 16, 2002, at C6. In fact, Watkins advised Lay not to engage
V&E but to hire an independent, outside law firm to investigate-one that was not Enron's
regular law firm, had not signed off on some of the questionable SPE deals, and did not
have a conflict of interest. Id. Contrary to her advice, Lay engaged V&E to review the trans-
actions, but the engagement was limited so that V&E would not "second guess" Andersen's
accounting treatment thereof.
266. The distinguished New York firm Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett reportedly per-
formed an even more cursory investigation for its client, Global Crossing. Asked to
investigate allegations of wrongdoing made by a manager in a manner strikingly similar to
Sherron Watkins' communications to Enron Chairman Lay, Simpson, Thacher conducted a
perfunctory inquiry in which it interviewed neither Global Crossing's outside auditors nor
the whistleblowing manager, and then advised the corporate client that no further investiga-
tion or action was necessary. SeeJoseph Menn, Global Crossing Case Figure Not Questioned, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at Cl.
267. In re Enron, 235 F.Supp.2d at 668 n.103.
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tion the very transactions that V&E itself had participated in struc-
turing, counseling, documenting, and facilitating with the
preparation of requisite opinions of counsel and securities disclo-
sure documents.
2 6
Once again, one must wonder what these lawyers could possibly
have been thinking.269 How could V&E ethically have undertaken
an investigation in which the adequacy of its own prior legal work
would inevitably be in issue? In the first place, such an engagement
creates an obvious conflict between the client's presumptive 270 need
for a credible, punctilious, and impartial investigation and the law
firm's interest in legitimating (if not exonerating) its prior work
for the client. Thus, under prevailing rules, a lawyer may not ac-
cept such an engagement if there is a substantial risk that the
lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and ad-
versely affected by the lawyer's own interest, unless the client gives
a fully informed and valid consent.27' Such a conflict cannot, under
prevailing ethical norms, be cured by disclosure and client waiver
268. See Cramton, supra note 264, at 164.
269. In that regard, one must wonder about V&E's objectivity and harbor the healthy
suspicion that any lawyers asked to conduct an internal corporate investigation must have
been so anesthetized by the prospect of additional fees that the firm failed to give even a
moment's thought to why Enron's management insisted on having V&E do the investiga-
tion, when it would clearly implicate the law firm's own prior work, and what that would tell
them about the type of opinion management wanted the firm to provide.
270. Presumptive, here, because this specific client, Enron, may actually have preferred
a whitewash rather than an objective investigation. Indeed, the limitations on V&E's en-
gagement suggest that may have been the case. Nevertheless, even if the client had insisted
upon limiting the investigation, as it may well have, acceptance of those restrictions would
fatally undermine the law firm's independence, objectivity, and competence to conduct the
investigation. Allowing the client to dictate which employees could be interviewed and what
areas of inquiry were out of bounds (for example, Andersen's accounting treatment) per-
force rendered the investigation perfunctory and inadequate. For example, what law firm
exercising independence, objectivity, and professional competence would uncritically accept
individuals' self-serving denials of their own wrongdoing at face value, without any further
inquiry, or fail to interview a number of employees with arguably relevant information? A
comparison of the V&E investigation with the subsequent investigation by the special com-
mittee of the Board that produced (with the assistance of a truly independent law firm) the
Enron Report proves this point dramatically.
271. Model Rule 1.7 is unambiguous on this point, both in its original avatar and in its
reincarnation as part of the ABA's Ethics 2000 revisions. Compare GILLERS & SIMON, supra
note 184, at 79 with id. at 93 (comparing current and prior versions). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 121-122 (2000). Here, Enron was V&E's larg-
est client, and the law firm had previously done extensive legal work in structuring and
documenting the transactions in question and approving financial disclosures relating to
those transactions. It should be clear beyond peradventure that V&E could not undertake
the internal corporate investigation without disclosure of the potential conflict and Enron's
informed consent.
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(even if it could be said to be "fully informed," which, from the en-
tity's point of view, is far from clear2 7 ) because of the separate and
independent requirement that the lawyer must reasonably believe
the representation will not be adversely affected by the lawyer's
conflict of interest.273 Even apart from the necessity of second-
guessing its own documents and legal advice, V&E should readily
have anticipated being named as a party defendant in any share-
holder suits against Enron and being used as a scapegoat by Enron
insiders seeking to avoid personal liability. (Don't blame us: we rea-
sonably relied on our lawyers, who assured us these transactions
were lawful and proper.)
Thus far, this discussion appears to highlight only the rogue be-
havior of two law firms. Yet, there is a plethora of other legal talent
who may appropriately share in the blame, even if we limit our-
selves to the Enron saga. Take, for example, the prominent
commercial and investment banking organizations whose assis-
tance in providing shady financing designed artificially to inflate
Enron's profitability has been the subject of congressional hearings
and is by now well documented.7  Without going into the details of
these complex financial manipulations, suffice it to say that they
were extensions of credit to Enron that were disguised as com-
• 275
modities sales (e.g., sales of oil or gas) or trading, often involving
SPEs established by the banking organizations themselves. No real
assets ever changed hands, nor was it ever intended that they
would; rather, the intent was for Enron to repay the disguised in-
debtedness (with interest, of course) and "cancel" the "sales." The
point of this rather elaborate scheme was to show as earnings on
Enron's books what was really debt and to leave Enron free to bor-
272. The officials purporting to consent on behalf of Enron were its Chairman, Ken-
neth Lay, and its General Counsel, James V. Derrick, Jr., both of whom were heavily
implicated in the misconduct alleged by Sherron Watkins.
273. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 271, at
§ 122(2)(c).
274. See, e.g., The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron's Collapse: Hearing Before the S.
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (2002), available at http://govt-
aff.senate.gov/073002levin.htm; http://govt-aff.senate.gov/073002collins.htm; http://govt-
aff.senate.gov/073002Iieberman.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). See also In reEnron Corp. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 235 ESupp.2d 549, 627-
28 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
275. In re Enron, 235 F.Supp.2d at 627-29, 651, 697. See also First Interim Report of Neal
Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 7 n.26, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr•
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
[hereinafter Batson Report]. Susan Koniak has also provided a summary description of
these transactions, which Batson calls "prepay" transactions, id., and which she characterizes
as "money-go-round deals," Koniak, supra note 113, at 1242.
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row money on the security of assets without relinquishing any con-
trol, or any benefits from the proceeds, of those assets.27" At the risk
of reiterating the obvious, none of these transactions could have
been consummated without the assistance of sophisticated, elite
law firms,277 which had to render legal opinions known as "true
sale" opinions and "nonconsolidation" opinions.
2 78
Then, as the threat of a government investigation into Enron, its
SPEs, and the accounting treatment of the various transactions
loomed, Enron's outside auditing firm, Arthur Andersen, initiated
a concerted effort to sanitize its Enron files, a process that resulted
in the destruction of untold numbers of documents. Having previ-
ously paid a fine to the SEC and settled a civil action in damages
for its conduct relating to insolvency of Waste Management, An-
dersen had revised its "document retention policy" in an apparent
effort to ensure that "smoking gun" work papers would not be
available to regulators and plaintiffs' lawyers in the future.279 Then,
in a variation on what might somewhat uncharitably be described
as the "Will no one rid me of this meddlesome priest?" sugges-
tion,2  Andersen in-house counsel Nancy Temple repeatedly urged
those working on the Enron account to be sure to comply with
Andersen's document retention policy. By this point, Andersen
had already engaged New York-based Davis, Polk & Wardwell l
and Temple testified that she consulted with Davis, Polk on the
subject of document retention.282 This almost sounds like a lawyer
276. Batson Report, supra note 275, at 48.
277. It goes without saying that the household names in the financial services industry
that participated in these transactions-Morgan, Citi, Merrill, and First Boston-all employ
such law firms on a regular basis, as did Barclays before them (in connection with the re-
structuring of the original SPEsJEDI and Chewco).
278. See Mike France, What About the Lauyers?, Bus. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58, 61-62.
279. See Cramton, supra note 264, at 158-59. See generally Destruction of Enron-Related
Documents by Andersen Personnel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-183 (2002).
280. Henry II's famous cry, pursuant to which some of his minions obligingly assassi-
nated the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas A Becket.
281. The precise scope of Davis, Polk's engagement by Andersen is uncertain, other
than for public statements that the firm was advising Andersen concerning its legal prob-
lems relating to the Enron engagement. Perhaps the scope of engagement was defined quite
narrowly, but, if it was so narrow that the firm could not properly advise on something as
basic as document retention, then acceptance of so restrictive an engagement may actually
have prevented the adequate representation required by ethics rules. See, e.g., MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.1 cmt. 5, 1.2(c) (2003).
282. See Destruction of Enron-Related Documents by Andersen Personnel: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong., 2d Sess.
118 (2002).
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joke: How many lawyers does it take to screw in a light bulb in or-
der to be able to see (and hopefully, preclude) the shredding of
documents critical to an imminent criminal and civil investigation?
What tune, one wonders, were Arthur Andersen's lawyers (in-house
and outside counsel) fiddling while Rome burned?8 3
Obviously, not just outside counsel, but in-house counsel as well,
must share the blame, as all ostensibly operate under the same
ethical strictures (though that, too, suppresses context). Nancy
Temple and James Derrick are two examples of what not to do that
emerge from the preceding discussion, but it must be recognized
that serving only a single client and being beholden solely to that
client for one's livelihood create pressures toward, at a minimum,
looking the other way when suspicious things are going on. The
allocation of ethical responsibilities becomes more complex, of
course, when there are interactions with outside counsel, particu-
larly where long-standing and tightly interwoven relationships
between a corporate client and its outside law firm create a clubby
atmosphere. 84 Noteworthy in that regard is that Enron's General
Counsel was a former V&E partner, who continued the company's
tradition of sending the firm a steady stream of business. Enron's
legal department also hired approximately twenty V&E lawyers
during the late 1990's.
"Son of Enron"
The Enron saga, unfortunately, does not stand alone. Consider
the strange case of Mark A. Belnick, a lawyer who years ago helped
Congress track down missing millions in the Iran-Contra affair and
was formerly a partner at the New York firm of Paul, Weiss, Whar-
ton, Rifkind & Garrison. He was lured from private practice to
work in-house at Tyco and has been accused of participating in a
conspiracy to loot Tyco of hundreds of millions of dollars.28 '
283. These limited facts suggest three possibilities, none of them good. Andersen's law-
yers were (1) actively encouraging this eradication through none-too-subtle hints; (2)
recklessly disregarding the very real possibility that documents might "disappear" as a result
of Andersen employees seeking to protect themselves or Andersen; or (3) lackadaisically
(and negligently) going about their business with nary a thought for whether or not the
Enron files were preserved. Any of these three would have ineluctably exposed Andersen to
civil liability to Enron and its shareholders and to potential criminal liability for obstruction
of justice. In actuality, these practices did all that and more, leading to worldwide public
opprobrium, client exodus, partner defections en masse, and, ultimately, the dissolution of
the firm.
284. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Enron's Many Strands: The Lawyers; Troubling Questions Ahead
for Enron's Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at Cl.
285. Jonathan D. Glater, Lawyer Caught in Tyco Tangle Leaves Friends Wondering, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at Cl. According to allegations in a lawsuit filed by Tyco, as soon as
Belnickjoined the company in 1998, he received two employment contracts, each dated the
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Sadly, this news story appeared on the same day with three other
startling stories of corporate greed and malfeasance. In one, the
NASD sued former Salomon Smith Barney analyst Jack B. Grub-
man for allegedly writing misleading research on Winstar
Communications, which paid his employer $24 million in invest-
ment banking fees during that same period. s6 In another, the
founder of cable company Adelphia Communications, John J. Ri-
gas, two of his sons, and two other former Adelphia executives
were indicted on securities fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and con-
spiracy counts, alleging a scheme to conceal approximately $2.5
billion in debt and other funds misappropriated by the Rigas fam-
ily.287 Finally, the chief Administrative Law Judge of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission found, in an administrative hear-
ing initiated by the state of California and one of the state's major
utility companies, that El Paso Corporation fraudulently drove up
prices for natural gas in California during the state's power crisis in
2000 and 2001 by manipulating energy supplies to withhold gas
from the state, thereby artificially increasing the cost of electricity
generated by gas-fired turbines.288
same day and signed by flamboyant CEO L. Dennis Kozlowski. Only one was approved by
the board of directors; the other was kept secret:
Under the first contract, Tyco would pay Mr. Belnick a salary of $700,000 and a first-
year bonus of $1.75 million, and provided him with 100,000 restricted company
shares and 500,000 options.
The second contract was far more lucrative. It guaranteed that Mr. Belnick's bonus
would be no less than one-third of that received by Mr. Kozlowski and entitled Mr.
Belnick to participate in the company's relocation program, the source of $14 million
in loans, which he used to pay for homes on Central Park West and in Park City,
Utah.
Id. at C9. Belnick also allegedly concealed from the board the fact that New York prosecu-
tors had subpoenaed documents related to art purchases by Mr. Kozlowski. Although
Kozlowski allegedly told two members of the board's governance committee about the sub-
poena (which ultimately matured into charges against him of avoiding state sales taxes),
Belnick, as general counsel, had an obligation to inform the board. Id.
286. Winstar filed for bankruptcy protection shortly after rosy research reports of its fi-
nancial condition (at the same time denigrating research from other firms that had been
critical of Winstar) had been released. The NASD also fined Salomon $5 million for issuing
the research-the third-largest fine ever issued by NASD. See generally Gretchen Morgenson,
NASD Sues Star Analysis Over Research: Salomon Is Told to Pay $5 Million Fine in Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2002, at Cl.
287. Geraldine Fabrikant, Indictments for Founder of Adelphia and Two Sons, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2002, at Cl.
288. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Lowell Bergman, Judge Says Supplier Inflated Gas Prices in
California Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at Al.
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To find four such stories in a single daily edition of a newspaper
is shocking, particularly as any one of them raises issues that are
potentially as troubling as those in the Enron situation. Take the El
Paso matter, for example. Those who initiated the proceeding are
seeking nearly $4 billion in damages, which is only the tip of the
iceberg in terms of civil lawsuits that have already been filed and
that will be advanced if the ALJ's ruling is sustained on appeal. 
2
9
Internal El Paso documents unearthed as part of a joint reporting
project between The New York Times and the Public Broadcasting
System program "Frontline" had earlier revealed, inter alia, a plan
to use interaffiliate sales of pipeline capacity to "'widen' the differ-
ence between what gas could be bought for in Texas and New
Mexico and what it could be sold for in California. 2 90 Assuming the
truth of these allegations, our fugue subject reprises: What could
the in-house lawyers and auditors (and/or outside counsel and
public accountants) of El Paso have been thinking? 91
The headlines go on and on. A front-page story in The Wall Street
Journal recounts the involvement of a prominent Chicago-based
law firm, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, in the collapse of Commer-
cial Financial Services, Inc. (CFS), a firm engaged in purchasing
bad consumer and credit card debt from banks at deep discounts,
packaging it, securitizing it, and then making collection efforts. 92 A
dispute has been raging between the law firm and the founder of
CFS, William Bartmann.
In 1997, CFS's recently hired CEO, Mitchell Vernick, abruptly
and unexpectedly announced his resignation because he had
"concluded the company's program for collecting delinquent debt
would never match the projections it was giving to bond buyers. He
noted that CFS was making up the shortfalls by selling off some
loans on which it managed to collect, but he said this practice dug
the company into an ever-deeper hole, by depriving it of future
289. Id. at C2.
290. Id. The FERC proceeding was initiated by the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion, which was "joined by the Southern California Edison unit of Edison International and
the Pacific Gas and Electric unit of the PG&E Corporation, each of which lost billions of
dollars during the power crisis." Id.
291. To come full circle on this series of scandals, the public now knows that Enron, de-
spite earlier denials by its executives, not only engaged in speculative trading by betting
(correctly, on the whole) on the direction of gas and electricity prices during California's
energy crisis ($7 billion of net trading gains during that crisis!) but also endeavored to add a
little leverage to its bets by conspiring with its subsidiary, Portland General Electric, to ma-
nipulate the price of power on the West coast. See David Barboza, Despite Denial, Enron Papers
Show Big Profit on Price Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at Al, C6.
292. See Mitchell Pacelle, Blame Game: As Firm Implodes, Lawyer's Advice is Point of Conten-
tion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2002, at Al.
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collections., 293 Vernick's draft resignation letter "said he was 'no
longer comfortable representing to investors ... that I have a high
confidence that they will be repaid in full"' and that, "[i]f it were
his company, he would stop selling new bond issues immedi-
ately... Prior to his resignation, Vernick was "debriefed" in two
meetings with Mayer, Brown lawyers, who then either drafted or
signed off on (depending on whether one believes the law firm's or
the company's version of events) disclosure language concerning
the CEO's "tumultuous departure. ", 95 This language, which was
critical to CFS's ability to keep selling bonds,
said both Mr. Bartmann and Mr. Vernick considered the
CEO's resignation "appropriate in light of their different per-
spectives and opinions related to a variety of issues
concerning the business of CFS, including, among other mat-
ters, the management of the collection process, its capital
market strategy and the value of the asset serviced by it."
The wording didn't spook rating agencies or investors. Over
the next 13 months, CFS sold additional bonds valued at $1.2
billion.
For outsiders, the first whiff of serious problems at CFS didn't
come until the end of those 13 months. On Sept. 30, 1998,
bond-rating agencies received an anonymous letter about
CFS. "Around 20% of all collections on the securitizations are
coming from assets sales," the letter said, not payments from
borrowers. "In the last year, nearly all of them have been to a
company called Dimat Inc. located in Shawnee, Okla.... Why
has no one in this industry ever heard of Dimat.",
6
Ultimately, the company defaulted on more than $1.6 billion in
bonds and filed for bankruptcy protection.
In the proceedings that followed, it emerged that Barmann's
partner, Jay L. Jones, had established Dimat as a "sham corpora-
tion" to facilitate "fraudulent purchases of CFS's most troubled
293. Id. atAl6.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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loans" as "a way of inflating CFS's debt-collection results and mak-
ing them appear sufficient to cover bond repayments."
2 97
In the litigation that has arisen following these events, questions
have been raised about the extent to which Mayer, Brown, which
earned substantial fees from these bond offerings, knew that CFS
was meeting its collection targets by selling off loans in sham trans-
actions to Dimat. "The law firm faces allegations of malpractice
and 'negligent representation' by CFS" and of securities fraud
from bondholders, who allege that the firm "knew CFS was 'a
house of cards about to fall down' but helped conceal this fragility
from investors so that bond sales could continue. '' 29' The plaintiffs
also cite to the firm's opinion letters containing standard language
to the effect that it "knew of no facts that led it to believe the offer-
ing documents contained an untrue statement or omitted a
material fact."
2
9
Without regard to what Mayer, Brown "knew" about the ongoing
securities fraud, what virtually leaps off the page when reading this
information is the inadequate and arguably deceptive nature of the
disclosure relating to Vernick's resignation. While not explicat-
ing-at least according to the article's account°00 -the details about
Dimat and its insider ownership, even the abbreviated version of
the reasons for the former CEO's resignation should have been
more than adequate to put a reasonable lawyer representing the
company (to say nothing of responsibility for securities disclosures)
on notice that something was amiss. Assuming, again, the accuracy
of the press account, the fugue subject makes its doleful return:
What could the Mayer, Brown lawyers have been thinking when
their only reaction to this information was, apparently, to craft re-
markably opaque language of which the only conceivable purpose
was to obnubilate the reasons for Vernick's resignation and con-
found public investors?
297. Id.
298. Id. In addition, Mr. Bartmann is reported as charging Mayer, Brown with putting its
own interests ahead of its client's. "They were making so much stinking money on the deals
that they didn't want it to end.... [Mayer, Brown] didn't tell anyone not to do any more
deals. In fact, they encouraged CFS to do more deals." Id.
299. Id. "This assurance was deliberately narrow, Mayer Brown told a federal court ear-
lier this year. The law firm 'was not opining that there was no fraud,' it said, 'but rather that
the lawyers ... did not subjectively believe, based on the facts they had seen, that there was
an untrue statement of material fact or material omission.'" Id.
300. What Vernick actually told the two Mayer, Brown partners when they "debriefed"
him at the time of his resignation was not known to the authors of the Wall Street Journal
article and, because of considerations of privilege, may never come to light (unless waived
by CFS or needed by Mayer, Brown to serve its own interests in defending lawsuits, of
course).
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2. The Regulatory Response-Notwithstanding wave after wave of
scandal, the puissance of the bar's campaigns lingered. When a
letter from a group of law professors urged SEC Chairman Harvey
Pitt to amend the agency's rules of practice the better to define
301what constitutes proper representation of public companies,
what came back was a reply from SEC General Counsel David
Becker disclaiming any enthusiasm-at least since 19823°2 -to
bring "Rule 102(e) proceedings against lawyers based on allega-
tions or improper professional conduct, or otherwise use [] the
Rule to establish professional responsibilities of lawyers."03 The
extent of regulatory capture of the SEC is clearly reflected else-
where in Becker's letter:
There has been a strong view among the bar that these mat-
ters are more appropriately addressed by state bar rules,
which historically have been the source of professional re-
sponsibility requirements for lawyers, and have been overseen
by state courts.... [T] here are also good reasons why consid-
eration of such a significant change in established practice
should be undertaken in the context of Congressional legisla-
304tion, as opposed to agency rulemaking.
Such legislation was not considered likely, but, then, to the sur-
prise of virtually everyone, an eleventh hour amendment to the bill
that became SOXA produced § 307, requiring the SEC to impose
an "up the ladder" regime and also to establish "minimum stan-
dards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation
of issuers. ... Consistent with the mandate to prescribe such
301. Letter from Richard Painter et al. to SEC Chairman, Harvey Pitt (Mar. 7, 2002),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/pitt.pdf (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The letter specifically sought an SEC rule
fashioned generally after Model Rule 1.13, but mandating"up the ladder" reporting when a
lawyer representing a corporation becomes aware of serious wrongdoing, on pain of dis-
barment from practicing before the agency.
302. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
303. Letter from David Becker, General Counsel, SEC, to Richard Painter (Mar. 28,
2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/becker.pdf (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
304. Id.
305. SOXA § 307 provides:
Not later than 180 days after July 30, 2002, the Commission shall issue rules, in the
public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards
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minimal standards, the SEC's proposed rule added a "noisy with-
30 307drawal"06 requirement to the "up the ladder" provisions.
Although "noisy withdrawal" was already a recognized part of law-
yers' ethical obligations, even as recognized by the ABA, s0 s the
SEC's proposal met with howls of indignation, pointed criticism of
the "noisy withdrawal" requirement, and a concerted campaign 30
of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commis-
sion in any way in the representation of issuers, including a rule-
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof,
to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the
equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence (adopt-
ing, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the
violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of
the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of directors
comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to
the board of directors.
15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2003).
306. "Noisy withdrawal" is a term used to describe a process whereby the attorney not
only withdraws from representing the client but also disavows (or, in legal ethics parlance,
"disaffirms") work product in order to prevent its being used in the client's intended or
future fraud.
307. See Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, Sec. Act Release
No. 33-8150, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670 (Dec. 2, 2002). Anticipating the firestorm, the SEC specifi-
cally solicited comments on the "noisy withdrawal" and "reporting tip" proposals. As to the
latter, the "reporting up" requirement was limited to "evidence of a material violation,"
which the proposal defined as "information that would lead an attorney reasonably to be-
lieve that a material violation has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur." Id. at 71,670,
71,704. Professor Coffee has expressed the view that the proposed rule was too solicitous of
the bar and did not go far enough. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., The Latest Sarbanes-Oxley Contro-
versy: Section 307, N.Y.I.J., Nov. 21, 2002, at 5.
308. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992), requires
withdrawal in the case of ongoing fraud by the client where the attorney's services would
assist the fraud and permits (but does not require) noisy withdrawal in appropriate circum-
stances.
309. See, e.g., Comments of 77 Law Firms (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/77lawfirmsl.htm (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform); Comments of the Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers (Dec. 17, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/amercollege.htm (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Comments of the Am. Corp. Counsel Ass'n
(Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/bnagler1.htm (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Comments of the Boston Bar
Ass'n (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/
jkociubesl.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Comments
of Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass'n (Dec. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarlton1.htm (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Comments of Conference of Chief Justices (Dec. 13,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/bboO40703.htm (on file
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to scuttle everything but the legislatively required "up the ladder"
requirement.
310
Predictably, given the degree of regulatory capture previously
discussed, that campaign was successful. The SEC adopted a modi-
fied version of the rule and deferred for further consideration the
controversial noisy withdrawal proposal.3 1' Deference to the con-
cerns of the organized bar are manifest even in the pared down
rule. Its formulation, for example, is quite odd. Attorneys appear-
ing and practicing before the Commission 3 1  must report up the
ladder when they "become [] aware of evidence of a material violation
by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or agent of the
issuer.'' 13 The italicized language is then defined in a peculiar dou-
ble negative format to mean "credible evidence, based upon which
it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent
and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Comments of Edward H. Fleisch-
man & 29 individuals (Nov. 25, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s74502/ehfleischmanl.htm (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform);
Comments of the Nashville Bar Ass'n (Dec. 13, 2002), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/nashvillel.htm (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform); Comments of the Nat'l Ass'n of Bond Lawyers (Dec. 18, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/kartinl.htm (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Comments of N.Y Council of Def. Lawyers
(Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/egsagorl.htn (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). See also Tamara Loomis, 75 Law
Firms Weigh In With Letter to SEC on Disclosures, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 18, 2002, at I (claiming that new
rule would mandate violation of client confidences); Attorneys Callfor Delay, More Discussion of
SEC Rule Proposals on Noisy Withdrawal, 34 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2045 (Dec. 23, 2002).
310. Of course, not every commenter expressed opposition. Legal academics (including
many of the same people who signed on to the March 2, 2002 letter to Chairman Pitt) sup-
ported the rule. See, e.g., Comments of Susan P. Koniak, et al. (Dec. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/spkoniakl.htm (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Comments of Richard W. Painter (Dec. 12, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/rwpainterl.htm (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Comments of William H. Simon (Dec. 13,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/ rules/ proposed/s74502/simon121302.htm (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
311. Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, Sec. Act Release No.
33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). The Com-
mission solicited additional comments on the noisy withdrawal proposal and, not
unexpectedly, has received many.
312. This encompasses lawyers who transact business with the SEC, who represent issu-
ers in connection with SEC proceedings, or who give advice with regard to U.S. securities
issues relating to documents filed with the Commission or to exemptions from filing or
other regulatory requirements. 17 C.ER. § 205.2 (a) (1) (i)-(iv) (2004).
313. Id. § 205.3(b)(1), (c)(1) (emphasis added). The duplication in two separate para-
graphs refers to two situations: one for issuers that have not established a Qualified Legal
Compliance Committee (QLCC) and the other for issuers that have.
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that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
,,314
occur.
Regulatory capture has thus produced a singularly unenforce-
able standard. When one tries to parse that language, one realizes
that a showing that it would be "unreasonable, under the circum-
stances, for a prudent and competent lawyer not to have
concluded" something is perilously close to a "knew or should have
known" standard of proof-in other words, scienter. Indeed, for an
enforcement lawyer to prove this double negative standard was vio-
lated would require establishing that no reasonable lawyer could
have concluded anything else but that the law had been, was being,
or was about to be violated. Securities lawyers thus have little in-
centive to abandon an ostrich-like or "ignorance is bliss" posture.3",
Assuming, however, that a lawyer possessed of superb semasi-
ological skills were able to navigate that linguistic labyrinth, he
must report the evidence to the CEO or chief legal officer
(CLO),3 6 and the latter must conduct an investigation and apprise
317the reporting attorney of his determination, whether or not a
material violation is present, and, if so, that the issuer is taking an
"appropriate response."31 If the reporting attorney is satisfied that
he has received an "appropriate response," he need do nothing
further;319 if not, he must explain the reasons for his dissatisfaction
to the CLO and on up the ladder.3 0 Alternatively, in the event that
322the issuer has previously established a QLCC,' the attorney may
314. Id. § 205.2(e).
315. Cf John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Securities, Myth & Reality: SEC's Proposed Attorney
Standards, N.Y.L.J.,Jan. 16, 2003, at 5. Coffee argues that the SEC would have done better to
adhere to a familiar materiality formulation such as that in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224 (1988). Id. "Absent such a definition, the SEC has not just pulled its punch; it has made
ignorance bliss." Id. at 7.).
316. 17 C.ER. § 205.3(b)(1) (2002). If he is a subordinate attorney, however, he may
content himself with reporting to his supervisor and need take no further action. Id.
§ 205.5(c). This is even less onerous than obligations under Model Rule 5.2(b), where the
subordinate attorney is in compliance only if the supervisory lawyer's resolution of an "argu-
able" question of professional duty is "reasonable" and the subordinate acts in accordance
with that resolution. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2(b) (2003).
317. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2) (2002). If the issuer has established a QLCC, the CLO may
turn the matter over to that committee in lieu of doing his own investigation. Id.
318. See infra notes 324-28 and accompanying text.
319. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (8) (2002).
320. Id. § 205.3(b) (9).
321. The requirements for a QLCC are set forth in 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k) (2002). The is-
suer cannot establish a QLCC de novo after the matter giving rise to the reporting
obligation has already arisen. Id. § 205.3(c) (2).
322. The reporting attorney can, if he so chooses, report to the CLO just as he would in
the absence of a QLCC. Given the lesser burden of QLCC reporting, however, it is difficult
to imagine anyone making such an election.
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satisfy his reporting obligation by reporting directly to the QLCC,
after which he need take no further action.
The Achilles heel of this scheme is the nature of the issuer's
"appropriate response." Obviously, one such response is the CLO's
conclusion that no material violation is present;24 another is that,
after a contrary conclusion, the issuer is taking appropriate meas-
ures to stop any ongoing violation, remedy a past violation, and
prevent any future violation. 5 These are unremarkable. More
problematic is the third alternative, whereby the issuer may engage
counsel to investigate and such counsel advises that the issuer has a
"colorable defense" that can be asserted "in any investigation or
judicial or administrative proceeding relating to the reported evi-
dence of a 'violation ."' 326 The glaring deficiencies of this approach
include the lack of indicia of independence of that counsel, who
need not even be outside counsel,3 7 and the ramshackle nature of
the "colorable defense" standard, under which even Enron's fraud
could have continued unreported-to say nothing of the monu-
mental failure of such a standard to fulfill the SEC's primary goal,
which is the protection of investors.328
III. SOME INSIGHTS FROM PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY:
REGULATORY CAPTURE
The various embarrassing episodes of lawyer misconduct, while
raising large amounts of public ire, drawing a considerable amount
of negative commentary in the media, and even pushing Congress
323. Id. § 205.3(c)(2).
324.. Id. § 205.3(b) (2).
325. Id.
326. Id. § 205.3(b) (3) (ii). Such other counsel may, instead, recommend certain reme-
dial measures that the issuer goes on to implement, but that is uncontroversial.
327. The author is indebted to Nathan Crystal for pointing out this shortcoming.
328. As Koniak explains:
[I]t makes no sense to say that an appropriate response for a company given a report
of evidence of corporate wrongdoing ... is to have the board find another lawyer
who has a colorable defense to the violation that he 'may' assert. If shareholders are
buying shares today or tomorrow based on bogus financial statements, the fact that a
lawyer can imagine a colorable defense that might be made, if the fraud is ever dis-
covered, is no excuse for the company leaving that information outstanding.
Koniak, supra note 113, at 1277.
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to enact the odd federal statute affecting lawyer liability,329 have not
resulted in any truly significant changes to the way in which the
legal profession is regulated. Insights into the reasons for the pro-
fession's seeming imperviousness to these public outcries come
from scholarship on collective action and public choice theory.3 °
Favorable regulation is frequently viewed as being for sale to the
highest bidder, but the high transaction costs of such behavior
constitute a worthwhile investment only for certain individuals or
self-interested groups 1 that can successfully pursue a wealth-
maximizing strategy with the regulatory treatment so "pur-
chased."3 2 Collective action theory, pioneered by scholars such as
329. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA] § 901; SOXA § 307.
330. Public choice theory is a pluralistic political interpretation that endeavors to ex-
plain statutory and regulatory provisions as outcomes of an equilibrium among the
pressures brought to bear by the various interest groups with sufficient influence to affect
the process. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). The theory presumes that all that participate in the politi-
cal process do so for selfish reasons. See Douglas T. Kendall & Eric Sorkin, Nothing for Free:
How Private Judicial Seminars Are Undermining Environmental Protections and Breaking the Public's
Trust, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 405, 427-28 (2001). See also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regu-
lation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998). This theory, in
some ways, challenges the legitimacy of regulatory regimes. See id. at 15-16 n.14; STEPHEN G.
BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 28 (5th ed. 2002) (noting
that the criticism of regulatory programs as being "created and administered for the benefit
of strategically placed and well-organized interests at the expense of the general public"
suggests that such programs "are inefficient and involve a serious welfare loss for the society
as a whole"). Some scholars discussing this approach use the term "interest group theory."
See, e.g., Finer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101
YALE L.J. 31, 35 (1991) ("The defining theme of the interest group theory of lawmaking is its
rejection of the presumption that the government endeavors to further the public interest.
Rather, under interest group theory, all the participants in the political process act to further
their self-interest.").
331. In seeking legislation or regulation advantageous to their position, groups can de-
flect the ultimate outcome away from the public good, in a way one commentator has
analogized to a form of" 'legislative auction' where the special interest group with the high-
est 'bid' wins . .. " Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory
and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 182 (1996). The interest groups "with the most
at stake in a regulatory decision will work most aggressively to influence that decision and
are likely to succeed in doing so." Andrew Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO.
L.J. 883, 902 (2002). Indeed, the theory suggests that self-interest utterly permeates the
process: "Citizens act to acquire the biggest piece of the collective resource pie at the lowest
cost to themselves; legislators act to acquire reelection; bureaucrats act to acquire more
power (bigger budget, wider authority, and so on) while in government and lucrative oppor-
tunities via the revolving door when they leave." Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and
Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam's Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 109, 110
(2000).
332. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971).
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Mancur Olson33 and Russell Hardin,3 4 explains that public outcry
is generally too diffuse, comprising tiny individual stakes, notwith-
standing the specter of huge societal costs in the aggregate, to
overcome the concerted efforts of a smaller, more concentrated
and more effectively organized group with considerably more at
'315
stake per capita.
If citizens themselves could overcome the market failures to
which much regulation purportedly responds, there would be
little need for a regulatory state .... Given the familiar obsta-
cles to concerted action, however, they cannot: Citizens
cannot build highways, inspect food and drugs, protect the
environment, ensure the safety of nuclear plants or the air-
lines, allocate the airwaves, or provide what are essentially
other public goods. To do such things would require vast
amounts of coordination and cooperation, even supposing
that citizens could afford to give such problems sustained at-
tention in the face of life's many competing demands.36
Among these "public goods" that citizens cannot provide3 3 7 is a
clear, effective, efficient, and enforceable system of lawyer regula-
tion that maximizes lawyers' ability to provide legal services to the
public with integrity while observing a healthy balance between
fiduciary duties to the client and to the legal system.
Owing to their superior organizational structure, trade associa-
tions and industry groups are expected to be-and are in fact-
far more effective in protecting their legislative and regulatory turf
against consumer interests.3 3 9 Both the ABA and state bar associa-
333. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
334. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
335. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 333, at 43-52.
336. Croley, supra note 330, at 12 (citing Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Struc-
ture, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267, 268-69 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson,
eds., 1989)).
337. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation of
the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619 (1978).
338. In Olson's collective action terminology, a "group" is simply "a number of indi-
viduals with a common interest." OLSON, supra note 333, at 8. Groups, under this
formulation, are not necessarily the same as "organizations" because the former may lack
the requisite structure that characterizes the latter and may, therefore, fail to generate
"group goods," which are defined as benefits accruing to all of the group's membership. Id.
at 14.
339. MANUEL F. COHEN & GEORGE J. STIGLER, CAN REGULATORY AGENCIES PROTECT
CONSUMERS? 15 (1971).
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tions are well-heeled and well organized, and the interests of their
membership in promoting and maintaining a regulatory regime
catering to their collective self-interest justifies the high transaction
costs of effective political action. Notwithstanding the nonho-
mogeneity (in Olson's terms)"' of these bar associations, they
benefit from having some members whose private benefits from a
collective good justifies those members' investment in the good,
notwithstanding that the rest of the membership will benefit as
free riders-in Olson's terms, a "privileged group."3'
The PSLRA, theoretically designed to protect investors, issuers,
and the capital markets from abusive securities litigation, is argua-
bly an example of public choice theory at work. By the 1990's,
securities regulation, which, on the whole, has functioned well
since the early 1930's, was being successfully employed by plaintiffs'
class action law firms to win large judgments (or settlements)
against the usual "suspects" in private securities litigation, namely
the issuers, but also those who might aid and abet the issuers in the
commission of securities fraud (including, of course, accountants
and lawyers). Interest groups acting on behalf of these classes of
defendants managed to persuade Congress that the securities laws
were being "abused" by unscrupulous class action lawyers. Admit-
tedly, there was some truth to that. Yet, by exalting the interests of
these parties over those of investors, the statute seems contradic-
tory to the basic premises of securities regulation. Moreover, the
power of those special interests displayed itself yet again when class
action plaintiffs, finding the federal courts no longer hospitable,
sought refuge in the state court system but soon found that alter-
native legislatively foreclosed as well. 4 '
Public choice theory, while perhaps not a perfect engine for ex-
plaining legislative and regulatory phenomena,343 offers useful
340. A "homogeneous" group is one in which the members all have the same willing-
ness to contribute toward the group good. OLSON, supra note 333, at 44.
341. Id. at 49-50. Hardin defines this as a "k group"-a subgroup of any group consist-
ing of members who stand to benefit from providing the collective good themselves, without
the need for contributions from other members. HARDIN, supra note 334, at 41.
342. Securities Litig. Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
343. Croley, supra note 330, at 41-56 (questioning underlying emphases on legislators'
electoral goals and legislators' motivations and criticizing inconsistencies of the collective
action problem and of deregulatory policy reforms). Professor Croley's extensive research
and scholarship on public choice and agency capture, in his 1998 article, heavily influenced
the author's thinking when he initially floated the suggestion, during the Salzburg confer-
ence mentioned at the outset of this Article, of a separate, independent federal agency
dedicated to partial regulation of lawyers. As this Article was in its final stages, a wonderful
article, authored by Benjamin Barton and also heavily influenced (or at least apparently so)
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insights when it comes to the regulation of lawyers. The unique
blend of regulation by state judiciaries",' adopted, often uncritically,
from a template of self-regulatory measures drafted by the organized
bar itself has shown itself time and again to be especially susceptible
to regulatory capture, 45 as public choice theory would predict. The
regulated exert a profound influence on the regulators, who act in a
manner designed to serve the interests of the former rather than as
a credible check on potential rent-seeking... excesses or on miscon-
duct. Such capture is scarcely unique to the regulation of lawyers,
but is, in fact, the rational end result of the self-interest of any regu-
lated entity and its interplay with both legislators and administrative
agencies tasked with the regulation in question."
by Croley's piece, appeared in print. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Law-
yer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market, 37 GA.
L. REV. 1167 (2003). Professor Barton covers much of the same territory as is summarized in
this Part III, only in much greater detail. He briefly considers federal legislative oversight,
but does not consider the administrative solution offered here, perhaps because his subject
is the entire, diffuse breadth of lawyer regulation, rather than the narrower set of concerns
raised for corporate regulatory practice by the sequence of scandals detailed in Part II supra.
344. As a technical matter, the high court of each state regulates the admission and the
conduct of all lawyers admitted to practice in that state. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & AD-
MISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 116 (1992) ("[T]he highest courts of the
several states are the gatekeepers to the profession both as to competency and as to charac-
ter and fitness."); WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 24 (articulating a cradle to grave regulation of
practice of law by state supreme courts). See also CENTER FOR PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, AMERI-
CAN BAR ASS'N, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY: REPORT ON THE COMMISSION ON
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 2 (1992) [hereinafter McKAY REPORT].
345. Regulatory capture describes the process by which regulated entities achieve favor-
able rulemaking and enforcement results via the influence they wield over the regulators.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 448-49
(1987);John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REv. 713,
723-26 (1986).
346. Stigler and others have argued that rent-seeking via government regulation is im-
manent in a political system such as ours. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 559-63 (2001); Stigler, supra note
332, at 3. Rent-seeking refers to obtaining government intervention for one's own benefit-
garnering the gains and limiting the losses that invariably flow from governmental acts. It
has also been defined as "the attempt to obtain economic rents (payments for the use of an
economic asset in excess of the market price) through government intervention in the mar-
ket." Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 n.6 (1986). Various economic theorists
writing about rent-seeking have elaborated quantitative models predicting legislative and
regulatory behavior. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups
for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent
Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987); Sam Peltzman,
Toward A More General Theory of Regulation, 19J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
347. George Stigler's pathbreaking work has engendered additional scholarship and in-
sights, some supportive of public choice theory, some critical. See, e.g., Croley, supra note
1109
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The regulatory capture phenomenon exacerbates another, in-
herent problem of regulation of the bar by the judiciary, namely
that courts are institutionally ill-suited to performance of such a
quintessentially legislative task.3 s The legislative and adjudicatory
processes may each, in its own way, be characterized as adversarial,
but there the similarity ends.348 The "dance of legislation, 35 ° unlike
adjudication, is always multilateral,35 has no prudential or constitu-
tional requirements (case or controversy, standing, mootness,
ripeness, etc.) that limit the number of participants in the process,
has no rules limiting the manner in which they participate, and is
not dependent upon strict legal analysis or reliance upon prece-
dent. In short, it is a game played as a "free-for-all" rather than a
decorous process under the Marquis of Queensbury rules.
Institutional ill-suitedness aside, proponents of judicial control
of lawyer regulation emphasize the expertise of the judiciary vis-A-
vis the legislative and executive branches of government, as well as
the judiciary's interest in preserving the integrity of its procedures
and in the need for judicial independence from overtly "political"
influences. The third of these justifications seems rather a make-
weight, at least when divorced from the second; as long as the
judiciary retains inherent power over the conduct of attorneys
practicing before it, its independence is scarcely dependent upon
330, at 42-45; Michael E. Levine &Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest and
the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 7J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990); Peltzman, supra note
346; Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335
(1974); Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94
YALE L.J. 1617 (1985). See also COHEN & STIGLER, supra note 339; JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED,
CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAw (1997).
348. Cf Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 824-25 (1961) (holding that a state su-
preme court order establishing a unified bar was legislative and not adjudicatory).
349. Cf LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 177-81 (rev. ed. 1969) (contrasting the
two processes of lawmaking).
350. See ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION (1973).
351. Adjudication is normally a bilateral process, the paradigmatic resolution of a con-
flict between parties A and B. Occasionally, litigation can be multilateral, as in more
complex litigative situations involving third-party defendants and fourth-party defendants,
counterclaims, cross-claims, or criminal prosecutions with multiple defendants, though,
even in those situations, the actual adjudication is not itself multilateral, but instead can be
reduced simply to a sequence of bilateral conflicts (A v. B, B v. C, C v. D, D v. B, etc.).
352. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION 3 (2000) (contrasting the "often-chaotic process" of legislation with the "highly
proceduralized adversary system of argument... culminating in a discursive opinion").
353. See, e.g., McKAY REPORT, supra note 344, at 1-8 (arguing in favor of judicial he-
gemony over regulation of the bar); Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar
Concept: Generalizingftom the Wisconsin Case, 1983 Am. B. FOUND. Rs.J. 1, 41 (1983).
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its role in regulating the practice of law outside of that context.354
The first justification, expertise, is a sound point, though the judici-
ary does not have a monopoly on that expertise, nor is it clearly
superior in that regard to other segments of the legal profession,
particularly since much, if not most, of lawyer regulation arises in
contexts other than the operation of the court system and the filing
and conducting of lawsuits. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that
such superior expertise resides with the judiciary, the advantage is
dissipated by the courts' delegation of that authority back to the
bar. Given the absence, then, of any truly unique institutional ad-
vantage enjoyed by the judiciary in terms of lawyer regulation
generally-and especially in contexts far removed from the court-
house-the issue becomes one of weighing the non-unique
advantages against institutional shortcomings.
State high court judges are invariably lawyers 56 and were likely to
have been, prior to ascending to the bench, successful practitioners
active either in bar association activities, or politics, or both. As such,
they have many social and political ties (and the even more subtle
psychological ties of loyalty) to their confreres in the practicing
ar, to some of whom they may owe their appointments (for those
354. One of the more commonly touted guarantees of judicial independence is life
tenure, although atypical for state judges. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamil-
ton). Another guarantee comes from the freedom from interference in judicial
decisionmaking by the executive and legislative branches. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The
Architecture ofJudicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315,318-26 (1999).
355. See, e.g., Christopher D. Kratovil, Note, Separating Disability from Discipline: The ADA
and Bar Discipline, 78 TEX. L. REv. 993, 995-96 (2000) (explaining that state high courts have
delegated enforcement responsibilities to state bar associations); McKAY REPORT, supra note
353, at 23; Charles W. Wolfram, Expanding State Jurisdiction to Regulate Out-of-State Lawyers, 30
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1015, 1047 (2002). Problems, including discriminatory enforcement
against solo practitioners and others not well represented in the bar by prosecutorial authori-
ties deputized largely from the ranks of elite firms by state courts, led to ABA criticism and
subsequent adoption by the ABA of model disciplinary rules, since adopted by many states. See
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (2001).
356. New Hampshire and Massachusetts are the only two states that do not require their
high court judges to be lawyers. See 33 COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES
135 (2000) [hereinafter STATES' DATA BOOK]. In fact, however, as a visit to their websites
demonstrates, both the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the New Hampshire
Supreme Court are populated solely by lawyers. See Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, Justices, available at http://www.state.ma.us/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/
supremejudicial court/justices.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform); New Hampshire Supreme Court, Meet the Supreme Court Justices, available at
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/justices.htm (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform).
357. SeeJonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 631 (1994) (judges' "investment in the legal system is likely to align
their preferences with the preferences (and interests) of the legal community as a whole").
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who are appointed) or victories (for those who are elected), and
upon all of whom they are dependent for the enjoyment of theperquisites of judicial office: power, influence, . 58 eper istesof iialprestige, and even
the ability to enjoy time away from work.
Mention was made earlier of the bar's self-interest in imposing
higher entry standards. 359 Self-interest will also motivate judges to
support higher standards"6 because judges are forced to rely upon
lawyers for the proper functioning of the court system. Having bet-
ter qualified and more ethical lawyers in the courtroom means (in
theory, at least) "better" filings (i.e., a higher percentage of filings
that are better researched and better written), more efficient use
of procedures designed for early disposition of cases, and easier
and more efficient docket control (and, aspirationally perhaps, halt-
ing or even reversing the burdensome effects of ever-burgeoning
dockets). All of these improvements would translate into fewer trials
and less call for judges devoting their time to administrative or dis-
ciplinary matters (e.g., discovery disputes, disqualification motions,
motions for sanctions, and the like). Beneath the black robes and
often stern demeanors are human beings with human prejudices
and proclivities,3 6 who value their leisure time at least as much as362
anyone else, as empirical studies3 63 and other commentaries36 have
observed.
358. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 959, 974 (1997) (explaining that the institutional motivation of judges includes
"seek[ing] to maximize some extrinsic good, such as their prestige").
359. See supra notes 70-72.
360. This is explicit in some state high court decisions on entry standards. See e.g., In re
Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 267-68 (Neb. 1937) ("[T]he court has an
immediate interest in the character of the bar, for the court's own sake.").
361. For insightful discussions of the impact ofjudges' personal beliefs and preferences
on adjudication, see Duncan M. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenolog3 , 36J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986), and Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incen-
tives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941 (1995).
362. Indeed, judges would be expected to value their leisure time more strongly than
practicing lawyers, inasmuch as longer hours for the former are not compensated with in-
creased income as they are for the latter.
363. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Sen-
tencing, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13, 24-26 (1992) (suggesting that sentences for those who
go to trial may reflect a penalty for having increased the court's workload); Christopher R.
Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 469, 475-76 (1998) (ex-
plaining that judges are expected "to decide at least some cases so as to protect or increase
their leisure time"); Gregory C. Sisk, et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An
Empirical Study ofJudicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1483-85 (1998) (linking judicial
behavior tojudges' workload in criminal sentencing practices).
364. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 109-44 (1995); Macey, supra note
357, at 631 (positing that judges may be expected to "further their own self-interest by pur-
suing nonmonetary interests such as increasing leisure [by] reduction in workload");
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State court judges, in their roles as regulators of lawyers practic-
ing in the jurisdiction, are also extremely susceptible to regulatory
capture. Although courts are normally thought to be independent
and untainted by the mischief of lobbying, that is truer for the
federal judiciary3 66 than for the states. This is because the majority
of state court judges must run for election, either in the first in-
stance367 or in retention elections 31 (in both cases on public
ballots), or via indirect retention elections (where the decision is
made by a politically accountable party, i.e. the legislature or the
governor or a delegatee, such as a judicial merit selection panel or
commission).39 Some of these judicial elections are partisan and
others are not, but, for practical purposes, any type of political ac-
countability ° on the part of state court judges7 1 makes them far
less immune to the lobbying blandishments of the organized bar
than might be desired 37
Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does),
3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 20-21 (1993) (describing judicial behavior that is "leisure-
seeking").
365. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 569-70 (6th ed. 2003).
366. Cf Charles D. Cole, Judicial Independence in the United States Federal Courts, 13 J. LE-
GAL PROF. 183 (1988).
367. This applies in Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. STATES'
DATA BOOK, supra note 356, at 137-39.
368. States adhering to this regime include Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Flor-
ida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
and Wyoming. Id.
369. Examples include Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. Id. at 131-32, 137-39. Several scholars
have noted that these merit selection committees are often partisan. See Henry R. Glick, The
Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 509, 521 (1978) (explaining that they are filled with partisan gubernatorial appoint-
ees). Others note they are controlled by the organized bar or segments thereof. See Kelley
Armitage, Denial Ain'tJust a River in Egypt: A Thorough Review ofJudicial Elections, Merit Selection
and the Role of State Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 625, 656 (2002) ("History has shown
that trial lawyers and their acolytes have controlled merit selection committees."). See also
Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1,
21-22 (1994) ("[Alttorney members of nominating commissions are either appointed by
the governor, or elected or appointed by the state or local bars.") (citations omitted).
370. Cf CHARLES R. ASHMAN, THE FINESTJUDGES MONEY CAN Buy 242 (1973) ("(AII
that has happened is that the politics of the governor and the bar association have replaced
the politics of the county party chairman and the electorate.").
371. Justices in Massachusetts and New Hampshire are appointed for life and face no
retention elections. Id.
372. Were that not the case, there would be no need for so many election-related provi-
sions detailing instances of judicial misconduct in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. For
example, Canon 5(A) (and its ancestor in the 1972 Code, Canon 7(B)) enjoins individuals
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For the most fundamental of personal motivations, then, namely
retaining their power, prestige, and jobs, the vast majority of state
judges will inevitably seek, at least to the extent legally accept-
able,73 to "curry favor"374 with local lawyers. Especially important
from this perspective is to be in good standing with the relevant
bar associations, which not only are called upon to provide evalua-
tions or endorsements for judges subject to initial merit selection 37'
(even going so far in some jurisdictions as to engage in "bar poll-
,,76ing with respect to individual judges), but also constitute the
who are candidates forjudicial office to "maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office"
and prohibits "mak[ing] pledges or promises of conduct iii office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office. .. ." PHILIP L. DuBois, FROM BALLOT
TO BENCH 65-66 (1980). See, e.g., In re Birnbaum, Determination (N.Y. Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct Sept. 29, 1997) (censuring judge who distributed campaign brochure giving the
impression that he would favor tenants over landlords in housing matters); In re Haan, 676
N.E.2d 740 (Ind. 1997) (reprimanding candidate for pledging in campaign materials to
"stop suspending sentences" and to "stop putting criminals on probation"); In re Hopewell,
507 N.W.2d 911 (S.D. 1993) (disciplining candidate for impugning the integrity of the judi-
cial system and his opponent); In re Tully, Order No. 90-CC-2 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n, Oct. 25,
1991) (statements by judge that he was "tough on crime" and "tough on taxes" within the
realm of general comment and not a pledge or promise). Various state versions of these
provisions have, however, succumbed to constitutional challenges. See Republican Party v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that Minnesota avatar of the Code of Judicial
Conduct violates the First Amendment); Beshear v. Butt, 773 F.Supp. 1229 (E.D. Ark. 1991)
(regarding statement that plea bargaining was unacceptable to the candidate and would not
be allowed in his court); ACLU, Inc. v. Florida Bar, 744 F.Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (gen-
eral challenge);J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991) (criticizing various state laws,
standards ofjudicial review, a supreme court ruling, and the Code ofJudicial Conduct dur-
ing election campaign). Cf Clark v. Burleigh, 279 Cal. Rptr. 333 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 1990)
(successfully challenging constitutionality of provision of California Election Code). North
Carolina amended its campaign speech rule in the face of a similar constitutional challenge.
See Amy M. Craig, The Burial of an Impartial Judicial System: The Lifting of Restrictions on Judicial
Candidate Speech in North Carolina, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 413 (1998). For a general discus-
sion of the phenomenon of electing state judiciaries, see Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995).
373. Acceptable, that is, within the framework set forth in the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct.
374. SeeCass, supra note 361, at 971-73.
375. This is done in states such as those listed in note 369, supra. For discussion of this
phenomenon, see, for example, Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing.- Are
State Judges'Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2J.L. & POL. 57, 121-32 (1985),
and Henry T Reath, Judicial Evaluation-The Counterpart to Merit Selection, 60 A.B.A. J. 1246
(1974).
376. These polls are conducted not merely to facilitate the bar's decisionmaking on
whether to endorse a particular individual, but also to influence the electorate. See DuBois,
supra note 372, at 67-69. The polls also influence the judges themselves. See DOROTHY L.
MADDI, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE POLLS 3-4 (1977). See also James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable,
Symposium: The Role of the Organized Bar in State Judicial Election Reform: The Year 2000 Stan-
dards, 106 DICK. L. REv. 683, 687 & n.24 (2002) (citing JAMES H. GUTERMAN & ERROL E.
MEIDINGER, IN THE OPINION OF THE BAR: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF BAR POLLING PRACTICES
(1977));John M. Roll, Merit Selection: The Arizona Experience, 22 ARiz. ST. L.J. 837, 878 (1990)
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richest (and often the only)311 vein for mining campaign contribu-
tions.s s That very dependency on lawyers has occasionally led to
abuses, such as where large contributions helped lawyers secure
large judgments for their clients or remunerative appointments
such as receiverships.79
In fact, apart from the practicing bar, few of the electorate seems
even to know anything about the judges for whom they are voting,
as shown by various studies. ss Such voter ignorance is neither un-
expected, nor merely a function of voter ignorance generally.
Rather, the likelihood of any judicial candidate's affecting the life
of a voter (other than, perhaps, in connection with acquaintance as
a result of jury service or in defending against a traffic ticket) is
rather slim.
381
(discussing the effects of bar polling on retention elections); PennyJ. White, JudgingJudges:
Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1053, 1064-65 (2002) (discussing bar polling in judicial elections and its abuses).
377. In an era where voter apathy and low turnout at the polls are frequently lamented,
voting in judicial elections may well represent the nadir of public participation in represen-
tational democracy. See, e.g., Bridget E. Montgomery & Christopher C. Conner, Partisan
Elections: The Albatross of Pennsylvania's Appellate Judiciary, 98 DICK. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1993)
(discussing widespread voter apathy in judicial elections); Peter D. Webster, Selection and
Retention ofJudges: Is there One "Best" Method ?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 1, 26 (1995) (same). The
literature is rife with reports of low turnout. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and
the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 973, 992 (2001) (contrasting Wisconsin's ranking among the
highest in the nation with regard to voter turnout in presidential elections with its small
turnout for judicial elections);Jay A. Daugherty, Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing
Socio-LegalEnvironment, 62 Mo. L. REv. 315, 322-23 (1997) ("U]udicial retention elections
attract the smallest voter turnout of all types of elections.").
378. See David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the
American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 361 (2001); Schotland, supra note 375, at 93-94 (ex-
plaining that the bulk of elected judges' campaign donations come from lawyers). See also
Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. App. 1983) (acknowledging that attorneys are the
principal source of contributions forjudicial elections).
379. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 79, 92 n.86 (1998) (citing examples of Ala-
bama Supreme Court upholding an enormous punitive damages award after each Justice
had received sizable contributions from plaintiff's counsel, and $315,000 in contributions by
Pennzoil to members of the Texas court that decided its landmark civil judgment against
Texaco).
380. See Deborah R. Hensler, Do We Need an Empirical Research Agenda on Judicial Inde-
pendence?, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 707, 721 (1989) (adducing evidence of voter ignorance that
judges are even elected and voter inability to name state court judges whatsoever, from trial
court to high court); Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Judges andJurors: Their Functions, Qualifications and
Selection, 36 B.U. L. REv. 1, 43-44 & n.63 (1956) (relating evidence of voter ignorance in
judicial elections).
381. See Croley, supra note 372, at 731-32.
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Not surprisingly, state high courtjudges are themselves members
of their state bar associations,382 which return the favor a hundred-
fold by lobbying for increased salaries and other benefits for their
judges.383 Many judges are ABA members as well, and the ABA, as is
well known, has assiduously recruited members for its Judicial Divi-
sion laboring long and hard to promote the public image of the
judiciary and, like their state bar counterparts, to lobby for higher
wages and increased judicial benefits."4
The return on the bar associations' "investments" in their judges
cannot be measured by dues payments alone. Many state high
courts have been most cooperative in mandating (sometimes by
court order alone) a unified bar,38 ' indispensable in adopting
386higher entry standards at the urging of the bar, and obligingly
protectionist in rooting out the unauthorized practice of law in
their jurisdictions-all feathering the rent-seeking nests of the le-
gal profession.
Furthermore, in the majority of states, the high courts have
delegated most, if not all, of their oversight of lawyers to unified
state bars. 88 Such delegation extends even to the inherent power of
382. Bar membership for state justices is required by law in twenty-seven states. COUN-
CIL OF STATE Gov'TS, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 6-7 (1978). In addition, it is, of course,
automatic in those jurisdictions (thirty-six states and the District of Columbia) with a unified
bar. Id.
For criticism of the unified bar model, see generally Schneyer, supra note 353, and Brad-
ley A. Smith, The Limits of Compulsory Professionalism: How the Unified Bar Harms the Legal
Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35 (1994).
383. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A SURVEY OF STATE JUDICIAL FRINGE BENE-
FITS (2d ed. 1996); NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SURVEY OFJUDICIAL SALARIES (Oct. 2002),
available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KISJudComjudSall002Pub.pdf (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
384. This dates back to 1912 for the federal judiciary, see 37 A.B.A. REP. 37-37 (1912),
and 1931 for state judiciaries, see56 A.B.A. REP 58-59 (1931).
385. See DAYTON McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 49 (1963). The advantage of "unifica-
tion" to the guild mentality that gave rise to the organized bar is obvious. Supra notes 67-72.
A lawyer in such a jurisdiction must become a member of the state bar association, as mem-
bership is requisite to the license to practice law there. Smith, supra note 382, at 36.
386. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 47 (1989) (noting ABA's alignment
with higher standards of legal education and efforts to persuade state supreme courts (or
their designees, the integrated bar associations) to adopt those standards as prerequisites to
bar admission).
387. See, e.g., In reJackman, 761 A.2d 1103 (N.J. 2000); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Harris-Smith, 737 A.2d 567 (Md. 1999); Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Misch, 695 N.E.2d 244 (Ohio
1998); Birbrower, supra note 73; Ferrey, supra note 73.
388. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Fountaine, When is a Computer a Lawyer?: Interactive Legal Soft-
ware, Unauthorized Practice of Law, and the First Amendment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 147, 150 (2002);
Judith Kilpatrick, Regulating the Litigation Immunity: New Power and a Breath of Fresh Air for the
Attorney Discipline System, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1069, 1101 (1992); Kratovil, supra note 355, at 995-
96; Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as Professional Credentia4 94 YALE L.J. 491,494 (1985).
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the court to preserve the dignity and the integrity of its processes
by remitting intransigent, unprepared, untruthful, and unethical
lawyers to the disciplinary process. This is an area in which one
would expect the judiciary as a regulatory institution to shine,
given judges' undoubted expertise in such matters and institu-
tional incentives (based, in no small part, on judicial self-interest
factors previously identified)" 9 to maximize the smooth and effi-
cient operation of the court system. Astonishingly, however, judicial
reports of lawyer misconduct are few and far between."'
Attorney discipline is, and in fact long has been, the stepchild of
the rules of professional conduct-"a scandalous situation that re-
quires the immediate attention of the profession.... [T] he
prevailing attitude of lawyers toward disciplinary enforcement
ranges from apathy to outright hostility. Disciplinary action is prac-
tically nonexistent in many jurisdictions. 9 ' Having delegated this
function to state bar associations, the judiciary has generally al-
lowed it to languish in underfunded obscurity.39 That obscurity
describes enforcement in general; when it comes to transactional
lawyers, particularly those at elite firms, the prospects for discipli-
nary actions are virtually non-existent.93
Proponents of judicial regulation of the practice of law point
to the imperviousness of an "independent" judiciary-in sharp
389. See supra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.
390. See, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge's Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other
Judges and Lawyers and its Effect on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 753-55
(1997) (detailing disincentives to judicial reporting of lawyer misconduct); David B. Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 799, 822-23 (1992) (discussing the over-
whelming majority of disciplinary complaints filed by clients rather than by other lawyers or
judges); STANDING COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE JUDICIAL RE-
SPONSE TO LAWYER MISCONDUCT iii (1984) (referencing research showing small percentage
of judicially-initiated disciplinary complaints, "even against easily detected serious miscon-
duct directly affecting the administration ofjustice").
391. CLARK REPORT, supra note 91, at 1. Justice Clark's Commission referred to the
situation prevailing prior to 1970.
392. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv.
1051, 1121 (1996) (noting lack of resources of disciplinary boards, particularly if called
upon "to do battle with wealthy class action lawyers and powerful members of the defense
bar"). See also McKA¥ REPORT, supra note 344, at xviii (noting that underfunded and under-
staffed disciplinary agencies "offer little protection against unethical lawyers").
393. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers'
Responsibility for Clients'Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 80 (1993) (characterizing the likelihood
of such disciplinary action as "remote"); Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regula-
tion of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 33, 51 (1996) (arguing that the Model Rules disciplinary
template is ineffective in preventing corporate lawyers from engaging in conduct harmful to
third parties because clients will not complain and a "smokescreen of confidentiality" may
conceal lawyer's role from injured third parties).
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contrast to the state legislature-to lobbying and other forms of
crass influence peddling by corporations, most trade associations,
and public interest groups (not to mention the general public
itself). This regulatory construct might indeed be workable, if only
the judiciary were equally impervious to lobbying by lawyers and
bar associations. Instead, one-sided access by the profession to its
judicial regulators facilitates an unparalleled degree of regulatory
capture. In general, conditions for regulatory capture are
optimized when the members of a regulated industry constitute
the principal and repeat players appearing before the regulator.
Here the regulated industry (the bar) has access to the regulator
(the judiciary) completely sewn up.
Just go to any gala function of a state or municipal bar associa-
tion, or even of a less official organization of lawyers. There, judges
are lionized like celebrities. On such occasions, it is common for
the master of ceremonies (typically the president of the bar asso-
ciation) to take time to identify each state and federal judge
attending the event by name and to solicit applause from the audi-
ence for all the judicial attendees as a group.394 While such
adulation is part and parcel of the prestige and power that are
perquisites of the job, the potential for increased judicial empathy
for positions taken by leaders and other well-known figures in the
bar association cannot be discounted.
Over the course of their legal careers, judges get to know many
lawyers. Some of whom may have been law partners or colleagues
in some professional endeavor, or even law school classmates, oth-
ers of whom may belong to the same clubs and civic organizations,
and still others who have been active in politics with the judge
prior to his or her ascendance to the bench. A vast gray area exists
along the continuum from professional or personal cordiality to
empathy to predisposition to bias. The restrictions in the Code of
Judicial Conduct are generally directed against potential bias or
395the appearance of bias only in connection with pending cases.
394. No criticism of this practice is intended by this description. The point is rather to
illustrate the degree to which the close relationship between bench and bar is institutional-
ized in these professional-cum-social settings.
395. For example, Canon 3E provides, "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a
proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The Canon
then lists four specific instances where recusal or disqualification is mandated, i.e., whenever
(a) a judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowl-
edge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
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Strikingly, no comparable strictures apply to the judiciary in its ca-
pacity as regulator of the bar.
Finally, from the viewpoint of the scandals that gave rise to this
article, state courtjudges (indeed, the judiciary in general), largely
drawn from that segment of the practicing bar involved in litiga-
tion, usually lack sufficient expertise in the types of business law
practice (and the mindset that such practice develops) to appreci-
ate fully the nuances that must inform the crafting of ethical rules
specific to the situations business lawyers (as opposed to litigators)
face. It is no accident that the "one size fits all" model of legal eth-
ics rules fits well within the litigators' (and, more specifically, the
trial lawyers') Weltanschauung."" This observation is not intended to
(b) ajudge served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he or
she previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning
the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(c) ajudge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or
minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(d) ajudge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship
to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (1990). While the provision and the com-
mentary explicate that this enumeration is not intended to be exclusive, the specificity of
the black letter language suggests myriad hues of gray. For example, what if a lawyer with
whom the judge previously practiced law represents the party now, as opposed to "during
such association?" What about a lawyer with whom the judge did not practice law but who
has been a longstanding personal and professional friend? What if the lawyer is the spouse
of such a friend? What if the lawyer is an officer of the bar association and has had occasion,
in that capacity, to present awards or other honors to the judge? The complete list of "what
if" variations on this theme would obviously be quite long. On the other hand, making alle-
gations of negative appearances is quite easy, so evaluation of these situations will of
necessity be quite fact-specific. For a general discussion, see Leslie W. Abramson, Appearances
of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned", 14 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETHICs 55 (2000).
396. Indeed, the overemphasis of the Model Rules on litigation contexts has led com-
mentators (including one well-known federal district judge and ex-SEC enforcement chief)
to call for separate ethical rules for discrete legal specialties. See, e.g., Nancy B. Rapoport,
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be in any way pejorative. Rather, it is a recognition of another in-
herent limitation of a system in which judges (coming from, and
having "grown up" in the practice of law with the litigation mind-
set) are being asked to legislate normative rules for practitioners
working in an array of different, usually transactional, often highly
regulated, business law disciplines. The former cannot fully appre-
ciate the tasks, training, and mindset that form the universe in
which the latter work on a daily basis. 07
Given the manifest inadequacy of attorney regulation by state
high courts, one is tempted, given the traditional primacy of the
states in this area, to look to state legislatures as a natural alterna-
tive. Indeed, as an historical matter, state legislatures were the
original fountainheads of attorney regulation, until the aggres-
sive appropriation by the state high courts of hegemony in the late
19th century under the aegis of the so-called "inherent power" of
the courts to regulate entry into the legal profession and the con-
duct of lawyers.3m Under the constitutional law of those states
where that has transpired, then, legislative regulation of the prac-
tice of law is a dead letter. '
Even apart from state constitutional law problems, state legisla-
tures, normally acting in shortened sessions and with limited staff
and resources, have shown themselves to be singularly susceptible
to regulatory capture by the bar. Examples include the perennial
success of trial lawyers in squelching tort law reform 401 and the suc-
Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 45 (1998); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the Vari-
ous Specialties, 7 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993).
397. Nor does it help that the judiciary has abdicated responsibility for the legislative
process of drafting professional ethics standards primarily to the ABA and secondarily to the
state bar associations. These organizations tend to be politically dominated by their litiga-
tors, as the rules of professional conduct they have crafted so eloquently demonstrate.
398. See, e.g., Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the Practice of
Law:An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REv. 525, 531-33 (1983); Alan F. Day, Lawyers in Colo-
nial Maryland, 1660-1715, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 145, 146 (1973); Charles W. Wolfram,
Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-Il The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 205, 211 (2002).
399. Alpert, supra note 398, at 536-51; WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 22-32. On the in-
herent power doctrine, see generally Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer
Regulation-The Role of the Inherent- Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK LJ. 1 (1989-90).
400. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 21-25; Alpert, supra note 398, at 536-51.
401. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System for Personal Injury, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 17, 29-31 (1986) (chronicling the killing of"no fault" insurance proposals by
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America). See also Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The
Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23J. LEG. STUD. 807 (1994); ToddJ. Zywicki, Public Choice
and Tort Reform (George Mason University School of Law Working Paper No. 0036, 2000),
available at http://www.law.gmu/faculty/papers/docs/00-36.pdf (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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cessful lobbying by bar associations in various states for state LLP
statutes, absolving one partner in a law firm from liability for the
-- 402
acts of another.
Having exhausted viable options at the state level, then, it seems
only prudent to consider the federal alternative. Part IV briefly
pays homage to earlier suggestions of federalizing legal ethics and
then considers the pitfalls of piecemeal regulation by individual
federal agencies with substantive regulatory responsibilities that
skew their positions on attorney conduct.
IV. WEAKNESSES OF PIECEMEAL FEDERAL REGULATION
"History repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce," as Karl
Marx observed when discussing Louis Napoleon. °3 In the case of
mass breakdowns of professional ethical norms, however, it has
been rather the converse. The early instances-National Student
Marketing, tax shelter opinions, O.P.M., etc.-were somewhat farci-
cal. The later ones-the gargantuan, worldwide fraud conducted
by BCCI, the S&L crisis, and now Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, etc.-
have become increasingly tragic. Thus, not only is self-regulation
ineffective, it is increasingly ineffective.
Pioneering work by Fred Zacharias and others some years ago
floated the suggestion that legal ethics might be federalized.4 Pro-
fessor Zacharias suggested a complete federalization of all rules of
legal ethics on grounds of uniformity. He argued that a uniform
system of regulation is necessitated by a variety of factors. First,
there is the increase in specialization that has led to the prolifera-
tion of "national" firms with multi-jurisdictional practices.00
Second, there is the "splintering" effect of significant differences in
ethical rules among the various states (as well as the disparity
402. See, e.g., Walter W. Steele, Jr., How Lawyers Protect the FamilyJewels ... The Invention of
Limited Liability Partnerships, 39 S. TEx. L. REv. 621, 623 (1998) ("[T]o some observers a con-
cept that allows partners to share the economic and professional benefits of a partnership
without sharing liability in order to save partners' economic hides is more than a contradic-
tion-it is hypocrisy.").
403. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in KARL MARX & FREDERICK
ENGELS, SELECTED WORKS 97, 97 (Progress Publishers reprint 1968) (1852).
404. See Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and
Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 974 (1992); Ted Schneyer, Professional Dis-
cipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 (1991); Fred C. Zacharias,
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEx. L. REv. 335 (1994).
405. Zacharias, supra note 404, at 345-46.
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between state and federal rules of conduct),4 °6 which leave clients
uncertain about what lawyers are permitted to do for them and
what is prohibited.4 7 Third, there is the decidedly negative impact
disparate rules of conduct have on the public's perception of, and
confidence in, the legal profession.4°8 Finally, there is the piecemeal
intrusion by federal agencies undermining the force of state
rules.409 Balanced against these factors are the concerns militating
against federalization: (a) elimination of the possibility of gains
through state experimentation; 410 and (b) conversion of general
ethics standards allowing for the exercise of individual professional
judgment into a fixed code of rules.4" Ultimately, Zacharias con-
cluded, the imperatives of eliminating the splintering of ethical
standards and the apparent inability of the ABA effectively to ad-
dress the problems occasioned thereby1 2 weigh in favor of
federalization.
At the time of Zacharias' pioneering article, Congress' plenary
authority under the Commerce Clause had been unquestioned for
nearly sixty years, and congressional authority to regulate the prac-
tice of law thereunder was not subject to doubt.4 1 3 Then, however,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez 14 and United States v.
MorriSon 1 5 held that that authority had limits. Therefore, no pro-
406. Id. at 346-54. One example given by Zacharias foreshadows the need for SOXA's
attorney regulation provision. "When national lawyers represent or sue national corpora-
tions, the problems are exacerbated. A firm that has several members representing a
corporation may find an issue simultaneously governed by the codes in (1) the state in
which the firm's lawyers communicate with the corporation (e.g., the firm's headquarters);
(2) the home states of the lawyers representing the corporation; (3) the home state of the
corporation; and (4) the state in which the legal issue arises." Id. at 352.
407. Id. at 357-65.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 365-70.
410. Id. at 373-75.
411. Id. at 378-79.
412. See id. at 380-81.
413. Indeed, there is already substantive federal regulation of lawyers that preempts
state regulation in certain fields, such as the Treasury Department's standards under Circu-
lar 230. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text. In addition, patent law has its own
exclusive federal bar and its own bar examination, which may not be trammeled by state
regulation of the bar. See Sperry v. Fla. ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). Indeed, the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office (PTO) has promulgated its own rules of ethics, patterned closely
on the Model Code. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.23 et seq., 10.130 et seq. (2003). Needless to say, the
ABA was not pleased. See Rich Arthurs, New Practice Rules Contain Pitfalls, Say Patent Lawyers,
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 18, 1985, at 1 (noting ABA's criticism of PTO for failing to adopt the
1983 Model Rules or else deferring to the state of the lawyer's admission). Moreover, the
PTO disciplines practitioners before it pursuant to explicit statutory authorization, 35 U.S.C.
§ 32, and the Treasury Department enjoys similar authority, 31 U.S.C. § 330.
414. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School Zones Act).
415. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating portions of the Violence Against Women Act).
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posal for federalization-even, as here, partial federalization-can
proceed without preliminarily considering these decisions to de-
termine whether the proposal passes constitutional muster.
Both Lopez and Morrison emphasized the non-economic nature
of the problems Congress had addressed (guns in school zones,
gender-based violence) and their attenuated effect on interstate
commerce. One of the doctrinal elements of the constitutional
analysis employed by the Court in these cases was the requirement
that the activity in question "substantially affect" interstate com-416
merce. Another was the revitalization of the distinction between
"commercial" and "noncommercial" activity.417 Both seem easily
satisfied41s when one is talking about legal services,419 especially for
lawyers engaged in corporate, securities, and banking transactions,
many of which, of course, involve publicly held entities. In Lopez,
the majority found somewhat off-putting the tenuousness of the
connection between possession of a handgun in a school zone and
cumulative effects on "national productivity"; similarly, in Morrison,
the Court rejected the suggested cumulative economic impact 420 of
gender-based violence. In contrast, the activities of business lawyers
routinely have great interstate effects, as the spate of legal ethics
416. E.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
417. Id. at 560-61, 564-66. See also id, at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[N]either the
actors nor their conduct has a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the de-
sign of the statute has an evident commercial nexus.").
418. One commentator, though generally disfavoring federalizing legal ethics, reaches
the same conclusion. See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regula-
tion of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. Rv. 73, 119-120 (1997) ("Even if the revitalized 'substantial
effects' test turns out to have bite beyond situations such as Lopez... any reasonable assess-
ment of the interstate effects of attorney conduct would find the test met .... Whatever the
merits, or workability, of [the 'commercial'/ 'noncommercial' activities] distinction, the
conduct of lawyers would appear to fall comfortably on the 'commercial' side of the line.").
419. The U.S. GDP for the private legal services industry in 2001 was $120.2 billion. Bu-
reau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Table, Gross Domestic Product by Industry
in Current Dollars: 1987-93 and 1994-2000, available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/
bea/dn2/gpoc.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Fur-
thermore, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates 1,134,560 persons were
employed in the legal services industry. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
AND WAGE ESTIMATES (2003), available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/2003/may/
naics4_541100.htm (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
420. But cf Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-61 (discussing and reaffirming earlier jurisprudence
validating broad congressional authority over classes of economic activity having, in the
aggregate, a substantial effect on interstate commerce even if wholly intrastate or having,
individually, small economic impact). See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-56
(1971); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 n.27 (1968); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 299-302 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
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scandals has so painfully demonstrated.42 Professor Zacharias' con-
clusion thus remains sound.
As a doctrinal matter, one might regard the states as better situ-
ated to regulate matters as to which there is considerable
geographic variability, thereby benefiting from the "laboratory"
approach extolled by Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Neiw State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann.' The practice of business law, however, does
not exhibit that kind of variation and is, if anything, becoming
more and more homogenized year by year (due in part to in-
creased stautory uniformity in corporate, commercial, and
bankruptcy law and initiatives by the ABA Business Law Section,
such as its Model Stock Purchase and Model Asset Purchase
agreements). Where some variation exists (though, even here, less
than before) is not in law practice but in the rules of professional
conduct adopted from state to state. However, these variations
seem only to have exacerbated the negative externalities arising
from the above-mentioned scandals-externalities that have pro-
foundly affected not only states other than those regulating the
lawyers in question but also, of course, the national markets as well.
Thus, again speaking doctrinally, the case for decentralized regula-
tion is weak, and, as the social costs related to these scandals
continue to escalate, the need for credible, national regulation
grows ever stronger.
Given the trajectory of the scandals discussed in Part II and their
consequent harm, it is readily apparent that things have gotten out
of hand and that the bar is in need of a fundamental reexamina-
tion and redefinition of what it is that lawyers, particularly business
lawyers, are "supposed" to do. 23 Professional discipline, for a vari-
421. The only thing Congress may not do is take a hybrid approach and establish fed-
eral standards for the states to enforce. The Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated such
"commandeering" approaches. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
422. The dissent reads in part:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. De-
nial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmaun, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
423. Incidentally, the accounting profession showed itself even more in need of ethical
guidance and redirection than the lawyers. It is no longer quite as funny ajoke that one can
always find an accountant to bless whatever transaction one is doing. In the past twenty
years, the public has seen a number of scandals involving accountants. First, Ernst & Young's
predecessor, Ernst & Ernst, certified the manifestly crooked books of the banks owned by
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ety of reasons, has provided little incentive for law firms to monitor
the partners who are bringing in juicy fees from major corporate
clients. The spread of limited liability partnerships accentuates the
willingness of partners to ignore the risks that other partners are
taking. Today's emphasis on "the bottom line" both in corporations
and law firms gives rise to a culture exalting prominence in the
annual listings of profits per partner over all other values.
This is a systemic problem that requires a systemic solution.
Band-aids, like SOXA § 307, are woefully inadequate at this late
date. Equally unsatisfactory, from a normative perspective, is
piecemeal regulation of the practice of law by federal agencies in
discrete regulatory jurisdictions, particularly where those agencies
are vulnerable to regulatory capture or have axes to grind that may
threaten to conflate an agency's own regulatory agenda with le-
gitimate lawyer regulation goals.
To the extent that there has already been some federal intrusion
into regulating lawyers' (and, for that matter, accountants') con-
duct, federal agencies have operated in particular regulatory
niches where the danger is that agency self-interest in furthering its
regulatory goals may be incompatible with objective regulation of
professionals practicing in that area. The SEC has endeavored to
the Butcher brothers in Tennessee and endeavored to bully bank examiners who had the
temerity to question the assets. Mayer, supra note 92, at 294. Second, Arthur Andersen
blessed accounting irregularities at Financial Corporation of America and Charles Keating's
notorious Lincoln Savings (even going so far as to cooperate with Jones, Day lawyers in file
stuffing in the latter instance). Id. Third, what was then Deloitte, Haskins & Sells gave its
imprimatur to the books of CenTrust Savings in Florida, where the chairman, David Paul,
used insured deposits to purchase yachts, paintings by old masters that he hung in his own
home, solid gold bathroom fixtures, and lavish hotel suites in New York City. Id. Fourth,
Touche Ross endorsed the books of Beverly Hills S&L, revealed in subsequent congressional
hearings to be engaged in clearly criminal enterprises. Id. Fifth, Ernst & Young's other
predecessor, Arthur Young & Co., blessed not only some of Keating's shenanigans at Lincoln
Savings, the arguably even more notorious Vernon Savings of Dallas at a time when 96% of
its loans were bad, and also helped Western Savings of Dallas continue to grow after it was
clearly insolvent-small wonder that Ernst & Young ended up having to settle with OTS and
RTC for $400 million. Id.
Of course, as all of the most notorious S&Ls claimed after having been seized by the gov-
ernment, all the transactions in which they had engaged had been blessed by prominent law
firms, and all the so-called "profits" they had booked had likewise been blessed by promi-
nent (then, Big Eight) accounting firms. A common notion was that the regulators were
incompetent (which, in the case of the FHLBB, may not have been too far off the mark) or,
worse, on ajihad to deprive red-blooded American entrepreneurs of the fruits of their en-
trepreneurship. That accusation could not, however, be leveled at the General Accounting
Office, which found, in a study of eleven large S&L failures, that seven of these had been
audited with so little regard for honest practice that it referred the accounting firms in ques-
tion to the AICPA for disciplinary action. Years passed, but no disciplinary action was taken.
See generally MAYER, supra note 92, at 293-94.
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take the high road by imposing on private lawyers the species of
gatekeeper obligations that Reinier Kraakman has dubbed "chaper-
one," as distinct from that favored by the OTS, "bouncer."4 2 4 The SEC
is satisfied that the lawyer's professional obligations are met if he
acts in good faith and exerts reasonable efforts to prevent viola-
tions of the law by the client.4 5 With SOXA § 307 and the statutory
injunction to prescribe "minimum standards for professional con-
duct," of course, gatekeeper responsibilities will have to become
tougher in the securities law area, but that is only fitting given the
overarching purposes of protecting investors and the integrity of
the public securities markets.
426
Some in the private bar have been critical of the SEC's pre-
SOXA efforts in this regard. They have argued that the agency
lacked both a statutory mandate to establish standards for the prac-
tice of law (no longer true) and any particular expertise in
establishing or applying such standards (debatable), and they
point out the absence of any uniform nationwide standard on the
very issues of confidentiality and disclosure that were at issue in
both National Student Marketing and Carter &Johnson. Critics have
also pointed to the in terrorem effect of an SEC Rule 2(e) proceed-
ing as potentially depriving clients of the detached and
disinterested legal advice to which they are entitled.427
The SEC, to its credit, has been fastidious in acknowledging the
concerns expressed by the private bar. Indeed, even after its initial
regulatory proposal pursuant to SOXA § 307, the Commission
backed off its "noisy withdrawal" proposal with alacrity when, not
unexpectedly, it drew fire from the ABA and virtually the entire
universe of elite law firms engaged in securities law practice.
It would seem, therefore, that the bar's criticisms of the SEC are
unjustified; in fact, the concern here is not regulatory zeal but
regulatory capture. The SEC has traditionally been very deferential
424. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls,
93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party En-
forcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986). Bouncer gatekeepers, as the rubric so
vividly suggests, would show would-be wrongdoers the door by denying them professional
assistance. Chaperone gatekeepers, by contrast, would "detect and disrupt misconduct in an
unfolding relationship with enforcement targets...." Id. at 63.
425. This is clearly the stance adopted by Carter & Johnson and Guffreund. See supra
notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
426. For an interesting discussion of gatekeeper responsibilities and the suitability of
securities lawyers for that role, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney As Gatekeeper: An Agenda
for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. RaV. 1293 (2003).
427. See Lorne & Callcott, supra note 154, at 1302 n.38 (citing remarks of former SEC
Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman).
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to the private securities bar, particularly the Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities of the ABA's Business Law Section. 428 This
is due, in part, to the revolving door nature of that practice. A re-
view of the active members of that segment of the bar over the past
twenty years will yield several former SEC Commissioners, several
former General Counsels, and several former directors of the Divi-
sions of Corporation Finance, Investment Management, and
Enforcement. Still, whatever one's view of the agency-ogre or
cream puff-it is apparent that adequate prescriptive and en-
forcement roles with respect to the professional obligations of
attorneys are better performed elsewhere.
At the other extreme have been the FDIC421 (at least when acting
in its receivership capacity) and, of course, the OTS. The latter's
most notorious escapade, the Kaye, Scholer asset freeze, has been
discussed ad nauseam, but it is nonetheless exemplary of the OTS's
proclivity toward exploiting federal enforcement authority in order
to bring to bear the awesome power of the federal government in a
manner that is ad hoc and retributive43 rather than being part of
428. That committee, although not necessarily any longer the largest in the Business
Law Section, has had dominant influence over the policies and politics of the Section by
virtue of the fact that a preponderance of the chairs of the Section have come out of that
committee.
429. In FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 669 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), reaffirmed on remand, 61 F.3d 17 (9th Cir. 1995), the receiver
of a failed thrift was held to have stated a claim for relief against a law firm that had assisted
the thrift in two real estate syndications offered to investors. When the private placement
was made, the thrift was in unsound financial condition; its officers had fraudulently over-
valued assets, embezzled funds, and generally "cooked the books." The complaint alleged
that O'Melveny, knowing of the recent resignations of the thrift's prior auditors and outside
law firm, did not question the auditors or the law firm about the reasons for their resigna-
tions, or federal or state regulators or the thrift's financial officer (who was in it up to his
neck and who, if asked, would certainly have lied) about the thrift's financial status before
giving legal opinions and doing other work that assisted a service company owned by the
thrift in soliciting investors for a real estate project. After the thrift failed, the FDIC, acting
as conservator, rescinded the investments and was assigned the investors' claims against
O'Melveny. The receiver then brought suit against O'Melveny for professional negligence
and negligent misrepresentation.
430. OTS has a well-deserved reputation in the federal judiciary for abusing its power,
inter alia, by making arguments that are "barely intelligible," "convoluted," "capricious," and
by attempting "to circumvent the statutory language ... [because of] excessive zeal."
Wachtel v. Office of Thrift Supervisor, 982 F.2d 581, 585-86 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See also Kaplan
v. Office of Thrift Supervisor, 104 F.3d 417, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding OTS acting direc-
tor's rejection of ALJ's recommended decision to dismiss the case to be "based on
unreasonable judgments which could be characterized as arbitrary and capricious" and
treating the respondent as a "scapegoat."); Fisher, Neither Evaders Nor Apologists, supra note
47, at 357 n.44 (reviewing above cases and detailing unprofessional attempt by OTS to avoid
decision on the merits of Vacancies Act challenge to agency action).
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any thoughtful, organized approach to regulating the practice of
law. Kaye, Scholer is not, however, the only example; there were
many others during the S&L crisis, and all shared the same defect
in terms of the regulation of lawyers and the prescription of stan-
dards of professional conduct. Namely, an innate conflict of
interest exists on the part of the agency prone to impose novel ob-
ligations and novel theories of lawyer regulation upon counsel ex
post in an effort to deputize the private bar to assist the agency in
performing its appointed regulatory tasks. This is a compelling ar-
gument for prohibiting piecemeal regulation of lawyers by federal
agencies with a regulatory axe to grind and preferring the inde-
pendent federal agency approach offered in Part V.
An example of comparatively recent vintage demonstrates the
danger of federal agency abuse quite clearly. Long after the S&L
crisis had subsided, OTS commenced an enforcement action
against a law firm (the "Firm"),431 which had previously been en-
gaged as special counsel by a thrift institution ("Thrift")4 3 2 in
connection with its conversion from mutual to stock form. The
gravamen of the OTS's allegations was that a prior transfer (which
antedated, by two years, The Firm's representation of Thrift as
conversion counsel) of depositors, without notice, from Thrift to a
separate, stock subsidiary (which was itself also a depository institu-
tion), as well as "identity blurring" (i.e., failure to maintain separate
corporate existence) between Thrift and that subsidiary, consti-
tuted violations of OTS regulations that were or should have been
known to the Firm, as conversion counsel, and should have been
disclosed or otherwise acknowledged in the conversion application
the Firm prepared.
The Firm, like many specializing in thrift regulatory work, repre-
sented a large number of depository institutions and their affiliates
431. OTS derives its enforcement authority from Section 8 of the Federal Deposit In-
surance Act, which allows the bank and thrift regulatory agencies to prosecute a variety of
administrative enforcement actions against insured depository institutions and against "insti-
tution affiliated parties" ("APs"). For a non-in-house lawyer to be an IAP, the lawyer must
fall within one of two paragraphs of the statutory definition. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(u) (3) (2002)
(defining IAP to include "any... person... who participates in the conduct of the affairs of
an insured depository institution"; or 1813(u) (4) (displaying intention of Congress to impli-
cate lawyers but only where the lawyer "knowingly or recklessly participates in (A) any
violation of any law or regulation; (B) any breach of fiduciary duty; or (C) any unsafe or
unsound practice, which caused ... more than a minimal financial loss to, or a significant
adverse effect on, the insured depository institution").
432. The author was engaged by The Firm and its counsel as an expert witness on the
ethical responsibilities of counsel representing depository institutions. Factual information
set forth herein is derived from several sources, including the allegations made by OTS and
submissions made to OTS on behalf of the Firm by its counsel.
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(including predominantly savings associations and savings and loan
holding companies) before the federal regulatory agencies, and
the bulk of its practice was before the OTS. The adverse publicity
and opprobrium, together with erosion of the working relationship
with OTS staff, that attend an OTS enforcement action posed so
significant a threat to the continued viability of The Firm and its
practice that the Firm, as a practical matter, had no choice but to
capitulate (as Kaye, Scholer had done, though without any showing
remotely comparable to that in Kaye, Scholer of culpability on the
part of the Firm).
Such an enforcement action was, in this author's view, inconsis-
tent with sound regulatory policy. Lawyers in private practice are
not guarantors or insurers of the accuracy of factual information
that has been furnished by their clients and, absent some palpable
basis for suspecting the existence of material omissions by a client,
had-both under then-applicable law and even now under
SOXA-no professional or ethical responsibility to ferret out such
omissions. The Firm was not the outside general counsel to Thrift
but merely special counsel engaged in connection with a mutual to
stock conversion-essentially a securities offering. Here, the mat-
ters that OTS complained were undisclosed in the conversion
application the Firm drafted were considerably outside the scope
of the Firm's engagement and, in fact, antedated by several years
the Firm's involvement with this client. The lawyers who worked on
the conversion had no reason to know (or even suspect) the facts
in question and no duty under existing rules of professional re-
sponsibility to ferret them out. Yet, the threatened enforcement
action would have imposed what is tantamount to strict liability
because they failed to discover those facts.
These problems, and the institutional incentives that give rise to
them, would be eliminated if federal regulation of the practice of
law were divorced from agencies with other substantive federal
regulatory jurisdiction and responsibilities. Imagine how an inde-
pendent and unbiased agency might analyze this situation.
To begin with, law is "intended to channel and regulate behav-
ior, as well as to enable complex forms of interaction, cooperation,
and reliance. To function properly law must be known by those it is
intended to regulate or enable. In our densely populated, techno-
logically and socially complex society, much of the law cannot be
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known (and thus cannot be effective) without the assistance of a
lawyer.
4 3
To perform his function, the lawyer must have access to the
facts. For these, he is generally dependent upon the client, but cli-
ents do not always cooperate fully: they may tell the story, but not
the whole story.3 4 There are many reasons for this and not all of
them are in any way "sinister" or motivated by a desire on the part
of the client to violate or evade the law. Fear, uncertainty, denial,
repression, conflict aversion, or simply memory lapse are all possi-
ble factors, as is the degree of the client's sophistication and prior
experience with the legal system.
These difficulties are magnified, of course, when representing a
corporate client because no one individual normally possesses all
the pertinent information. As a result, in a wide variety of business
lawyering contexts, including mutual to stock conversions, the law-
yer is forced to rely to a large extent upon a large and diverse
group of client representatives for information. The due diligence
process is not intended to be a comprehensive factual audit of a
corporate client's business. Nor, in the case of a regulated client, is
it intended to be a regulatory audit; it is rather an exercise in ob-
taining the types of information that the lawyer, by dint of training
and experience in prior transactions, knows will be pertinent to
the particular type of engagement.
Back now to the case: The Firm sent Thrift a detailed, multi-
page, single-spaced Due Diligence Information Checklist by means
of which the Firm sought production of and access to a compre-
hensive array of factual information about Thrift and its
subsidiaries and service corporations. OTS did not deny that the
types and quantity of information sought by the Firm were clearly
consistent with professional standards with respect to securities of-
ferings. Thrift failed to furnish the "whole" truth to the Firm by
omitting to provide information relating to Thrift's earlier failures
to provide depositors in its subsidiary with the requisite disclosures.
Nor did the Firm find anything in prior OTS reports of examina-
tion that would fairly have put the Firm on notice of this lurking
issue.
To the extent, however, that OTS was suggesting that its reports
of examination should have put the Firm on notice of the regula-
433. Stephen Pepper, Why Confidentiality?, 23 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 331, 334 (1998) (ci-
tations omitted).
434. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAwYERS' ETHICS 147-160
(1990).
435. See Pepper, supra note 433, at 335.
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tory infractions at Thrift, then OTS was already aware of the in-
formation its enforcement staff was seeking to penalize the Firm
for not disclosing! Thus, had the Firm been able to read the tea
leaves from an isolated and ambiguous statement in a single ex-
amination report to infer the existence of the undisclosed facts, as
OTS appeared to suggest the Firm should have, then the Firm
would have structured the proposed conversion along the lines
that the Firm ultimately did recommend once it became aware of
the facts concerning the depositors of the subsidiary. Disclosure of
the reasons for structuring the transaction that way (which un-
doubtedly would have generated complaints from the depositors of
Thrift, as opposed to those of the subsidiary) would simply have
informed OTS of that which it already knew. 436 Nothing in the con-
cept of a "higher calling" requires this of an attorney. Given the
OTS's formidable array of supervision, oversight, and monitoring
powers via the examination process, it is clear that the agency does
not need any outside law firm, much less one serving as special
counsel with respect to 'a limited engagement, to serve as an addi-
tional, independent source of disclosure. Indeed, in an ironic echo
of what was argued-inappropriately, because of its interference
with the examination process-by Kaye, Scholer, the breadth of
that very regulatory and supervisory power enjoyed by the OTS
suggests that depository institutions may have an especially compel-
ling need for independent advice and representation from counsel
who are untainted by conflicts of interest that arise from applica-
tion of some ex ante duty to the federal government.
An independent agency, acting prospectively and by rulemaking,
would not be operating with the handicap of OTS's regulatory
437blinders or other institutional problems. Uncritically imposing a
"duty to investigate/ guarantee" type of obligation upon outside
counsel to depository institutions would likely end up being ex-
tremely counterproductive from the regulatory policy point of
view. While superficially attractive to an agency laboring under the
difficulties of regulating with scarce resources, placing a lawyer
under a duty to anticipate and address each and every regulatory
436. Indeed, even after OTS suspended the conversion, the Firm continued to work
with the client and the OTS Staff to find ways to salvage the transaction. That course of con-
duct scarcely counsels invoking the awesome equitable enforcement power of the United
States Government.
437. One might suggest, by way of example, an overstaffed enforcement division des-
perately searching, in a time of overall prosperity and regulatory compliance, for ways to
justify their continued employment.
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concern that conceivably might arise-even when the facts known
to the lawyer do not suggest any regulatory impropriety-would
ultimately be self-defeating if, as a consequence, one were to di-
minish the ability of the lawyer to provide the client with the
progressive representation that has become so important a part of
modern business lawyering.
That is particularly true in the highly complex framework of
regulated industries, where Congress, in demarcating the balance
of interests effected by its regulatory enactments, often deliberately
chooses to leave open certain areas of the law for future develop-
ment through experimentation and innovation. For example,
many of these "gaps" in our balkanized system of depository insti-
tution regulation represent conscious, open-textured areas of legal
ambiguity where imaginative lawyering has enabled clients to adapt
to changing market conditions.3
Nothing here should be read as suggesting that a lawyer would
or should be permitted to ignore applicable law or regulations or
aid or counsel actions that the lawyer has reason to believe would
be in violation of such law or regulations. If, however, the conse-
quence of honest but mistaken lawyering were that a federal
agency could subsequently argue that the lawyer had violated a
duty to the agency, or if the agency could argue that the lawyer had
a duty to ferret out material omissions by the client even where the
lawyer has no reason to suspect the existence of such omissions, a
prudent lawyer would be driven to one of two courses of action. He
could either refuse to represent certain categories of client, or con-
tinue to represent them43 9 but ensure that any advice or assistance
given, whenever there was any conceivable doubt regarding the
state of the law, should always err in the direction of the views the
lawyer believes the agency might take. Neither option is appropri-
ate to a legal system such as ours that embraces-indeed depends
upon-robust and progressive (albeit responsible) legal represen-
tation of clients, whether they be individuals or corporations.
438. See supra note 229.
439. Such continued representation would doubtless entail significantly higher billing
rates to compensate for the drastically increased liability risk as well as pressure from (or
perhaps withdrawal of coverage for this area of practice by) malpractice insurance carriers.
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V. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE
The solution of partial federal regulation suggested herein ne-
cessitates the creation by Congress of a new federal agency to
regulate the practice of law in key areas of federal interest, starting
with such subjects as conflicts of interest, the appropriate scienter
standard and the duty (if any) to investigate, and the duty of confi-
dentiality. An agency will benefit from the ability to have in-house
expertise, the lack of which can be detrimental to a legislature
from the public choice point of view. 440 This new federal agency
would be completely independent of other regulatory agendas
within the executive branch (or, for that matter, the judicial
branch) and would consider individual topics with the broad per-
spective that the organized bar, at its best, has brought to
professional responsibility issues, only without suffering from the
innate conflict of the bar's self-interest. The agency would also be
able to consider the propriety of special or more highly nuanced
contextual rules for lawyers in certain areas of practice, rather than
the largely "one-size-fits-all" approach of the current legal ethics
regime that proceeds from an antiquated and no longer true (if it
ever was) view of lawyering as a unitary profession. For ease of ref-
erence, and with due regard to its purpose in salvaging the legal
profession from the "flood" of scandal and disillusionment, call the
proposed agency the Attorney Regulatory Commission, or "ARC."
ARC would be established as a multi-member commission, to-
gether with a modest staff of attorneys and investigators. It
need not be a particularly large bureaucracy, at least not initially
(and hopefully not ever). Its initial mandate would be to prescribe
uniform, national standards of attorney conduct in corpo-
441
rate, commercial, tax, and financial regulatory law (the latter an
440. See WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
CONGRESS AND THE STATES 296-98 (7th ed. 1989) (relating capacity to resist political pres-
sures of organized groups with their lobbyists and experts for hire to a legislature's
independent analytical and information-gathering resources).
441. Some might object that corporate law, being a creature of state law, is ill-suited to
national, uniform standards. Yet, whatever differences may persist in the substantive laws
states enact to govern the corporations they charter, the practice of those representing those
corporate entities is already fairly uniform, as evidenced by the proliferation, under the
aegis of the ABA Business Law Section, of "model" corporate documents such as stock pur-
chase and asset purchase agreements. Indeed, state corporate law itself is converging toward
uniform standards, with the adoption by 37 states (now 38, with the November 2003 revision
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intentionally broad category, encompassing, at a minimum, securi-
ties, banking, savings and loan, credit union, insurance, and
commodities regulation) and to enforce compliance with those
standards.
As a general proposition, administrative agencies have proved to
be remarkably effective from the public choice perspective.442 Nev-
ertheless, a federal agency tasked with regulation of lawyers would,
of necessity, be heavily populated by lawyers, and the threat of en-
hanced levels of access to such decisionmakers by the organized
bar and of promulgation of regulations unduly favorable to the bar
must be addressed. 443 Fashionable though it may be to say that law
is politics, 4 4 ARC needs to be insulated from both direct lobbying
and from the blandishments of the political branches of govern-
ment as influenced by various interest groups (indirect
lobbying) ." Even apart from the shadows of the Keating Five and
others, the preceding discussion is rife with examples of the politi-
of the Massachusetts corporate laws) of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act. In any
event, to the extent that minor differences in substantive law might affect the ethical stan-
dards to be applied to particular lawyers, the contextual regulatory model proposed for ARC
would duly take those into account.
442. See, e.g., David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000); David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87
CORNELL L. REv. 397 (2002).
443. Contrast Professor Zacharias' expectations if Congress were directly enacting fed-
eral rules of attorney conduct:
[O]ne would expect Congress to endure heavy lobbying by (1) lawyer organizations
seeking to limit intrusions on lawyer discretion, and (2) corporate clients that can use
lawyers best when they are not obligated to third-party societal interests. In adopting
its models, the ABA confronted similar pressures, but was able to convince members
that significant self-regulation was necessary to fend off more intrusive outside regu-
lation. At the point the bar faces outside regulation, it has little incentive to
compromise. If Congress's main lobbying constituency is the bar, one would expect
Congress to heed the bar's demand that Congress adopt the lowest common de-
nominator-the least restrictive provisions-among the existing state rules.
Zacharias, supra note 404, at 377 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 81) ("To the extent lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occa-
sion for government regulation is obviated."). When mentioning the lobbying influences
that had been brought to bear upon the ABA during the crafting of the Model Rules,
Zacharias cites, inter alia, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J.
1239, 1252-54 (1991); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on
Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L. REv. 689, 703-14 (1981); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar
Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 703-
23 (1989).
444. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIER-
ARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983).
445. As reported frequently in the media, the trial lawyers were highly influential dur-
ing the Clinton Administration.
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cization of attorney regulation. In order to be successful as a regu-
lator, ARC must therefore be inoculated, to the maximum extent
possible, from these and other political pressures. In short, ARC
needs to be an "independent" agency.
Attorney regulation, like the regulation of financial markets that
have suffered by its laxity, presents a particularly compelling case
for an expert and truly independent agency (along the lines that
the Federal Reserve is independent). The regulatory task calls into
play the classic justifications for an independent agency: (1) to
professionalize and provide expertise to regulatory policy; (2) to
provide a stable and consistent basis for regulatory continuity; (3)
to allow for constant regulatory adaptation to changing conditions;
and (4) to eliminate the political influence of special interests. 446
To ensure the independence of an ARC, the terms of the commis-
sion members must be of sufficient duration (certainly longer than
a single Presidential administration). The size of the commission
should be large enough to ensure diversity from both the political
perspective (no more than a bare majority of commissioners be-
longing to any one political party) and the interest perspective
(some should be lawyers, some should be judges, and some should
be laypersons). The commitment of the Executive and Congress to
the agency's independence must be strong. Compensation for
members and staff attorneys must be reasonably competitive. Fi-
nally, the agency's funding must, to the maximum extent possible,
be autonomous and disjunct from the congressional appropria-
447tions process.
Immunizing the agency from undue political influence does
not, however, make its functions apolitical. Indeed, it is vital that
competing interests have an opportunity to be heard and that their
input be solemnly weighed and considered in the process of fash-
ioning sensible, coherent ethical rules. Furthermore, given that an
appropriate and effective enforcement mechanism for those rules
must be in place, considerations of fundamental fairness dictate
that the rules need to be prospective in application. Attorneys cer-
tainly ought not to be held liable on the basis of ethical
446. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
137-43 (1955).
447. Much of the agency's budget could be supported by annual "bar association"-type
dues paid by lawyers in the practice areas covered by the ARC's jurisdiction. These funds
would have to be declared by Congress not to be government funds or appropriated mon-
eys, as it has done for Federal Reserve assessments against member banks. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 244 (2000).
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standards-promulgated with the wisdom of hindsight-that did
not exist at the time of the conduct complained of and were un-
foreseen by the lawyers involved.
Thus, in promulgating national standards of attorney conduct,
ARC would proceed solely by rulemaking. The modus operandi, pref-
erably, would be notice and comment rulemaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ,4  though negotiated rule-
making could conceivably be an effective alternative in certain
matters.445 Such rulemaking could, in appropriate instances, in-
clude holding public hearings for the purpose of taking testimony
and gathering "legislative" facts from a variety of disparate inter-
ests. The rules, once adopted, could then be supplemented by
agency interpretations, which would be available online at the
agency's website and published periodically (not less frequently
than annually) in a compilation of such interpretations in the Fed-
eral Register and maintained in the Code of Federal Regulations,
and accompanied by a provision imposing sanctions on those who
violate the rules.4'
448. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). This suggestion is intended to eliminate the possibility of es-
tablishing standards by adjudication. Cf SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (giving
agencies discretion to choose either rulemaking or adjudication in the absence of a congres-
sional directive to the contrary). Rulemaking enjoys several advantages over adjudication:
prospective application, general applicability, and openness to participation by all interested
parties. See William D. Araiza, Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence Over
Rulemaking, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 611, 616 (2002) (noting comparative advantages of rulemak-
ing as "common wisdom").
449. In normal rulemaking, only the agency drafts the contents of the proposed rule. In
negotiated rulemaking, authorized under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-648, 104 Star. 4969 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 581 et seq. (2001)), notice of that choice
of rulemaking method will be published in the Federal Register, along with "a description of
the subject and scope of the rule to be developed," a listing of "interests likely to be signifi-
candy affected by the rule," and the "persons proposed to represent such interests." 5 U.S.C.
§ 584(a) (2000). Members of the public or interest groups not so proposed, but who "will be
significantly affected by a proposed rule and who believe that their interest[s] will not be
adequately represented ... may apply for, or nominate another person for, membership on
the negotiated rulemaking committee. ... " Id. § 584(b). The agency is then only a member
of that committee, the meetings of which are run by a "facilitator" who "impartially aids in
the discussions and negotiations." Id. § 582(4). This process will produce a rule only on the
basis of consensus, defined by statute as "unanimous concurrence among the interests rep-
resented .... Id. § 582(2). Whether or not to use this process, or to proceed by normal
notice and comment rulemaking, would be entirely within ARC's discretion.
450. For the agency's rules and interpretations to be assured of receiving judicial Chev-
ron deference, the congressional delegation of power to the agency should explicitly include
the authority to make rules with the force of law. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576 (2000); see also United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (both holding that Chevron
deference applies only to agency interpretations that have the "force of law"). Moreover,
Mead explicates that agencies act with the force of law only if Congress intended to delegate
authority for them to act in that way. 533 U.S. at 226-27. For an interesting argument that
much federal legislation since the New Deal operated under a "convention" whereby rule-
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Disciplinary mechanisms could consist of a variety of administra-
tive enforcement proceedings, ranging from cease and desist
actions, to disbarment (either permanent or temporary) from one
or more areas of practice within the ARC's jurisdiction, to orders to
make restitution to clients or victims. The advantage of enforce-
ment by an independent body like the ARC is that it removes the
omnipresent taint of unfairness that lingers over enforcement or
disciplinary actions brought by a regulator with substantive juris-
diction over the practice area (e.g., the SEC, the OTS). Full due
process rights would be afforded attorneys who wished to contest
ARC enforcement proceedings, with ultimate review by a federal
court of appeals based on traditional APA standards. Final en-
forcement orders of the ARC (whether consented to or imposed
after unsuccessful contesting by the attorney respondent) would be
enforceable by the agency in federal district court, and copies
would be forwarded to the state bar authorities of the jurisdictions
where the attorney respondent is admitted for such further action,
if any, as they might deem appropriate. In certain cases, ARC, after
a preliminary investigation, would also be empowered to make re-
ferrals to the Department of Justice, federal agencies with
substantive jurisdiction, and state disciplinary boards.
As an example of how interpretive guidance could be of enor-
mous benefit to the bar, consider structuring. Structuring
transactions is an important component of the skill set vital to the
practices of a broad range of tax, corporate, and regulatory law-
yers. As with any element of the lawyer's armory, structuring is
susceptible to abuse. Thus, it seems appropriate to distinguish be-
tween suitable and unsuitable applications of this technique.
Suppose lawyers are working on a proposed merger of two bank-
ing organizations-each, for the sake of simplicity, consisting of a
bank wholly owned by a holding company with no other subsidiar-
ies-that are directly competing with each other in the same
geographic market. The merger will therefore have an effect on
competition and so implicates antitrust policy. That policy, in bank-
ing regulation, is embodied in provisions of the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHC Act) and the Bank Merger Act.451 Were it not
making grants had the force of law only if coupled with a statutory provision imposing sanc-
tions on violators, but could only be procedural or interpretive in the absence of such a
statutory sanctions provision, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules
With the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REv. 467 (2002).
451. The antitrust standards of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2002), have
been engrafted nearly verbatim into both Section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act,
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for the presence of the two holding companies, the transaction
would clearly be governed by the latter statute, which gives the par-
ties flexibility, depending upon how the transaction is structured,
with respect to being able to preselect the federal agency that will
have approval authority over the merger. To have that choice-
which would be among the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (the "Comptroller"), the Federal Reserve Board (the "Fed"),
and the FDIC-one would need to be rid of at least one of the
holding companies. Otherwise, approval would have to be pursu-
ant to the BHC Act, which eliminates any choice of agency
decisionmaker, as the Fed exercises sole jurisdiction under that
Act.
Suppose further it turns out that not being able to avail oneself
of the choice under the Bank Merger Act would be outcome de-
terminative because of the Fed's (deserved) reputation as the most
conservative of the three agencies on competitive issues (i.e., the
least likely to approve the transaction). To avoid the Fed, then, is a
consummation devoutly to be wished for the parties and their
counsel. They must therefore figure out a way to rid themselves of
at least one holding company. Liquidation as part of the merger
will not do as, under the BHC Act, the Fed would have a hook into
the overall transaction because of its approval authority over such
liquidations. The best approach then is a multi-step process: (i) to
organize de novo a subsidiary of the bank (Diagram 1), (ii) merge
the holding company with and into that subsidiary-i.e., merge the
grandparent into the grandchild (Diagram 2), and (iii) merge
the two banks (Diagram 3) in a transaction subject to the Bank
Merger Act and structured so as to be subject to approval by either
the Comptroller or the FDIC. Finally, if desired, the subsidiary of
the now merged bank can be liquidated, yielding the final struc-
ture (Diagram 4).
12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2002), and the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c). See generally
KEITH R. FISHER, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS OF BANKS AND SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS §§ 3.2-
3.3 (1993).
452. Merging the holding company into the bank (i.e., parent into child) is not possible
here, because state and federal law generally permit banks to merge only with others of their
kind and not artificially with general business corporations (like holding companies).
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Why is this an example of suitable structuring? After all, the sole
purpose is to avoid the Fed! Nonetheless, this sort of structuring is
an appropriate exercise of the lawyers' skills to maximize the likeli-
hood of regulatory approval for what both clients want to
accomplish, and, most important perhaps, there are no adverse side
effects. No third party is injured. Avoiding the Fed does not in any
way alter the regulatory burden imposed on the parties to the pro-
posed merger. Since all three agencies must apply the identical
[VOL. 37:41140
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statutory competitive impact standard, federal antitrust policy will be
fully vindicated.4 s Moreover, the structural opportunity is one that
Congress expressly provided, and so exploiting it can scarcely be
said to be inimical to the spirit of the law or antithetical to public
policy. In short, use of the technique here effects avoidance but not
evasion.
By contrast, examples of unsuitable structuring are plentiful, and
some have already been discussed, e.g., the Enron SPEs and myriad
instances during the S&L crisis in which law firms structured trans-
actions that had no other purpose than evasion of a variety of
regulatory burdens: federal regulations, lending policies, and agency
orders or supervisory agreements. 4 54 Even more important, these
structurings led with depressing regularity to inordinate amounts of
economic harm being visited upon innocent third parties.
Another fruitful area for consideration is competence. Profes-
sional competence is so fundamental 455 that it is seldom discussed;
yet, the instances of lawyers and law firms undertaking representa-
tions they had no business accepting are astonishingly numerous.
Competence can be measured by knowledge and experience, but it
can also be affected by the existence of institutional factors that
render lawyers who are concededly competent by the first yardstick
incompetent as a matter of law. Problems in the knowledge/
453. The language of the BHC Act and the Bank Merger Act are identical in this re-
gard. Furthermore, the Bank Merger Act provides for views on the transaction's competitive
impact to be sent to the decision-making agency by the other agencies and by the Justice
Department. The latter also has authority to bring suit to enjoin the merger as being anti-
competitive, and, to allow for that possibility, the statute imposes a 30-day stay on the parties'
ability to consummate the merger after receiving the decision-making agency's approval.
454. Many of these instances were publicly aired in litigation commenced by FSLIC or
FDIC as receivers for failed depository institutions. See, e.g., FDIC v. Wise, 758 F.Supp. 1414
(D. Colo. 1991); Complaint at 14, FDIC v. Shrader & York, No. H-91-1372 (S.D. Tex. filed
May 17, 1991) (on file with author) (complaint ultimately dismissed as time barred). See
FDIC v. Shrader & York, 777 F.Supp. 533 (S.D. Tex. 1991), affd, 991 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1993);
Complaint at 6-11, FDIC v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, No. A-90-CA-925 (W.D. Tex. filed
Oct. 30, 1990) (on file with author) (case ultimately resolved by Jones, Day's payment of a
substantial settlement). See also Complaint at 13-16, FDIC v. Bauman, No. CA3-90-614-H
(N.D. Tex. filed Mar. 9, 1990) (on file with author); Complaint at 6-13, FSLIC v. Lensing,
Gravel, Rosenzweig, Christen & LeBeau, P.C., No. 89-329 (M.D. La. filed Apr. 28, 1989) (on
file with author); Complaint, FSLIC v. Fazio, No. 89-328 (M.D. La. filed Apr. 28, 1989) (on
file with author); Amended Complaint, FSLIC v. Dreyer and Traub, No. 88-279-CIV-J-16
(M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 8, 1988) (on file with author); Complaint, FSLIC v. Vineyard, No. CA5-
87-124 (N.D. Tex. filedJune 17, 1987) (on file with author).
455. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) (stating that the duty of com-
petent representation owed by the lawyer to the client is so fundamental that it can never be
waived by the client). That spills over into a limitation on the extent to which a client may
limit the scope of an engagement. Id. at R. 1.2.
1141
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
experience category crop up frequently with litigators. Criminal
lawyers often accept engagements to represent insiders in securi-
ties and bank regulatory enforcement proceedings. While it is true
that such enforcement proceedings may, from time to time, lead to
criminal referrals, thereby making the advice of a seasoned crimi-
nal lawyer useful, the majority of criminal lawyers lack the requisite
securities or financial regulatory expertise to be able to represent
the client competently in the civil enforcement context. Similarly,
Kaye, Scholer, with no in-house expertise in savings and loan regu-
lation, had no business accepting the representation of Lincoln
against its regulators. Institutional problems have been encoun-
tered both with and without the accompanying specter of conflict
of interest. Clearly, Vinson & Elkins' undertaking the engagement
to conduct an internal investigation implicating its own prior work
for Enron rendered the firm legally incompetent by reason of the
obvious conflict. Other law firms have faced institutional pressures
of a different sort that have compromised their abilities. 6 While
competence is an ethical obligation clearly identified in the Model
Rules, the competitive pressures of business generation have
caused it to be routinely ignored; the failure of bar authorities to
bring any disciplinary actions in connection with such violations
suggests the need for, at a minimum, sterner guidance.
Other areas that might benefit from plenary consideration via
ARC rulemaking include:
* the existence (and if so, the scope) of a duty of in-
quiry;
457
* the proper scope of the duties of confidentiality and
rectification of client fraud, a pervasive problem in
the scandals discussed above;
458
456. E.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holland & Knight, 832 F.Supp. 1532, 1534 (S.D. Fla.
1993) (summarizing RTC allegations of incompetence and disloyalty in law firm's handling
of internal corporate investigation for the notorious Florida S&L, CenTrust).
457. Cf FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 746-47, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (detail-
ing background of allegations that O'Melveny failed to inquire of law firm that it replaced
and of accounting firm that client had likewise replaced the reasons therefor and conclud-
ing that these were suspicious enough circumstances as to mandate further inquiry), rev'd on
other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (invalidating decision predicated on federal common law),
remanded to 61 F.3d 17 (9th Cir. 1995) (reinstating decision, this time unambiguously
grounded in California law); FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir. 1992) (upholding jury
verdict against law firm engaged to investigate claims that bank president had conspired to
defraud the bank when lawyers merely accepted the president's explanation and made no
further inquiry).
458. One obvious advantage to federalizing the rnles in this area is that it will no longer
subject ethical norms to the vagaries of state variations on the text of model rules, thereby
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* problems relating to conflicts of interest and the ob-
ligation to exercise independent professional
judgment;45 9
* the obligation to monitor or supervise the behavior
or work product of law firm attorneys;
" the circumstances (if any) under which it would be
appropriate to adopt Ted Schneyer's suggestion of
disciplining entire law firms;
461
* identification of appropriate gatekeeping functions
(e.g., promulgating standards with respect to the
rendering of legal opinions used to facilitate or en-
able transactions) .462
The foregoing description of the proposed ARC, its structure
and authority, and types of ethical issues it could profitably address,
eliminating situations, such as took place in the O.P.M. scandal, where a minority rule in a
particular jurisdiction can so tie the lawyers' hands that they can continue representing a
client they know has previously used their services to commit fraud, even when they suspect
(but do not yet "know") that the client means to do so again in the future.
459. In addition to the obvious problems of V&E and K&E with Enron, Fastow, and the
SPEs, the S&L crisis provided a multitude of examples. See, e.g., FDIC v. Shrader & York, No.
H-91-1372 (S.D. Tex. filed May 17, 1991) (on file with author) (attorneys allegedly acted as
borrowers in transaction designed to disguise loss for another client); FDIC v. Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue, No. A-90-CA-925 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 30, 1990) (on file with author) (firm
represented both thrift and its service company); FDIC v. Martin, No-90-409-CIV-T-17B
(M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 6, 1990) (on file with author) (firm simultaneously represented thrift
and borrowers); FDIC v. Bauman, No. CA3-90-614-H (N.D. Tex. filed Mar. 19, 1990) (on file
with author) (firm simultaneously represented sole shareholder of thrift, thrift, and holding
company); FDIC v. Vaughn, No. CA3-90-1282-D (N.D. Tex. filed June 4, 1990) (on file with
author) (attorneys and related entities allegedly received nearly $55 million in loans from
thrift at the same time that they were representing thrift); Order to Cease and Desist and for
Affirmative Relief, In reAlan J. Berkeley and Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, OTS AP 92-106 (Oct. 5,
1992) (on file with author) (firm simultaneously represented insured savings bank and its
holding company in connection with incomplete and misleading regulatory filings on plan
of collateral substitution that caused loss to savings bank in excess of $23 million).
460. Recall the injunctive relief denied by the court in National Student Marketing with
respect to LBL's implementing internal policies and procedures to assure future compliance
with its obligations as counsel in securities matters. See supra note 110. See also FDIC v. Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue, No. A-90-CA-925 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 30, 1990) (on file with author);
FDIC v. Wise, No. 90-F-1688 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 21, 1990) (on file with author); FDIC v.
Martin, No-90-408-CIV-T-17B (M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 6, 1990) (on file with author).
461. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1991).
Cf Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large
Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (2002); Julie Rose
O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor Schneyer's Proposa 16
GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2002).
462. There is already federal precedent for this, of course, in the Treasury's Circular
230. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
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is by no means comprehensive, nor was it intended to be. It is not a
blueprint, but rather a thumbnail sketch, of an alternative mecha-
nism for elaboration and enforcement of norms of ethical attorney
conduct. This mechanism, if properly implemented, has the poten-
tial to cauterize the gaping wounds the bar has inflicted upon itself
and upon an unsuspecting public and, one day, to restore the prac-
tice of law to its former status as a learned profession and bring
renewal to the concept of a "higher calling."
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of specialties and subspecialties in law prac-
tice, together with the inadequacies of prevailing ethics regulation
and the vagaries of ethics rules formulations from state to state
have not served well. Manipulation, motivated by politics and self-
interest, of the ideology of the bar to adhere to rules of ethics
predicated on an antiquated and no longer realistic model of a
unified profession has likewise been counterproductive. The mul-
tiplicity of scandals in corporate America over the past 35 years
eloquently attests to that conclusion.
Those in the organized bar who have opposed contextual rules
and challenged the authority of the federal government to bring
enforcement actions have not adequately balanced the needs of
the profession-and the public it serves-against the extent to
which it has been transformed from that outmoded model. Stub-
born refusal to address these changes comprehensively and
constructively has not only demoralized many segments of the legal
community, debased the legal profession in the public's eyes, and
tolerated the sorts of moral indeterminacy that have given rise to
the scandals described herein, but has also tempted federal re-
sponses that are themselves counterproductive and could well lead
to the outright balkanization of the legal profession. The model of
partial federal regulation offered herein is by no means the only,
or necessarily the optimal, solution, but, hopefully, it will spark ad-
ditional discussion and debate that might, with any luck, lead to a
workable system for providing lawyers the solid, thoughtful, and
objective guidance they need to don the legal profession's vener-
able mantle and fulfill its time-honored pledge.
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